Neuroscientific discourse on consciousness often resorts to "collection of elements", notwithstanding the Gestalt demonstrations against representing conscious experience as a collection of sensory elements. Here I show that defining conscious experience as an object of the category of conscious experiences, instead of as cohesion-less set of structure-less elements, provides the conceptual repertoire—basic shapes, figures, and incidence relations—needed to reason about the essence of conscious experiences and the essence-preserving transformations of conscious experiences. Viewed in light of the category of conscious experiences, designers of user experience—in designing pre-conceptualized user experiences—are well situated to contribute to the development of the science of consciousness

Posina, Venkata Rayudu

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1  Title: Conscious Experience and Designing User Experiences 1 Author: Venkata Rayudu Posina 2 Article Type: Comment 3 Running Title: Designing Conscious Experiences 4 Word Count: 2443 5  6 Affiliation: 7 Independent Scientist 8 ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3040-9224 9 Google Scholar Profile: 10 https://scholar.google.co.in/citations?user=cnMxV9MAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao 11  12 Address for Correspondence: 13 Venkata Rayudu Posina, 101- B2 Swathi Heights, A. S. Rao Nagar, Hyderabad - 500062, 14 Telangana, India 15 Email: posinavrayudu@gmail.com, Tel: +91-963-222-4686  16 2  Summary 17 Neuroscientific discourse on consciousness often resorts to „collection of elements‟, 18 notwithstanding the Gestalt demonstrations against representing conscious experience as a 19 collection of sensory elements. Here I show that defining conscious experience as an object of 20 the category of conscious experiences, instead of as cohesion-less set of structure-less elements, 21 provides the conceptual repertoire—basic shapes, figures, and incidence relations—needed to 22 reason about the essence of conscious experiences and the essence-preserving transformations of 23 conscious experiences. Viewed in light of the category of conscious experiences, designers of 24 user experience—in designing pre-conceptualized user experiences—are well situated to 25 contribute to the development of the science of consciousness.  26 3  What is consciousness? Consciousness, according to Koch, “is everything you experience. It is 27 the tune stuck in your head, the sweetness of chocolate mousse, the throbbing pain of a 28 toothache, the fierce love for your child and the bitter knowledge that eventually all feelings will 29 end”1 (p. S9). This raises two foundational questions: 30 1. What is the nature of conscious experiences? 31 2. What is the nature of consciousness? 32 How are we to think of the totality of conscious experiences i.e., consciousness? How are we to 33 think of the constituents of consciousness i.e., conscious experiences? One obvious answer: 34 Conscious experiences are objects of the category of all conscious experiences and 35 consciousness is the category of conscious experiences. In other words, every conscious 36 experience has the essence of the category of conscious experiences, whatever the essence(s) 37 maybe. This characterization is in the spirit of asserting that a chair is an object of the category 38 of chairs. 39    Let us consider a visual experience: a face. A first-order approximation would represent the 40 experience as a feature list, as a point in a feature-space, or as a set of features: Face = {eyes, 41 nose, mouth}2. Sensory features are obviously structured, unlike the structure-less elements of 42 sets3 (p. 1). Equally importantly, sensory features of a visual object are related to one another in 43 specific ways resulting in a cohesive object, which cannot be modeled by a set with its zero 44 internal cohesion4 (p. 146). Elementism, notwithstanding the Gestalt demonstrations5 (p. S34), 45 continues to be the default terminology as in analyzing “perceptual experience into a collection 46 of simple sensory elements”6 (p. 19). Along similar lines, mind is defined as a set of brain 47 functions (p. 68 in ref. 7; p. 546 in ref. 8). The claim that „mind is a set‟ is repeatedly asserted in 48 4  the textbook Principles of Neural Science9 (p. 5, 334, 384), which takes on added significance in 49 light of its pedagogical value in training neuroscientists. Of course, this terminology does not 50 reflect any failure to recognize that, in terms of the above example of face perception, the 51 constituent eyes, nose, and mouth, unlike the structure-less elements of a set, are figures of 52 various shapes; and that these figures constituting a face are related to one another in specific 53 ways. Nevertheless, it does highlight the absence and the significance of having a conceptual 54 repertoire that fits the reality of conscious experiences. 55    Here I put forward mathematical category4 (p. 21, 135-148) as a construct suited for the study 56 of consciousness. In line with the commonplace understanding of the notion of category, a 57 mathematical category consists of objects all of which partake in the essence that is characteristic 58 of the category; since every object of the category partakes in the essence, the transformations of 59 objects preserve the essence (e.g. in the category of dogs, a transformation of an young dog into 60 an old dog preserves the “dogness”). 61  62 Theory of Conscious Experiences 63 What is the essence of conscious experiences? Continuing with our example of face perception, 64 an experience of a face can be said to consist of figures of various shapes: two eye-shaped 65 figures, one nosed-shaped figure, and one mouth-shaped figure. Of these shapes, we can say that 66 eye, nose, and mouth are the basic shapes, and their incidence relations determine the mutual 67 relations between various basic-shaped figures constituting the face4 (pp. 82-83, 250-253). When 68 considering conscious experience in general, we may treat sensory features (e.g. color, shape), 69 modalities (visual, tactile, etc.), and emotion, among others, as basic shapes. For example, anger 70 5  (in conscious experience) can be considered as an emotion-shaped figure (in the experience) just 71 as redness can be thought of as a color-shaped figure. The mutual relations between basic shapes, 72 say, emotion and color, determine the mutual relations between figures of the corresponding 73 shapes (anger and redness). 74    Basic shapes along with their incidence relations constitute the abstract essence or theory of the 75 category of conscious experiences (pp. 154-155, 235-236 in ref. 3; pp. 149-151, 369-370 in ref. 4; 76 p. 215, 217 in ref. 10; pp. 10-12 in ref. 11). First, every experience has the essence [of 77 experiences] given by the basic shapes and their incidence relations. Next, every experience can 78 be represented as a structure formed of the basic-shaped figures and their mutual relations 79 induced by the incidences of basic shapes (Fig. 4 in ref. 12). Since every experience has the 80 essence of experiences, transformations of experiences are required to preserve the essence of 81 experiences, and as such are natural transformations. Geometrically speaking, natural 82 transformations „do not tear‟ the structure transformed4 (p. 210). Philosophically, a natural 83 transformation is: Becoming consistent with Being13 (e.g. biological growth). 84    What are we to make of the totality of all conscious experiences along with their essence-85 preserving transformations? Objects along with essence-preserving morphisms of objects form a 86 category. With conscious experiences as objects and essence-preserving transformations of 87 experiences as structure-preserving morphisms of objects, consciousness—the totality of 88 conscious experiences—can be construed as a category of conscious experiences4 (p. 21, 152-89 154, 321-322). Note that any experience can remain the same (identity transformation). If I went 90 from sad to happy and from happy to detached, then I went from sad to detached (composition of 91 transformations of experiences). Along these lines, the other axioms and laws, which are 92 required to be satisfied in order for us to talk about a category of conscious experiences, can be 93 6  verified. Within this categorical framework, the structure of consciousness is an external 94 reflection of the structural essence of conscious experiences14 (p. 10). More immediately, a 95 category embodies a mode of cohesion4 (p. 146), which is the most basic attribute of conscious 96 experience. For example, parts (hands, legs, etc.) of a body have a mode of cohesion, which is 97 different from the mode of cohesion of parts (color, shape) of a visual object. Note that „part‟ is 98 both itself and its relationship to the whole15 (pp. 53-55). 99    As an illustration of theory of a category and its basic shapes, I present simple theories 100 (abstract essences) of conscious experiences. More explicitly, the mathematical method, 101 according to F. William Lawvere, “consists of taking the main structure [of an object] by itself as 102 a first approximation to a theory of the object, i.e. mentally operating as though all further 103 structure of the object simply did not exist”14 (pp. 9-10). With „interpretation of sensation‟ as a 104 theory of conscious experiences, we obtain a category of two-sequential processes as the 105 category of conscious experiences. Here, the basic shapes are physical stimuli, neural sensation 106 of stimuli, and conscious interpretation of sensation. With conscious experience as an object of 107 the category of two sequential functions, we find that the objective logic intrinsic to 108 consciousness is non-Boolean; for example, it has four truth values12 (pp. 172-174). 109 Alternatively, we can take „action of memory on sensation‟ as a theory of conscious experiences. 110 Yet another example of an abstract theory of conscious experiences: „particular as an exemplar 111 of a general‟9 (pp. 628-630), which gives the category of idempotents as the category of 112 conscious experiences4 (p. 106). 113    Given a category of conscious experiences, how do we abstract the theory (essence) of 114 experiences? Theorization begins with measurements of properties of the objects of the given 115 category. Oftentimes, we find that there is small subcategory of properties (and their 116 7  determinations) within the category of all properties that constitutes the abstract essence shared 117 by all objects of the given category. This abstract essence in which every object of a given 118 category partakes is the theory of the given category (pp. 154-155 in ref. 3; pp. 149-150 in ref. 4; 119 Fig. 5 in ref. 12; pp. 44-47 in ref. 14). In geometric terminology, we consider a subcategory of 120 basic shapes and their incidence relations, and examine if figures with objects in the subcategory 121 as shapes are adequate to completely characterize every object of the category and tell apart 122 transformations between objects (pp. 370-371 in ref. 4; p. 49 in ref. 15). 123  124 Designing User Experiences 125 We now view user experience design in light of the category of conscious experiences. Let us 126 say you were to design an artifact that elicits a specific experience, say, religious experience16. 127 You imagine a category of artifacts (along with their mutual relations). Next, you measure the 128 values of their properties and examine their mutual determination. On further examination, you 129 find within this category of properties (and determinations), there is a subcategory of properties, 130 which is essential for the elicitation of the specific experience (cf. raised gaze for religious 131 experience). This essence is the theory of the category of artifacts (eliciting the desired 132 experience). Now that you have the essence („raising the gaze‟) of the category of religious 133 buildings, you interpret the essence (theory) into a background category of, say, brick and mortar 134 to obtain a model of the theory of your imagined category of religious buildings15 (pp. 44-47). 135 Within this broad categorical framework, we can accommodate distinct experiences elicited by 136 different architectural designs17 (p. 201). 137 8     In the context of developing a scientific theory of conscious experience, it is important to 138 recognize change-of-experience as intrinsic to the practice of design. Neuroscientists vary stimuli 139 and examine the corresponding changes in conscious experience. So do designers of user 140 experience. Designers of user experience, by way of changing the basic shapes (e.g. sensory 141 features, modalities) and their incidence relations constituting the essence or theory of desired 142 experiences, are designing experiences ranging from ordinary experiences with the usual subject-143 object divide and all the way to aesthetic and spiritual experiences variously described as „figure-144 sans-background‟, „disappearing into appearance‟, or „losing oneself‟ (cf. music18). Here, 145 material objects are designed to elicit a pre-conceptualized experience. In designing experience, 146 design subsumes specification of the experience (in terms of figures of various basic shapes and 147 their incidences) and its essence-preserving transformations from and to experiences of the 148 category of experiences. Since theory is the essence of practices extracted from a conscious 149 participation in the practice10 (p. 215), a theory of experiences can be abstracted from conscious 150 participation in the practice of designing user experiences. Furthermore, changing theories and 151 the induced changes in experiences are integral to designing user experiences. Equally 152 importantly, the wealth of empirical data accumulated in designing user experiences is a valuable 153 resource to draw upon in testing for the adequacy of theories of consciousness. 154  155 Conclusions 156 I defined conscious experience as an object of the category of conscious experiences, which 157 aligns with the intuitions engendered by our everyday experience with things and thoughts (cf. 158 an idea is an object of a category of ideas). It is fascinating to note that the most advanced 159 9  scientific understanding of object (as an object of a category of objects) is in accord with our 160 ordinary experience. The category of conscious experiences provides the conceptual repertoire—161 basic shapes, figures, and incidences—needed to develop an adequately explicit theory of 162 conscious experiences. In doing so, it brings into focus the significance of user experience design 163 in the development of a comprehensive theory of consciousness.  164 10  Acknowledgments 165 I dedicate the paper to the memory of Professor B. V. Sreekantan. I am grateful to Professors: 166 Andrée C. Ehresmann and F. William Lawvere for their invaluable help in learning category 167 theory. I am also grateful to Professor Jagriti P. Galphade for inviting me to lecture at National 168 Institute of Design (NID), Bengaluru. Thanks also to NID students for their questions and for 169 finding flaws in my lectures. I‟m also grateful to Professor Michael A. Arbib and Dr. Ruadhan 170 O‟Flanagan for helpful suggestions.  171 11  References 172 1. Koch, C. What is consciousness? Nature 557, S9-S12 (2018). 173 2. Fodor, J. When is a dog a DOG? Nature 396, 325-327 (1998). 174 3. Lawvere, F. W. & Rosebrugh, R. Sets for Mathematics (Cambridge University Press, 175 2003). 176 4. Lawvere, F. W. & Schanuel, S. H. Conceptual Mathematics: A First Introduction to 177 Categories (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 178 5. Albright, T. D., Jessell, T. M., Kandel, E. R. & Posner, M. I. Neural science: A century of 179 progress and the mysteries that remain. Neuron 25, S1-S55 (2000). 180 6. Albright, T. D. The Veiled Christ of Cappella Sansevero: On art, vision and reality. 181 Leonardo 46, 19-23 (2013). 182 7. Bunge, M. Scientific Materialism (D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981). 183 8. Kandel, E. R. The new science of mind and the future of knowledge. Neuron 80, 546-560 184 (2013). 185 9. Kandel, E. R., Schwartz, J. H., Jessell, T. M., Siegelbaum, S. A. & Hudspeth, A. J. 186 Principles of Neural Science (McGraw Hill Education, 2013). 187 10. Lawvere, F. W. Foundations and applications: Axiomatization and education. The 188 Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9, 213-224 (2003). 189 11. Lawvere, F. W. Functorial semantics of algebraic theories and some algebraic problems 190 in the context of functorial semantics of algebraic theories. Reprints in Theory and 191 Applications of Categories 5, 1-121 (2004). 192 12. Posina, V. R., Ghista, D. N. & Roy, S. Functorial semantics for the advancement of the 193 science of cognition. Mind & Matter 15, 161-184 (2017). 194 12  13. Posina, V. R. Truth through Nonviolence. GITAM Journal of Gandhian Studies 5, 143-195 150 (2016). 196 14. Lawvere, F. W. Perugia Notes: Theory of Categories over a Base Topos (Universita‟ di 197 Perugia, 1972). 198 15. Lawvere, F. W. Tools for the advancement of objective logic: Closed categories and 199 toposes, in The Logical Foundations of Cognition (eds. Macnamara, J. & Reyes, G. E.) 200 pp. 43-56 (Oxford University Press, 1994). 201 16. Arbib, M. A. When brains design/experience buildings: Architectural patterns for a good 202 life, in Cultural Patterns and Neurocognitive Circuits (eds. Vasbinder, J. W. & Gulyas, 203 B.) pp. 111-140 (World Scientific Publishers, 2016). 204 17. Albright, T. D. Neuroscience for architecture, in Mind in Architecture: Neuroscience, 205 Embodiment, and the Future of Design (eds. Robinson, S. & Pallasmaa, J.) pp. 197-243 206 (The MIT Press, 2015). 207 18. Posina, V. R. Symbolic Conscious Experience. Tattva - Journal of Philosophy 9, 1-12 208 (2017). 209 

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