I investigate the connection between representations of space itself, as opposed to objects' spatial relations, and the representation of objects as mind-independent. I assume that perceptual states are reason-giving in that they represent the world to us as mind-independent, and seek to discover what features of their content might be necessary for this. In my first main chapter (II), I argue that spaces themselves cannot be represented purely auditorily; but I also argue that the representation of spaces themselves plays an important part in both vision and touch. In chapter III, I discuss two interpretations of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, in an attempt to uncover necessary conditions for spatial perception that involve the representation of space itself. I start with Daniel Warren's discussion of place-representation, and connect this to discussion of spaces and objectivity (Allison / Strawson). In chapter IV, I discuss arguments for constitutive links between spatial representation and representation as objective, making use of Gareth Evans' and John Campbell's discussions of a simple spatial theory of perception that constitutes our grasp of an empirical world. Having concluded that representation as objective may require the representation of space itself, I explore in chapter V the problem of how this requirement might be met in hearing, despite the fact that spaces cannot be represented purely auditorially. I criticise possible accounts according to which space-representation is extrinsic to hearing. I then offer an account that emphasises the need to characterise the contents of auditory perception in a way that is integrated with our other senses and with perceptual memory: I claim that this integration is essential to auditory perceptual content
