A Keane

G Wells

HR Huber-Stearns

J Börner

J Milder

JA Fisher

L Lundberg

L Peskett

NJ Berry

S Wunder

U Pascual

V Kolinjivadi

Y Hou

English

Crossref

In defence of simplified PES designs

Wells, G.

Ryan, C.

Fisher, J.

Corbera, E.

Edinburgh Research Explorer

     Edinburgh Research Explorer                                      In defence of simplified PES designsCitation for published version:Wells, G, Ryan, C, Fisher, J & Corbera, E 2020, 'In defence of simplified PES designs', NatureSustainability. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-020-0544-3Digital Object Identifier (DOI):10.1038/s41893-020-0544-3Link:Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research ExplorerDocument Version:Peer reviewed versionPublished In:Nature SustainabilityGeneral rightsCopyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise andabide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.Take down policyThe University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorercontent complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright pleasecontact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately andinvestigate your claim.Download date: 03. Dec. 2020In defence of simplified PES designs  1 G. Wells, C. Ryan, J. Fisher and E. Corbera. 2 Corresponding author: Geoff Wells, geoff.wells@su.se 3  4 Payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes are underperforming. Wunder et al.1 conclude that 5 this is because many projects are allowing local politics, rather than economistic theory and 6 evidence, to dictate who participates, and how they are paid and sanctioned. While we appreciate 7 Wunder et al.’s analysis, we view that their work downplays key evidence about the importance of 8 maintaining the legitimacy of PES schemes amongst local participants, and of the wider range of 9 social-ecological factors that may explain variability in PES effectiveness. We argue that 10 simplification of such schemes, by enhancing local transparency and acceptability, can in fact be 11 scientifically justified and central to project effectiveness. 12 Understanding what determines the effectiveness of a PES project is a research frontier. Wunder et 13 al. conclude that the three PES ‘desirable design features’ of spatial targeting, payment 14 differentiation and sanctioning are often being overly simplified in order to maintain local political 15 support. Wunder et al. then argue that this may explain why many PES schemes are not effective. 16 Our main concern is that the framing of the article appears to lead to an unwarranted (although 17 perhaps unintended) relegation of social concerns, below their three desirable design features. The 18 authors conclude that projects may be reluctant to sanction non-compliance, and to adopt more 19 complex differentiation of payments, in order to maintain local perceptions of fairness and 20 community support (henceforth, ‘local legitimacy’). In contrast to this view, both theory2 and 21 observations3 show that local perceptions of project legitimacy are central to PES effectiveness—22 without it, projects can fail in their land use objectives. Further, evidence suggests that to achieve 23 local legitimacy, PES projects often need to adopt procedures that are easily understandable, and 24 seen as fair, by local participants4. This is the rationale for simplified approaches to the desirable 25 design features of Wunder et al. 26 Wunder et al. do implicitly address some aspects of local legitimacy through their discussion of 27 distributional equity issues and the political sensitivities of sanctioning. We argue, however, that the 28 overall effect of their framing causes local legitimacy to be treated far less prominently than the 29 empirical PES literature warrants: the conclusions mainly present such concerns as a cause of 30 ‘deficiencies’ in design, where programmes have departed too far from their three design principles. 31 While there is ongoing debate about the extent to which local legitimacy concerns should be 32 prioritised over other issues, we propose that there is a growing consensus that accounting for local 33 legitimacy (and related equity) is at least one of the main enabling factors for PES effectiveness5. We 34 suggest that local legitimacy be considered an additional theoretical pre-condition for effective PES, 35 alongside Wunder et al.’s other principles. 36 The treatment of non-compliance in the article provides an example of how explicit consideration of 37 local legitimacy may allow for more nuanced and locally grounded understandings of PES design. 38 Wunder et al. categorise many of the projects in their sample as having ‘never’ sanctioned non-39 compliance. However, assessments of non-compliance are rarely straightforward decisions as 40 implied by Wunder, and need to be adapted to local behaviour (see Keane et al.6 for examples from 41 conservation). Thus, the type and severity of sanctions need to be negotiated locally with legitimacy 42 considerations in mind. Other evidence7,8, however, shows that at least some of these projects do 43 sanction non-compliance by temporarily withholding payments to underperforming farmers until 44 agreed ‘corrective actions’ have been completed– and that this nuanced approach was developed to 45 improve programme effectiveness by strengthening the local legitimacy of institutional processes. 46 Local legitimacy concerns thus interact with and moderate other design features such as sanctioning, 47 and are mutually supportive. 48 Our two other concerns are straightforward. First, while we recognise existing evidence that 49 effective targeting can improve PES effectiveness, other evidence shows that even the most 50 advanced methods for estimating both opportunity costs9 and likely ecosystem service benefits10, 51 have limited certainty and precision. Additionally, more complex approaches are likely to be more 52 costly, which might prevent or impair projects with fewer resources (many of which may coincide 53 with remote ‘high value’ conservation areas)11. Wunder et al. state that simple targeting is likely 54 affordable and use examples of national schemes. This may be true for larger schemes with 55 economies of scale, but is likely to be costly for smaller projects12. Simpler and cheaper approaches 56 to environmental assessments can be just as effective13. We thus caution against encouraging PES 57 implementers to invest their limited resources in complex and costly analyses unless the relative 58 gains are clear. Finding simple and effective methods of targeting remains a key challenge for PES. 59 Second, and more broadly, the wider PES literature suggests that drivers of effectiveness are far 60 more diverse than the three design features of spatial targeting, payment differentiation and 61 sanctioning (for a recent review see Huber-Stearns et al.14). The three design features assessed in 62 Wunder et al. are an analytical framework (derived from Ezzine-de-Blas et al.15) focused the on 63 economistic design principles of efficiency and conditionality, rather than a more comprehensive 64 scoping of factors. The wider PES literature suggests that, while these design features are no doubt 65 important, they likely offer only partial explanations of PES effectiveness14. 66 In summary, while we appreciate Wunder et al.’s examination of their selected design principles, we 67 view that future studies on PES effectiveness should explicitly address the wider social-ecological 68 context and drivers of environmental interventions and behaviour. 69 References 70 1. Wunder, S., Brouwer, R., Engel, S., Ezzine-de-Blas, D., Muradian, R., Pascual, U. and Pinto, R., 71 2018. From principles to practice in paying for nature’s services. Nature Sustainability, 1(3), 72 p.145. 73 2. Pascual, U., Phelps, J., Garmendia, E., Brown, K., Corbera, E., Martin, A., Gomez-Baggethun, 74 E. and Muradian, R., 2014. Social equity matters in payments for ecosystem services. 75 Bioscience, 64(11), pp.1027-1036. 76 3. Fisher, J.A., Cavanagh, C.J., Sikor, T. and Mwayafu, D.M., 2018. Linking notions of justice and 77 project effectiveness in carbon offset forestry projects: Insights from a comparative study in 78 Uganda. Land Use Policy, 73, pp.259-268. 79 4. Kolinjivadi, V., Gamboa, G., Adamowski, J. and Kosoy, N., 2015. Capabilities as justice: 80 Analysing the acceptability of payments for ecosystem services (PES) through ‘social multi-81 criteria evaluation’. Ecological Economics, 118, pp.99-113. 82 5. Börner, J., Baylis, K., Corbera, E., Ezzine-de-Blas, D., Honey-Rosés, J., Persson, U.M. and 83 Wunder, S., 2017. The effectiveness of payments for environmental services. World 84 Development, 96, pp.359-374. 85 6. Keane, A., Jones, J.P., Edwards‐Jones, G. and Milner‐Gulland, E.J., 2008. The sleeping 86 policeman: understanding issues of enforcement and compliance in conservation. Animal 87 conservation, 11(2), pp.75-82. 88 7. Ruiz-De-Oña-Plaza, C., Soto-Pinto, L., Paladino, S., Morales, F. and Esquivel, E., 2011. 89 Constructing public policy in a participatory manner: from local carbon sequestration 90 projects to network governance in Chiapas, Mexico. In Carbon sequestration potential of 91 agroforestry systems (pp. 247-262). Springer, Dordrecht. 92 8. Peskett, L., Schreckenberg, K. and Brown, J., 2011. Institutional approaches for carbon 93 financing in the forest sector: learning lessons for REDD+ from forest carbon projects in 94 Uganda. Environmental science & policy, 14(2), pp.216-229. 95 9. Lundberg, L., Persson, U.M., Alpizar, F. and Lindgren, K., 2018. Context matters: Exploring 96 the cost-effectiveness of fixed payments and procurement auctions for PES. Ecological 97 Economics, 146, pp.347-358. 98 10. Hou, Y., Burkhard, B. and Müller, F., 2013. Uncertainties in landscape analysis and ecosystem 99 service assessment. Journal of Environmental Management, 127, pp.S117-S131. 100 11. Berry, N.J. and Ryan, C.M., 2013. Overcoming the risk of inaction from emissions uncertainty 101 in smallholder agriculture. Environmental Research Letters, 8(1), p.011003. 102 12. Milder, J., Scherr, S. and Bracer, C., 2010. Trends and future potential of payment for 103 ecosystem services to alleviate rural poverty in developing countries. Ecology and Society, 104 15(2). 105 13. Wells, G., Fisher, J.A., Porras, I., Staddon, S. and Ryan, C., 2017. Rethinking monitoring in 106 smallholder carbon payments for ecosystem service schemes: devolve monitoring, 107 understand accuracy and identify co-benefits. Ecological Economics, 139, pp.115-127. 108 14. Huber-Stearns, H.R., Bennett, D.E., Posner, S., Richards, R.C., Fair, J.H., Cousins, S.J. and 109 Romulo, C.L., 2017. Social-ecological enabling conditions for payments for ecosystem 110 services. Ecology and Society, 22(1). 111 15. Ezzine-de-Blas, D., Wunder, S., Ruiz-Pérez, M. and del Pilar Moreno-Sanchez, R., 2016. Global 112 patterns in the implementation of payments for environmental services. PloS one, 11(3), 113 p.e0149847. 114 

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