Enforcement

- Fisheries control monitoring and surveillance must be even-handed but this is

limited by lack of financial resources. .

- Regulations must be practically enforceable otherwise there will be a loss of

credibility of enforcers .

Reasons for failure in fisheries management

~ Traditionally, private entities (fishers) are given public rights (known

exclusive access) to a common-pool good (the fishery). In other words,

individual can fish from a resource that every one owns in common for

their own private gain, but they cannot stop anyone from doing the same.

Under these conditions, no body has an incentive to conserve the

resource, because if they act responsibly they watch others continue

fishing. More and more fishers and boats will arrive until profits disappear

altogether, and the long-term health of fishery deteriorate

Namisi, P.W.

English

Aquatic Commons

Paper Presented at FIRRI,
Jinja-Lake Victoria Stakeholders. workshop, 2001
i f ~J.lcrt ,,_
By; PW. Namisi . '.
_,~ ,-Economics Sub - ~OI1!Po,~~nt, ./
~ I~. ries Research Component~ ,,~riesResources Research"Institute (FIRRI)
.- - ox 343, Jinja, Uganda, Fax: 256-43-120192
: firi@infocom.co.ug or firi@firLgo.ug
Options for Poverty Reduction Through
Community Empowerment Towards Sustainable
• Fisheries Resource Production and Equity
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Enforcement
- Fisheries control monitoring and surveillance must be even-handed but this is
limited by lack of financial resources. .
- Regulations must be practically enforceable otherwise there will be a loss of
credibility of enforcers .
Reasons for failure in fisheries management
~ Traditionally, private entities (fishers) are given public rights (known
exclusive access) to a common-pool good (the fishery). In other words,
individual can fish from a resource that every one owns in common for
their own private gain, but they cannot stop anyone from doing the same.
Under these conditions, no body has an incentive to conserve the
resource, because if they act responsibly they watch others continue
fishing. More and more fishers and boats will arrive until profits disappear
altogether, and the long-term health of fishery deteriorates .
~ Fisheries management that emphasizes conventional regulatory tools like
quotas, gear restrictions, and sizes, boat types, catch limits and other
"technical conservation measures," simply results in more costly resource
harvest. This results in competitive pressure among fishers to invest in
improved gear and boats to maintain their harvests as each tries to make
a living. Overfishing thus persists in the face of regulation because of
capital investments.
Need for Altemat~ve approaches
~ From a social point of view, the cnsls of fisheries is one of (future)
employment, income generation, and income distribution. It also has
gender dimensions.
~ The crisis of fisheries is also a crisis of management-it is therefore
worthwhile to reflect on various management options, their usefulness and
consequences.
SOME USEFUL MODELS
There are several examples and models that can help improve fisheries
management on a practical level.
1. Forum Fisheries Agency
2. Japanese Villages
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3. Individual Transferable Quotas
4. Community Fishing Corporations
5. The role of Incentives-
6. Precautionary approach to harvest
7. Co-management
Precautionary approach to harvest
~ Achieving a realistic balance of management capabilities against the
intensity and extent of fishing is part of what is known as the precautionary
approach. In a precautionary contest, absence of adequate scientific data
should not justify delaying or not taking action to conserve target species,
associated or dependent species and known target species and their
environment.
~ Incomplete or inadequate data are frequently the norm in fisheries
management situations, as in most natural resource management
activities. In some cases, conservation actions may need to be based on
analyses of the probably consequences to the fishery, especially when
long term, or irreversible consequences are more likely than not.
~ A precautional approach to fisheries management places the responsibility
to harvester to act effort promptly once reduced spawning stocks are
identified by managers. When resource assessments are uncertain,
managers of the fisheries of the option of restraining harvesting until better
information allows them to be more certain about the consequences of
fishing.
COMMUNITY-BASED FISHERY MANAGEMENT
~ The conventional approach to fisheries management usually pits the
manager and the managed against each other in an adversarial-type
relationship. Excluded from the decision-making process and often not
appreciating the need for particular management measures, fishermen will
attempt to circumvent them in order to maximize catches and, in turn,
revenue. They will do this even though penalties exist for infringements.
~ In normal circumstances fishermen are not involved in designing and
implementing fisheries management regimes, though this situation is
changing particularly in developed countries. Indeed, consultation
between the managers and fishers is often limited to an explanation by the
managing authority as to the nature of management measures after they
have been adopted and are in the process of being implemented.
~ With the imposition of measures from above, fisheries managers rely on
the goodwill of fishermen and legal sanctions for support. In Uganda,
fisheries administrators have tended to underestimate the importance of
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~ Complicated for the exploitation of multispecies fishery.
~ Use of maximum economic yield (MEY)
.1. limited by" insufficient knowledge to. calculate the optimum catch when
recruitment -of young fish to the fishery was constantly changing .
2. Need to take account of all species and their interactions.
3. MEY depends on demand since when demand is low the market would be
saturated by a lower catch than is incorrectically sustainable.
~ Success of objectives comes with
need for a major reduction in fishing effort.
Pproblem therefore becomes one of deciding on the amount of fishing, which
can be allowed in order to optimize catch over the long term. This can be
solved by:
1. Analysing stock levels and recruitment of all the key species and then
deducing the catch to give the overall MEY. This would then need converting,
through a knowledge of fishing power of vessels into the number of vessels
allowed to fish.
2. Carry out an assessment of the profitability of the fishing activity.
The causes of over-exploitation
~ The Fisheries of Lake Kyoga basin, in common with most other fisheries
are over-exploited, providing a lower yield of fish for more effort than need.
be the case. For over-exploitation to take place for an extended period
two conditions need to exist:-
1. There must be common ownership of the resource (where ownership exists
the owner would take steps to limit exploitation).
2. It must continue to be economical to fish even when over-fishing occurs.
(This of course assumes that there is a demand for the fish, because without
that there will be no market, where there is no demand, or it is low, over
fishing does not occur).
Control of Access
~ Over-exploitation of Lake Kyoga fisheries is a result of fishers competing
to take as big a share as possible from the common resource. Successful
management of Lake Kyoga fishery requires the elimination of this
competition and a reduction in fishing effort.
~ Controlling access by existing fishing boats must be accompanied by
measures to prevent new boats joining the fishing. Control of access
should also be even handed across all riparian districts operating in the
area. Otherwise the management would fail. This situation is complicated
by open access resource and immigrating fishers.
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traditional knowledge and practices in formulating management regimes
and they have therefore failed to benefit from this knowledge.
~ The involvement of fishers in the development, implementation and
supervision of fisheries management regimes has been widely practised in
some countries (e.g.,Japan) and is gaining prominence into the countries
as a means of making a regime a regroups scientific foundation more
efficient. FAO (1992 forthcoming ) has noted that community based
management could lead to welfare improvements if it is possible to
rehabilitate or build on traditional management systems.
~ When fishermen are involved in attempting to solve problems associated
with fisheries over exploitation, they become active agents for change in
the process. They are likely to understand the rationale and need for
management, even though measures proposed might appear to
disadvantage them, albeit in short term. Moreover, it is likely that such
regimes will be more cost effective because, through participation, fishers
will ensure that measures are observed and surveillance and
enforcement costs will therefore be lower.
~ In Uganda, although the effectiveness of customary institutions and values
have been eroded in the course of social change, attempts to build on
traditional experience and modes of operation for fisheries management ,
has merit. Community based approaches to management essentially
involve "bottom -up" or "grass- root" planning. This means that
communities would be involved in determining fisheries management
measures, supervising their implementation and invocating penalties when
management measures and guidelines are ignored.
~ The Uganda Government has recognised the need to decentralise
decision making and authority in a number of important policy and
development areas including financial administration, the public service,
fisheries and agriculture. Devolution of responsibility has involved
transfers of power from national to district governments.
~ Government have adapted a policy of decentralisation principally for
political reasons. Their objective has primarily been to give people greater
role in decision making and policy development. Governments have also
acknowledged that in traditional small scale societies people were
consulted on important matters and that their contributions were taken into
account.
~ Decentralisation has also been a priority for Uganda government because
of the failure of institutions established in colonial periods, and continued
after political independence, to meet community needs. This failure has
provided a strong incentive for governments to pursue decentralisation
policies as an alternative development strategy. The devolution of
fisheries powers to districts or lower levels has enabled fishers and related
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Government
National
Regional
Provincial/state
Municipal/district
Village
Co-management
Fisheries
Management
Fisheries
stakeholders
Boat owners
Fish traders
Money lenders
Recreational fishers
Etc.
Fig. 1. Fisheries Co-management as a partnership
Coastal Stakeholders
Tourism
Beach
Industry
Hotels
Etc.
>- Fisheries co-management can be defined as a partnership arrangement in
which government agencies, the community of locaal resource users
(fishers), non-government organisations, and other stakeholders (fish
traders, boat owners, business people, etc.) share the responsibility and
authority for the management of a fishery.
interests groups to be more closely involved in decisions concerning
management issues.
External agent
Non-government
organisation
cademic
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>- Co-management covers various partnership arrangements and degrees of
power-sharing and integration of local (informal, traditional, customary)
and centralized government management systems.
Five Broad types of Co-management
>- Based on role played by Government and Resource users
1. Instructive (minimal information exchange)
2. Consultative (consultation exists)
3. Co-operative (co-operation as equal partners)
4. Advisory (user advice to government)
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5. Informative (delegation of authority to users).
However, this is an oversimplification. In actual situation a multitude of tasks that
can be co-managed under a different type of co-management arrangement at
different stages in the management process exists.
» Co-management is a middle course between state-level concerns on
fisheries management for efficiency and equity, and local concerns for
self-governance, self-regulation and active participation. It is a process of
resource management: adjusting and maturing to changing conditions
over time and involving aspects of democratization, social empowerment,
power sharing and decentralization.
>- Co-management is not a regulatory technique but should be
seen as flexible management strategy in which a forum or
structure for action on participation, rule making, conflict
management, power sharing, leadership, dialogue, decision-
making, knowledge generation and sharing, learning, and
development among resource users, stakeholders and
government is provided and maintained.
>- Partnerships are pursued, strengthened and redefined at different times in
the co-management process, "depending on the existing policy and legal
environment, the political support of government for community-based
actions and initiatives, and the capacities of community organizations to
become government partners" (Rivera 1997).
The co-management process may include formal and/or informal
organizations of resource users and stakeholders.
Community-based Fisheries Co-Management
>- Community-based resource management is a central element of co-
management.
>- CBCRM according to Korten (1987) includes several elements: a group of
people with common interests, mechanisms for effective and equitable
management of conflict, community control and management of
productive resources, local systems or machanisms for capture and use of
available resources, broadly distributed participation in control of
resources within the community, and local accountability in management.
It is basically seen as community empowerment for resource productivity,
sustainability and equity.
>- Community-based resource management is people-centred and
community-focused, while co-management focuses not only on these
issues but also on partnership arrangement between government and the
local community and resource users. The government usually plays a
minor role in CBCRM.
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~ Co-management, on the other hand, has a major and active role for
government. Government serves a number of important functions
including provision of supporting policies and legislation such as
decentralization of management power and" authority, fostering of
participation and dialogue, legitimization of community rights, initiatives
and interventions, enforcement, addressing problems beyond the scope
of the community, co-ordination at various levels, and financial and
technical assistance, among others.
~ Government provides legitimacy and accountability to CBRM through co-
management. Only government can legally establish and defend user
rights and security of tenure at the community level.
Co-management often addresses issues beyond the community level, at
regional and national levels, and of multiple stakeholders, and allows
these issues, as they affect the community, to be brought more effectively
into the domain of the community.
Fisheries co-management, however, is not a panacea for sustainable
fisheries management but just an alternative strategy for resource
management. Interestingly, it" is a strategy which is receiving more
attention from resource managers, policy-makers, development agencies,
non-governmental organizations, and donors worldwide.
Role of Fisheries Marketing under Co-management in Poverty
Reduction
~ One of the main challenges facing small-scale subsistence fishers, as well
as commercial fishers, is the need to reach markets. Markets are the
primary transmission channels of economic information (prices, wages) to
economic agents. With this information, decisions can be made on what
and how much to produce, and by what method, and when to consume.
Changes in this information may stimulate new consumption choices,
production processes and technologies. Market information may also
transmit the need for regulation to public officials. If they work properly
markets are potentially the most efficient means by which this information
can be conveyed.
~ This can be done much more successfully by working as a group. It is a
proven fact-there is strength in numbers. Take a look at any successful
economy and you will find that much of the driving force comes from group
activity. From teachers' Unions to cooperatives, people from all
background find new strength in working together. But fishers'
organizations are often few and far between because, until recently,
fishers in African countries have not been encouraged to form themselves
into groups, which can represent their interests. This omission has been
the missing link in our development strategy.


Options for Poverty Reduction Through Community Empowerment Towards Sustainable Fisheries Resource Production and Equity

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Options for Poverty Reduction Through Community Empowerment Towards Sustainable Fisheries Resource Production and Equity

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