Bycatch Avoidance Under Amendment 80 in the BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish Trawl Fishery. Lowell Wakefield Fisheries Symposium, Anchorage, AK, May 13-16, 2014

Abbott, Joshua

Haynie, Alan

Reimer, Matthew

English

ScholarWorks@UA

Bycatch Avoidance Under Amendment 80 in the BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish Trawl Fishery  Alan HaynieNational Marine Fisheries Service Alaska Fisheries Science Center Matthew ReimerUniversity of Alaska Anchorage Institute of Social and Economic Research Joshua AbbottArizona State University School of Sustainability -  Institutions are pivotal in shaping fishermen incentives - e.g. catch shares and bycatch avoidance-  However, the ability to avoid bycatch depends on technological, biological, and physical aspects of the fishery as well - e.g. “production possibilities” or “targeting ability”Motivation1. Was a new incentive structure (Amendment 80) successful in increasing bycatch avoidance and reducing bycatch rates? 2. Can institutions mask hidden flexibilities and substitution capabilities of fishermen?Two QuestionsChapter 5. The Fishery Production Function: Implications for Fishery Policy Analysis 75hyperbolic distance function has been applied in a fisheries setting to explicitly accountfor the nature of bycatch or bad output production. Third, pre- and post-rationalizationdata allow me to investigate the extent to which previous inferences on targeting ability innon-rights-based fisheries reflect actual technological relationships or are merely the productof the poor incentives for substitution provided without the security of harvesting rights.These findings will be useful in guiding a priori assessment of the impacts of rights-basedmanagement systems on the composition of multi-species catch and production.5.1 The BSAI Groundfish FisheryThe BSAI non-pollock groundfish trawl fishery is a relatively small fleet of catcher processorsthat ply the waters of the Eastern Bering Sea and the Aleutian Islands (Figure 5.1), usingbottom trawl gear to catch a variety of groundfish species.1 Vessels embark on trips of 2-4weeks in length, processing harvested fish onboard. Processing is typically minimal, ofteninvolving heading and gutting the fish, freezing them, and ultimately delivering them tobrokers or wholesalers for direct sale or further processing. Since the early 2000s, twenty-three vessels have actively participated in the fishery, ranging in size from 91 to 295 feet(median=154) with horsepower ranging from 850 to 7000 (median=2250).²0 70 140 210 280 35035Nautical MilesALASKAAleutian IslandsBering Sea²0 25 50 75 100 12512.5Nautical MilesALASKAPribilof Islands Habitat Conservation AreaRed King Crab Savings Area(RKCSA)Red King Crab Savings Subarea (RKCSS)Figure 5.1: Map of Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands -Generally speaking, the BSAI groundfish fishery can be divided into two fisheries: the1“Groundfish” refers to any fish species that live on or near the bottom of the seafloor.Bering Sea and Aleutian IslandsThe BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish FisheryThe BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish FisheryMultispecies fishery- Prohibited Species: • Pacific Halibut • King Crab • Tanner Crab - Primary “Target” Species: • Rock sole • Yellowfin sole • Flathead sole • Pacific cod • Atka mackerel • Pacific ocean perchThe BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish Fishery- Catcher Processor Trawlers • Primarily head and gut • 23 CPs since 2000 • range from 91 to 295 ft2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 201200.511.522.533.5YearGroundfish (100,000 mt)Total Groundfish Harvest in the Amendment 80 BSAI Fishery2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012050100150200250300350Wholesale Value of Groundfish in the Amendment 80 BSAI FisheryYearWholesale Value ($ Millions; 2012)Amendment 80- Goals and Objectives • Increase target catch and profits • Reduce bycatch and discards • Increase flexibility while complying with target and prohibited species TACS- Adopted by NPFMC in 2006 and implemented in 200852668 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 178 / Friday, September 14, 2007 / Rules and Regulations DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 15 CFR Part 902 50 CFR Part 679 [Docket No. 0612242886–7464–03; I.D. 041307D] RIN 0648–AU68 Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Allocating Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands Fishery Resources; American Fisheries Act Sideboards AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), obtained from NMFS Alaska Region, P.O. Box 21668, Juneau, AK 99802, Attn: Ellen Sebastian, and on the NMFS Alaska Region Web site at http:// www.fakr.noaa.gov. The proposed rule to implement Amendment 80 also may be accessed at this Web site. Written comments regarding the burden-hour estimates or other aspects of the collection-of-information requirements contained in this rule may be submitted to NMFS at the above address, and by e-mail to David_Rostker@omb.eop.gov or by fax to 202–395–7285. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Glenn Merrill, 907–586–7228 or glenn.merrill@noaa.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The groundfish fisheries in the BSAI are managed under the FMP. The North vessels; (2) allocating fishery resources among BSAI trawl harvesters in consideration of historic and present harvest patterns and future harvest needs; (3) establishing a LAPP for the non-AFA trawl catcher/processors and authorizing the allocation of groundfish species to harvesting cooperatives to encourage fishing practices with lower discard rates and to improve the opportunity for increasing the value of harvested species while lowering costs; and (4) limiting the ability of non-AFA trawl catcher/processors to expand their harvesting capacity into other fisheries not managed under a LAPP. I. Development of the Program A. History of Bycatch and Discard Reduction Efforts in the BSAI The Council has long recognized the • Pre-Amendment 80 (prior to 2008): - Target species TACs allocated as fleet-wide common pool over multiple “sub-seasons” - e.g. Rock sole A, B, and C seasons, each with their own TACThe BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish Fishery- TAC for prohibited species allocated to each target species fisheries  - e.g. Halibut allocated to each rock sole sub-season - Target fishery closed if either prohibited species or target species TAC reached. !- Target fisheries typically closed due to binding bycatch TAC - Halibut was the primary “choke” speciesChapter 5. The Fishery Production Function: Implications for Fishery Policy Analysis 7802,0004,0006,0008,00010,000Production (mt)3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48Yellowfin Sole Atka Mackerel Cod Rock Sole Flathead Sole Pollock OtherRsole/flathead/other closed (Feb 21)Rsole/flathead/other closed (Apr 13)Rsole/flathead/other closed (Aug 8)yfsole fishery closed (June 8)yfsole fishery open (May 21)yfsole fishery closed (Apr 20)Rsole/flathead/other open (Apr 1)yfsole fishery open (Jul 19)yfsole fishery closed (Aug 8)cod fishery closed (Aug 31)cod fishery open (Jul 19)cod fishery closed (June 8)cod fishery closed (Mar 12)rsole fishery open (June 29)Atka Central AI fishery closed (Feb 18)Atka fishery open (Sep 1)Atka Western AI fishery closed (Oct 6)Atka Central AI fishery closed (Oct 6)Figure 5.2: Weekly production and closures - Weekly production and fishery closuresfor the BSAI groundfish fisheries in 2006. Data is from the weekly production reports.8mented to the BSAI Fishery Management Plan. The provisions of A80 were designed tofacilitate increased target catch and profits, reduced bycatch and discards, and increasedflexibility while complying with target and prohibited species TACs. Implementation of A80made a number of changes to the state of fishery regulations at the time. First, A80 e↵ec-tively limited future entry into the fishery and granted a defined share of the total A80 TACfor the six target species (yellowfin sole, rock sole, flathead sole, Pacific cod, Atka mackerel,and Pacific Ocean perch) to each vessel according to their catch history. Second, vessels couldvest their shares in either a cooperative formed by participating members or in a limitedaccess common pool fishery. Cooperatives are given considerable flexibility as to how catchentitlements are internally allocated. Leasing arrangements and/or non-arms-length meth-ods of internal reallocation are all feasible, and some trading between cooperatives is allowedas well. Vessels that join the limited access fishery vest their shares to a common pool that• Post-Amendment 80 (2008 and after): - Shares of target and prohibited species TACs allocated to each vessel -  Two options: - (i) cooperatives: vest shares into cooperative, with flexibility as to how catch entitlements are internally allocated - (ii) limited access: vest shares into a common pool that is available to all non-cooperative vessels - Initially one cooperative formed (Alaska Seafood Cooperative): 16 vessels, 7 companies    - Since 2011, limited access vessels formed the Alaska Groundfish CooperativeThe BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish Fishery• Also…..Amendment 85 - NPFMC reallocated the BSAI TAC of cod across sectors - Amendment 80 sector received 13.4% of BSAI TAC, considerably lower than historical harvest shareImmediate Impacts: Utilization of Halibut Allocation•Observer Data - Latitude and longitude of tow - Time of tow - Duration and depth of tow - Total catch - Catch compositionObserver Data…..A Deeper Look•100% coverage for vessels > 124ft pre-2008 - approximately 40% species composition sampling•200% coverage for all vessels after 2008 - approximately 100% species composition samplingCatch per unit effort Share of Total CatchHalibut: CPUE and Share of Total CatchWeekly "Bycatch" Share of Total CatchWeekly "Bycatch" Share of Total CatchChapter 5. The Fishery Production Function: Implications for Fishery Policy Analysis 980.2.4.6.8Daily halibut per rock sole2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010excludes outside values010203040Kernel density0 .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06Daily halibut per rock sole2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Figure 5.14: Daily halibut per rock sole - Box-and-whisker plots and kernel-smootheddensities of daily halibut per rock sole.all inputs and other outputs constant. As an approximation of this, Figure 5.15 presentsa scatter plot of daily rock sole and halibut catch and the best fitting quadratic functionwithin a small range of daily fishing duration.25 To account for the di↵erent sampling schemebefore and after A80, I divide daily production and fishing hours by the number of trawlsin a day. The figure clearly displays the very di↵erent subsets of the production set that aresampled before and after A80, reminiscent of the simulated production sets in Chapter 4.The fitted quadratic functions suggest that post-A80 production frontiers lie well above thosepre-A80, indicating that considerably more rock sole is caught for a given level of halibut areA80. While this supports those findings in Figure 5.14, it also indicates that the absoluteproduction of rock sole increased substantially, despite the lower amounts of halibut caught.25I omit the range of daily fishing duration to protect the confidentiality of fishermen. The best quadraticfit was estimated without a constant to be consistent with the idea of null-jointness presented in Chapter 4.Estimation with a constant produced similar patterns.January-April (Rock sole season)Changes in Bycatch IntensityChapter 5. The Fishery Production Function: Implications for Fishery Policy Analysis 99010203040Rock Sole (mt)0 .5 1 1.5 2Halibut (mt)2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010010203040Rock Sole (mt)0 .5 1 1.5 2Halibut (mt)Pre-A80 Post-A80Figure 5.15: Production set in rock sole–halibut space - Sample daily production setin rock sole–halibut space for a small window of daily trawling hours. Production is dividedby the number of trawls in a day.5.5 The output distance functionWhile Figure 5.15 provides some evidence of a shift in the reduced form production fron-tier, the fitted quadratic functions do not qualify as a bonafide production frontier since theproduction of other outputs is not being held constant, nor do they account for other pos-sible mechanisms such as ine ciency or heterogeneity in fishermen. Thus, a more rigorousinvestigation of the transformation function defining the frontier of the PPF is needed. Aspreviously discussed, a transformation function approach to describing technology su↵ersfrom the fact that the transformation function cannot be identified empirically without im-posing some form of normalization. For this reason, ? and ? found it convenient to workwith a normalized form of the transformation function called the output distance function.The output distance function represents the distance an output bundle is away fromChanges in Production PossibilitiesJanuary-April (Rock sole season)Changes in Production FrontiersJanuary-April (Rock sole season)020406080100Rock Sole (mt)0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5Halibut (mt)2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Changes in SubstitutabilityJanuary-April (Rock sole season)Chapter 5. The Fishery Production Function: Implications for Fishery Policy Analysis 125.2.4.6.8sub by2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010.2.4.6.8sub byPre-A80 Post-A80Figure 5.18: Relative substitutability (sub) - MLE estimated mean sub between halibut(b) and rock sole (y) as derived in equation (5.13) for the annual (left) and B&A (right) model.Whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals computed using the delta method.5.8.3 Morishima elasticity of substitution (MES)As discussed in Section 5.6.4, MES provides a measure of the curvature of the PPF, quan-tifying the rate at which MRTby increases as the good to bad ratio (y/b) increases. MESwill take on a negative value if the outputs are substitutes and a positive value if the outputsare complements. We would thus expect MESby to be positive between rock sole and hal-ibut. The size of the value is a measure of the strength of the substitute/complementarityrelationship. In particular, values of MESby that are greater in magnitude imply that amarginal reduction in halibut bycatch will come at a relatively higher opportunity cost.I estimate MESby for both the annual and B&A models, evaluated at the seasonal mean(Figure 5.19).48 As expected, MESby is positive—indicating that rock sole and halibut are48See equation (B.7) in Appendix B.1 for the actual statistic for MESby.How did fishermen reduce bycatch rates?……Coming up next…….To Conclude…• Pre-A80 “targeting abilities” different from post-A80: - Estimated production relationship is a function of technology, biology, and behavioral incentives - Highlights the difficulty in assessing the potential for cross-species substitution in fisheries using ex ante data alone • Fishermen substantially reduced bycatch of halibut under Amendment 80: - New incentive structure altered fishing practices - Substitution potential was latent until management changes altered incentivesChapter 5. The Fishery Production Function: Implications for Fishery Policy Analysis 85.09.105.12.135.15Halibut biomass (millions mt).91.21.51.82.1Biomass (millions mt)2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Year-20-10010203040% difference from 20072005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010YearCod Yellowfine sole Rock sole HalibutFigure 5.4: Biomass estimates - (left) Stock assessment estimates of biomass. Estimatesfor cod, yellowfin sole, and rock sole biomass (left axis) are obtained from NPFMC (2011).Estimates for halibut biomass (right axis) is obtained from Hare (2011). (right) Percentagedi↵erence in biomass estimates from 2007.5.3 The rock sole/cod fisheryFor reasons discussed above, I limit my analysis to the early season rock sole/cod fishery(henceforth RS fishery) in the Eastern Bering Sea for the years 2005 to 2010. The RS fisheryis relatively well-defined prior to A80 implementation by the opening season date (January 20every year), the fishery closing date (Table 5.1), and the fact that the other major subfisheryat this time of year takes place in a distinctly di↵erent geographical region (i.e. the Atkamackerel fishery in the Aleutian Islands). For the years 2005 to 2007, the RS fishery wasclosed prematurely due to a binding halibut TAC, leaving a large portion of the rock sole andcod TACs unharvested. The end of the RS fishery is not particularly well-defined post-A80however, since there is no o cial closing of the fishery. To remedy this, I choose a post-A80

Bycatch Avoidance Under Amendment 80 in the BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish Trawl Fishery

https://scholarworks.alaska.edu/bitstream/11122/11177/1/2014_05Reimer_Wakefield.pdf

Bycatch Avoidance Under Amendment 80 in the BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish Trawl Fishery

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

ScholarWorks@UA