Brian Leiter (2002) argues that Nietzsche’s claims about value, such as his criticisms of conventional morality, are not objectively grounded but are matters of taste. However, this view (i) conflicts with Nietzsche’s rhetoric and (ii) may fall into an unresolvable dilemma, as suggested by Ian Dunkle (2013). In response, I advance the claim that Nietzsche views moral value as being relationally, and thus objectively, grounded. For example, moral value claims can evaluated as prudentially good or bad for a person by appealing to the relationship between type-level facts about the person and the values they hold. This interpretation more clearly accounts for (i) the philosophical weight Nietzsche saw in his project, (ii) Nietzsche’s task to “revaluate all values,” (iii) his repeated attacks against dogmatism both in and outside philosophy, and (iv) his extensive use of vivisection as a morally significant term of art
