This article offers a brief survey of bidding theory in high price auctions, of experimental studies of behavior in such auctions, and of the interplay between the design and results of the experiments and efforts to further develop the theory. Two new series of experiments are reported. The first applies a convex transformation of payoffs in an attempt to induce a lowering of subject bids as if the bidders had become less risk averse. The second applies a method for inducing any prespecified utility function for risky choices on an individual. It is used to induce as if risk-neutral behavior. Both series use baseline control to calibrate the hypothesized effect of the procedures on risk-averse behavior. A close examination of individual bidding suggests that subjects bid less only when the profit potential is below the 50 cent break-even level. Above this 50 cent potential profit level, subjects tend to bid relatively higher. This can be interpreted as a type of satisficing behavior in which subjects attempt to do at least as well under the quadratic transformation as in the baseline experiments
