Bunker, Robert J.

Scholarship@Claremont

Claremont CollegesScholarship @ ClaremontCGU Faculty Publications and Research CGU Faculty Scholarship1-1-2001Strategic Arms Reduction TreatyRobert J. BunkerClaremont Graduate UniversityThis Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CGU Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusionin CGU Faculty Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contactscholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.Recommended CitationBunker, Robert J. "Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty." Europe Since 1945: An Encyclopedia, Ed. Bernard A. Cook. New York, NY:Garland Publishing, 2001. 1196-1197.1196 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty yarsk radar sire and rhe development of rhe SS-25 ICBM, and growing tensions as rhe Cold War heightened. T he rreary would have provided for an initial overall limit of 2,400 srraregic nuclear delivery vehicles for each nation and a limit of 1,300 mulriple-independendy-rarge table-reenrry vehicles (MIRV) carrying ballistic mis-siles. T he protocol would have banned the deployment of air-to-su rface ballistic missi les (AS BMs) and ground-and sea-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs) with ranges in excess of 600 ki lometers, whi le the Joint Sraremenr of Principles wou ld have provided for subse-quent SALT III negoriarions. Sri II , rhe SALT II acco rds were observed by borh the US R and rhe Uni ted Stares on a vo luntary basis until May 1986, when President Ronald Reagan annou nced rhar the United Stares would no longer be bound by irs cei lings. In rhe meantime, a new round of arms control negotiations had already been initiated by rhe Reagan ad-ministration in July 1982 under rhe Strategic Arms Re-duction Talks (START I). BIBLIOGRAPHY Labrie, Roger P., ed. SALT Handbook: Key Documents and Issues 1972-1979. Washington, D.C.: American En-terprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979. U .. Arms ontrol and Disarmament Agency. Arms Con-troL and Disannament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990. U .. Congre s, Commirree on Foreign Relations. The SALT If Treaty. Report and Hearings. 96rh Congress, 1 sr ess ion . Washington , D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979. Robert j. Bunker SEE ALSO rraregic Arms Limitation Talks I; Strategic Arm Reduction Treary Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Anns control talks ( TART I) berween d1e USSR and rhe United rates d1ar replaced the rraregicArms Limitation Talk ( ALT). T hese talks were carried our from June 1982 until July 1991 , re ulring in the Treaty Berween me United tares and the USSR on the Reduction and Lim-itat ion of Strategic Offen ive Arms. The e talks were initial ly conducted by me United Stares wid1 the goal of reducing large numbers of Soviet m ul rip le- i ndependen dy- ra rgerable- reen rry-veh icled (MIRVed) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), while ar d1e same rime keeping intact U.S . submarine-launched ballistic miss il es (SLBM) and ai r-laun h d c e . cruise-miss iles-(ALCM)-ba ed strategic forces. Soviet del. egares countered d1 ese proposals with their own demands, which included a total ban on all long-range cruise m~. siles. These ralks were broken off by rhe USSR in No-vember 1983. They resumed on ly in March 1985, under rhe bilateral Nuclea r and Space Talks forum, afreran eas. ing of tensions over U.S. basing of ground-launched cruise missil es (GLCMs) and Pershing lis in Wesrern Eu. rope. The START I Treaty was finally reached on july 31 , 1991. The Russ ian Federation, Republic of Belarus Ukraine, and Kazakhsran-four successor states of th; former Soviet Union-became parries to this treaty with rhe sign ing of me Lisbon Protocol in May 1992. In this rreary an agreed limit of 1,600 "deployed"stra· regie nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) and 6,000 "ac· counrable" warheads (that is, warheads on the SNDYs) was set. For these warheads, lim irs were set at 4,900 for deployed I CBMs/SLBMs, 1, 100 for deployed mobile ICBMs, and 1,540 for deployed heavy ICBMs. Reduc· rions to rhe agreed upon limi rs were to rake place in three phases over rhe course of seven years. The rreary itself would be in force for fifteen years, at me end of which an option for extension exists. The first phase of reductions rook place no later than thirty-six months after treaty entry into force and wit-nessed a lowering of SNDVs to 2,100 and warheads ro 9,150 (of which only 8,050 could be deployed on ICBMs/SLBMs). The second phase of reductions wa.s slated to rake effect no later than sixty months after the treaty's entry inro force and would acllieve a lowering of SNDVs to 1,900 and warheads to 7,950 (of which only 6,750 could be deployed on ICBMs/SLBMs). The third phase of reductions would rake place no later than eighty· four months after the treaty's entry into force and rep· resenrs the target numbers agreed upon in mis accord. Separate agreemenrs to this treaty limited SLCMs with ranges above 600 kilometers at 800 for each nation and lim ited Soviet Backfire bombers to 500. Three major criticisms of the START I Treaty exist. First, it fails to rake into accounr immense Soviet ICBMl SLBM reload capabilities (i .e., srraregic SNDV reserves). Second, rhe lack of parity berween Soviet and U.S. SNDVs was nor given consideration. The Soviet ICBM force was far more lethal d1an irs U.S. counterpart, yet born sides' ICBMs were counted equally. Lasr, me co~­cepr of "accounrable" warheads deployed on SNDVs. JS Aawed. Photoreconnaissance suggests rhar me SovJet SS-18 force, whjch represented most of me Soviet's !CB~ - L d · h adili· u1row weight, was capable of being ourfitte wrr tional warheads per missile in violation of rreary rerrns. Because of chese criticisms, it has been argued chat che START I T reary al lowed the Soviets to use the rubric of arms reductions to ach ieve strategic offensive force mod-erniza tion while at che same time denying such an option ro the United States. With che demise of che USSR and the signing in Ja.nuary 1993 of the START II agreement as yet unratified, many of chese criticisms may be al levi-ated. The START II treaty eliminates all MIRY-equipped ICBMs and limits the overal l number of warheads to 3,500 or fewer. BIBLIOGRAPHY Clark, Mark T. "START and the Bush Initiative. " GLobaL Affairs (Winter 1992): 132-49. Kartclwer, Kerry M. Negotiating START Strategic Arms Reduction TaLks and the Quest for Strategic StabiLity New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1992. U.S. Arms Control and Disarman1ent Agency. START Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet SociaList RepubLics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive A1ms. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991. Robert ]. Bunker Strategic Defense Initiative The Strategic D efense Initiative (SDI) was a research and technology development program established by the United States in January 1984. T he Strategic D efense Ini-tiative O rgan ization (SDIO) was created in April 1984 to explore five research concepts relating to a defense against ballistic missiles. Two of these concepts were based pri-marily on forms of advanced non nuclear weaponry, directed-energy weapons (DEW): lasers and particle beams, and kinetic energy weapons (KEW): electromag-netic and rail guns . The three other research concepts were surveill ance, acquisit ion, tracking and kill assessment (SATKA) , systems analysis and battle management (SN BM), and survivability, lethality, and key technologies (SLKT). The Reagan admin istration's primary rationale behind SDI was originally to protect the population of the United Stares and char of its allies by a "missile shield"; however, che emphasis shifted to one of deterrence and thereafter to lower Soviet capacity for preemptive strike capability against U.S . retaliatory forces. The USSR did not respond to che SOL Rather, the SDI was a response by rhe United Stares to me strategic missile defense program of the USSR. For years prior to the SDI, the Soviets had been actively creating and de-ploying strategic missile defenses, at rimes in violation of Strategic Defense Initiative 1197 tl1e 1972 Ami-Ballistic Missile (AB f) T reaty. Defenses fo r che ovier capital, Moscow represented rhe only fu lly operational ABM system deployed in cl1e world. Soviet doctrine and strategy emphasized rraregic de-fense as a complement to the use of overwhelming offen-sive forces. T he DI directly challenged Moscow' pre-emptive m ike capab ili ty and , as a re ult placed it nnre military rrategy in jeopa rdy. Further, th DI threatened to rake the Cold War to a new rhre h ld and place rhe USSR in a no-wi n situatio n. A ballisri mis il e defen e race would place such an imm nse rrai n on the oviet econom ic and political sy rem rhar ir woull be unable to compere effectively aga inst a technologically advanced West unless ir adopted a marker eco nomy. T he adoptio n of this type of econo mic system would discred it and ul -timately underm ine the ideology of the ovier Commu-nist regime. In response, an in tensive propaganda and disinfor-marion cam paign was directed aga inst the DI by the USSR. This well-coordinated campaign was conducted on a number of levels, including overt government arms conrrol efforrs, propaganda, and KG B-promoted active measures cl1at focused o n the SDI. The SDI program was reoriented in 199 1 under the Bush administration to defend aga inst lim ited ballistic missile threats and became known as global protectio n agai nst lim ited strikes (G PALS) . This program in rurn was reorganized under the Ballistic Missile Defense Or-ganization (BMDO) by the C lin ton administration. The BMDO focused on theater missile defense (TMD) and contained very modest strategic ballistic missile defense research. The SDI was also known derogator ily as "s tar wars" because of the science fiction-like weaponry ir would re-quire. T his type of weaponry, of which lasers are one example, is currendy beginning to be deployed by U.S. ground forces. BIBLIOGRAPHY Clark, Mark T. "The Soviet Political C ampaign Against the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative." (Ph .d diss, Uni-versity of Southern California, 1989. Mikheev, Dmirrii. The Soviet Perspective on the Strategic Deftnse Initiative. Washington, D.C. : Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1987. Yost, DavidS. Soviet BaLListic MissiLe Deftnse and the West-ern ALLiance. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988. Robert]. Bunker SEE ALSO Arms Control T rearies and Agreements 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1394&context=cgu_fac_pub

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Scholarship@Claremont