Hoshi, Tomohiro

Isaac, Alistair

English

An equivalence relation is more transparent when complemented by anexplicit specification of the set of transformations under which equivalenceis preserved. In the case of extensive games equivalent with respect totheir strategic normal form, the set of transformations was provided byThompson (1952). We extend Thompson’s result to the case of games withunawareness (Feinberg (2009)

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The Strategic Equivalence of Games with Unawareness

The Strategic Equivalence of Games with Unawareness

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