John Stuart Mill has come under severe criticism, in some cases even from usual supporters, for his strong position against paternalism. His view is that paternalism, described in today's language as coercive strong direct paternalism, is always wrong. In this paper I argue that paternalism is best construed as an interference with autonomy, or what Mill calls individuality, on grounds of beneficence. I further show that Mill's absolute prohibition against coercive strong direct paternalism, and especially legal paternalism, is correct. I develop four powerful arguments for this conclusion based on Mill's book, On Liberty. The first maintains the supreme worth of individuality and autonomy. The second line of argument, one Mill seemed to think was the strongest, is based on the fear of legal moralism. The third argument holds that the model of good parenting requires non coercive means of control for self-regarding behavior. The final argument might best be described as the dilemma of paternalistic punishment. This argument maintains that punishment for self-regarding conduct on grounds of beneficence undermines the beneficence. I argue that this line of argument is especially powerful against legal paternalism. My conclusion is that, when properly understood, Mill's position on paternalism is perfectly consistent and defensible
