This dissertation is an examination of Kant\u27s rather notorious claim that natural science, or physics, has a priori principles, understood as the claim that physics is constrained by rules warranted by the essential nature of thought. The overall direction of this study is towards examining Kant\u27s claim by close study of a particular principle of physics, the principle of the conservation of matter. If indeed this is a principle of physics, and Kant can successfully show that it is a priori, then it will be reasonable to conclude, in company with Kant, that physics has a priori principles.;Although Kant\u27s proof of the principle of the conservation of matter has been traditionally regraded as a reasonably straightforward consequence of his First Analogy of Experience, a careful reading of his proof reveals that this is not really the case. Rather, Kant\u27s proof of the conservation of matter is a consequence of (i) his schematisation of the category of substance in terms of permanence, and (ii) his identification of matter as substance, by appeal to what he thinks is the empirical criterion of substance, activity.;Careful examination of Kant\u27s argument in defence of the principle of the conservation of matter, however, reveals a number of deficiencies, and it is concluded that Kant cannot be said to have satisfactorily demonstrated the principle of the conservation of matter or to have convincingly illustrated his claim that physics has a priori principles by appeal to this instance
