"Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual Transferable Quotas." International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade's 16th Biennial Conference, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, July 16-20, 201

Abbott, Joshua

Reimer, Matthew

Wilen, James

English

The prediction that individual transferable quotas (ITQs) induce changes along the extensive margin via consolidation of quota among fewer vessels has been ex tensively documented. In contrast, behavioral changes along the intensive margin in response to ITQ incentives have been relatively neglected. We use the 2005 introduction of ITQs to the Bering Sea red king crab fishery to decompose the sources of rent generation across both margins. We develop a conceptual model of the harvesting production process that captures the principal decisions made by the skipper and crew throughout a fishing season. We depict the decision-making environment under pre- and post-ITQ settings by modeling limited entry and ITQ fisheries as two di↵erent symmetric games. We show that the e↵ects of introducing ITQs are potentially multi-faceted, non-monotonic, and at times contrary to prior expectations. For the crab fishery we find that the bulk of rents were generated across the extensive margin

Matthew N. Reimer

James E. Wilen

Joshua K. Abbott

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Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual Transferable Quotas

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https://scholarworks.alaska.edu/bitstream/11122/11158/1/2012_07Reimer_IIFET.pdf

Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual Transferable Quotas

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