The first essay attempts to explain the heterogeneity in the stock market’s reaction to a firm’s lobbying for good efforts. It is hypothesized that higher (a) CEO equity-to-pay ratio, (b) marketing influence in the TMT, (c) marketing capabilities, (d) corporate social performance, and (e) institutional ownership, will be associated with less negative abnormal stock returns. Results indicate that firms with a greater amount of marketing influence in the top management team experience greater negative abnormal returns. While firms with a higher CEO equity-to-pay ratio and a greater level of institutional ownership experience less negative abnormal returns. The second essay explores the impact of a consumer boycott on the shareholder wealth of the competitors of the targeted firm. It is hypothesized that similarities between the target and the competitor will result in less of a competition effect. Additionally, its hypothesized that firms with higher (a) advertising, (b) marketing influence in the TMT, (c) marketing capabilities, and (d) corporate social performance will experience a greater competition effect. Results indicate that firms with greater institutional ownership overlap and marketing capabilities experience less and more of a competition effect, respectively. The third and final essay focuses on the impact of a consumer boycott on long-term firm value (i.e., buy-and-hold abnormal returns) for the targeted firms. It is hypothesized that firms with greater amount of corporate political activity experience more negative buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Furthermore, firms with a marketing CEO will experience less negative buy-and-hold abnormal returns and this effect is mediated by marketing influence in the TMT and marketing capabilities
