A. Bouhoula

C. Meadows

D. Dolev

D. Musser

D. Song

F. Fábrega

G. Ateniese

G. Bella

G. Lowe

H. Comon

H. Ganzinger

J. Millen

L. Bachmair

L.C. Paulson

M. Protzen

M. Tagdhiri

N. Asokan

O. Pereira

R. Needham

W. Ahrendt

W. Reif

English

Crossref

Attacking a Protocol for Group Key Agreement by Refuting Incorrect Inductive Conjectures

Automated tools for finding attacks on flawed security protocols often struggle to deal with protocols for group key agreement. Systems designed for fixed 2 or 3 party protocols may not be able to model a group protocol, or its intended security properties. Frequently, such tools require an abstraction to a group of fixed size to be made before the automated analysis takes place. This can prejudice chances of finding attacks on the protocol. In this paper, we describe Coral, our system for finding security protocol attacks by refuting incorrect inductive conjectures.We have used Coral to model a group key protocol in a general way. By posing inductive conjectures about the trace of messages exchanged, we can investigate novel properties of the protocol, such as tolerance to disruption, and whether it results in agreement on a single key. This has allowed us to find three distinct novel attacks on groups of size two and three

Steel, G.

Bundy, Alan

Maidl, M.

Edinburgh Research Explorer

A key distribution and rekeying framework with totally ordered multicast protocols.

A lightweight formal analysis of a multicast key management scheme.

A survey of authentication protocol literature: Version 1.0. Available via http://www.cs.york.ac.uk/jac/papers/drareview.ps.gz,

An on-the-ﬂy model-checker for security protocol analysis.

API level attacks on embedded systems.

Athena: A novel approach to eﬃcient automatic security protocol analysis.

Breaking and ﬁxing the Needham Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR.

Canonical Equational Proofs.

Completion of First-order clauses with equality by strict superposition (extended abstract).

Deductive search for errors in free data type speciﬁcations using model generation. In

Disproving conjectures. In

Dolev-Yao is no better than machiavelli.

Extending formal cryptographic protocol analysis techniques for group protocols and low-level cryptographic primitives.

Finding counterexamples to inductive conjectures and discovering security protocol attacks.

Flaw detection in formal speciﬁcations.

Implicit induction in conditional theories.

Informatik — Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von G¨ unter Hotz, chapter Inductive theorem proving by consistency for ﬁrst-order clauses,

Isabelle: A Generic Theorem Prover,

Key-agreement in ad-hoc networks.

New multiparty authentication services and key agreement protocols.

On proving inductive properties of abstract data types.

On the security of public key protocols.

Some attacks upon authenticated group key agreement protocols.

Strand spaces: Proving security protocols correct.

Symbolic protocol analysis with products and DiﬃeHellman exponentiation.

System description: Spass version 1.0.0.

TAPS a ﬁrst-order veriﬁer for cryptographic protocols.

The Inductive Approach to Verifying Cryptographic Protocols.

The NRL protocol analyzer: An overview.

Theorem proving by resolution as a basis for question-answering systems.

Towards an automatic analysis of security protocols in first-order logic.

Undecidability of bounded security protocols.

Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers.

Verifying second-level security protocols. In

Attacking a Protocol for Group Key Agreement by Refuting Incorrect Inductive Conjectures

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Crossref

Edinburgh Research Explorer