Estlund has replied to my "Motivational Demands on the Limits of Justice". This short note is my rejoinder

Wiens, David

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Version 1.2 // July 2016Rejoinder to EstlundDavid WiensThis short note is a rejoinder to Estlund’s reply to my “Motivational Limitations onthe Demands of Justice” (both in European Journal of Political Theory, vol. 15, no. 3). I usethis opportunity to make several clarificatory remarks.On the success conditional analysis of ability. In his reply, Estlund claims that “the broadconditional approach to ability is assumed by the view [he] criticize[s]” (p. 354), that is, theview that motivational incapacities can block abilities (and, in turn, moral requirements,given “ought implies can”). According to Estlund, his target’s view is that inability consistsin failing to φ despite trying to φ. This idea is captured by Estlund’s proposed analysis:A person is able to (can) do something if and only if, were she to try andnot give up, she would tend to succeed. (2011, p. 212, emphasis added)This implies that failing to φ even if one tries to φ is sufficient for inability. Thus, Es-tlund claims, he can safely assume his proposed analysis because that’s the analysispresupposed by the target of his critical arguments.But this is mistaken — Estlund’s target need not assume his proposed analysis. Estlundproposes the italicized condition as not only necessary for ability but also sufficient.Estlund’s target can accept the italicized condition as necessary — thus, that failing to φdespite trying to φ is sufficient for inability — without accepting that it is sufficient forability. It might also be necessary for ability that (e.g.) one have the motivational resourcesrequired to try. If that’s the case, then we have an analysis that implies that “can’t will”implies “can’t do”, pace Estlund. (It’s beyond the scope — and beside the point — of thisshort note to defend such an analysis.)Estlund’s argument requires that the italicized condition be sufficient for ability, aclaim his target need not endorse, his claim to the contrary notwithstanding. Thus, hecan’t simply assume his “working account” (2011, p. 212) of ability on the ground that histarget must endorse this account too. Since it is open to his target to adopt an analysisthat undermines the key premise that “can’t will” does not imply “can’t do”, Estlund mustdo something he has yet to do: provide an argument in favor of his proposed analysis ofability. (More on this below.)© 2016 David WiensPlease refer to version number and date when citing.David WiensOn the alleged counterintuitive implications of my proposed refinement. At the core ofmy challenge to Estlund is a proposed refinement of his analysis (which I grant for thesake of argument):A person is able to (can) φ if and only if, were she to repeatedly makegood faith attempts to. . . φ, she would tend to φ.I then argue that we should favor my proposed refinement to Estlund’s original analysisbecause the former, but not the latter, explains pairs of intuitive judgments such as thefollowing: (1) Danny might be able to write a book; (2) Claudia is unable to write a book.1(See pp. 340–41 of my original article for the relevant details of these cases.)Estlund diagnoses my challenge to him as follows: why isn’t my proposed refinementof his analysis of ability at least as plausible as his original analysis? This seems fair. Toanswer the challenge, Estlund presents the cases of Tal and Janna as a means to showthat my proposed refinement has counterintuitive implications that his analysis does notshare. Here I suggest that these cases do not strike the blow that Estlund thinks.Regarding the Tal case: I think it’s notable that Tal quits in his endeavor to write abook because he prefers to be a lawyer. As Estlund sets out the case, Tal’s choice to quit is aresponse to a cost-benefit calculation: upon experiencing the costs and benefits of bothpracticing law and writing a book, Tal weighs up the various considerations and decidesto practice law rather than write a book. In contrast, as I had envisioned the case, Claudiadoes not quit writing a book because she has decided that she’d rather do something elsewith her life. To sharpen the case, suppose, in a cool moment unclouded by her emotions,Claudia conducts a cost-benefit analysis of her options and decides (on the basis of herexperience in trying to write a book) that the best thing to do with her life is write a book.Even still, in the face of eventual obstacles, she can’t bring herself to continue writing, asspecified in the original case. (A case like this shouldn’t be difficult to imagine if one buys1 Estlund claims that I do not offer any argument to favor my proposed refinement over his analysis norany criticism of his analysis. This seems odd to me. Here’s the criticism: Estlund’s analysis is inadequateinsofar as it fails to explain the aforementioned pair of judgments (or a similar pair of judgments for someother case). Here’s the argument: We have reason to favor my proposed refinement insofar as it can explainthe aforementioned pair of intuitive judgments while Estlund’s analysis fails to do so. I acknowledge thatthe argument and criticism are far from decisive — one might deny that there is a difference to explain. ButEstlund can’t object to my resort to intuitive judgments at this point. Support for his analysis of ability restson similarly intuitive ground (see the discussion below about the selfish Bill case). To the extent that oneconcedes these intuitive judgments (or a similar pair of judgments for some other case), that’s a point infavor of my proposed refinement.2Rejoinderthat people can be weak-willed.2) Unlike Tal, Claudia doesn’t prefer to do something otherthan write a book; she lacks the motivational resources required to muster the will to dothat which she prefers. I trust the reader can work out an amendment to my proposedrefinement that allows us to say that Claudia, but not necessarily Tal, is unable to write abook. (Working out the details of that amendment is beyond the scope of this rejoinder.)Regarding the Janna case: My proposed refinement is said to imply that Janna is un-able to continue divesting from South African companies. This, in turn, has the allegedlycounterintuitive implication that Janna is not morally required to continue divesting fromSouth African companies. In reply: Estlund and I both grant that “ought implies can”,where “can” is taken to mean “has the requisite ability”. Given this, one can assess theJanna case in one of two ways: (1) hold fixed a judgment about Janna’s obligation (orlack thereof) to divest and, on that basis, form a judgment about Janna’s (in)ability todivest; (2) hold fixed a judgment about Janna’s (in)ability to divest and, on that basis,judge that Janna is (not) required to do so. Estlund clearly adopts the first strategy: we’remeant to find my proposed refinement counterintuitive because it implies that Janna isnot required to divest.In general, this seems like a shaky strategy for interrogating the plausibility of ananalysis of ability. With “ought implies can” operating in the background, the introductionof moral intuitions requires one to simultaneously balance two interdependent sets ofjudgments in assessing cases like Janna’s: judgments about requirements and judgmentsabout ability. But we can’t actually allow both sets of judgments to vary simultaneouslyin our assessment of any case. Doing so leaves the assessment indeterminate. To getany grip on the case, we must hold one set of judgments fixed. Estlund opts to fix ourjudgment about what Janna is required to do and use this and “ought implies can” tosettle our judgment about Janna’s ability. But we might just as easily fix our judgment thatJanna is unable (if we buy that as an implication of some favored analysis of ability) andsettle our judgment about Janna’s obligation using that fixed point and “ought impliescan”. Estlund has offered no reason to think that we should favor an assessment of thecase that starts by fixing the moral judgment over an assessment that starts by fixing theability judgment.Moreover, I doubt that the intuition that Janna is required to divest is sufficientlyindependent from intuitions about her abilities to use it as a fixed point in our assessmentof the case. Put differently, with “ought implies can” lurking in the background, intuitions2 One might suggest here that Claudia’s decision to quit reveals her “true preference” to do somethingother than write a book. But this is plausible only if one accepts the axiom of revealed preference, which hasbeen challenged by Sen (among others) from numerous angles (see the essays in Sen, 1997, 2002).3David Wiensabout Janna’s obligations are bound to be influenced by intuitions about her abilities. Isuspect that those who insist that Janna is required to divest start with an intuition thatshe is able to divest (which is then consolidated by the conjunction of the requirement and“ought implies can”). Note that this need not cause trouble for my proposed refinement.Perhaps one finds it difficult to imagine that Janna could really be as torn about thesituation as Estlund suggests (given preconceptions about financiers’ motivations); orperhaps one finds it difficult to believe that Janna’s failure to divest could be based onanything other than a cooly-conducted cost-benefit analysis of continued divestment(perhaps she’s reached the point where she’s sustained the maximum losses she’s willingto incur). Importantly, these point to possibilities for explaining the intuition that Jannais really able to continue to divest (and, thus, subject to an obligation to do so) thatare consistent with my proposed refinement — namely, ways of interpreting the casesuch that Janna does not really give a good faith effort to continue divesting (even if she,successfully, gave a good faith effort to divest in the past).Of course, Estlund could just stipulate that she really does give a good faith effort,however such effort is to be understood (“fill in the details required to make the casevivid”). But then it no longer seems obvious that Janna is required to continue divesting,in large part because it no longer seems clear that Janna is able to continue divesting (orso it seems to me). But then the implications of my proposed refinement for Janna don’tseem so counterintuitive. “If Janna really is unable to divest,” one might object, “thenperhaps she’s not required to divest after all.”I don’t wish to settle the Janna case here; I don’t think I can, nor do I think I need to. Ithink it’s enough to cast doubt on Estlund’s assessment of the case by noting that it derivesan ability to divest by holding fixed a requirement to do so. If, instead, we provisionallyset aside the issue of requirement to investigate the issue of Janna’s ability directly andfind that she satisfies the conditions for inability, then I doubt we’d find the lack of arequirement in this case so counterintuitive (given “ought implies can”, of course).On the structure of Estlund’s original argument. In broad outline, Estlund’s (2011) centralargument goes as follows.(1) Ought implies can (do)(2) Can (do) does not imply can will(3) Therefore, ought does not imply can will.Since Estlund concedes (1) for the sake of argument, the key task is to vindicate (2).How does Estlund do this? So far as I can tell, (2) is meant to follow from his proposed4Rejoinderanalysis of ability.3 So the key premise of the argument rests entirely on Estlund’s “workingaccount” of ability. Of course, Estlund’s rejection of the human nature constraint will notbe very compelling if he simply assumes his proposed analysis. So what’s the argument?4In fact, Estlund never directly argues for his proposed analysis of ability. Instead, heuses the case of selfish Bill to support the intuition that “can’t will” is not requirement-blocking, from which one might draw indirect support for his analysis (Estlund, 2011, p.220).(1) Plausibly, Bill is required to take his trash to the community bin.(2) But Bill can’t be motivated (“can’t will”) to take his trash to the bin.(3) Therefore, Bill’s lack of motivation to take his trash to the bin does not block therequirement to take his trash to the bin.It’s easy to let Estlund’s conclusion here pass through because he never directly considerswhether Bill’s lack of motivation undermines his ability to comply with the assumedrequirement. Moreover, it’s easy to go along with this assessment because it’s difficult toimagine Bill as anything other than an asshole5 (if not subject to motivational patholo-gies). With Estlund’s analysis of ability in the background, it’s natural to grant that Bill isable to take his trash to the bin: given that he’s simply being an asshole, if he tried to bringhis trash to the bin and didn’t give up, he would tend to succeed. So it seems that Bill’slack of motivation does not undermine his ability. Thus, “can’t will” does not imply “can’tdo”.I submit that this is shaky ground on which to rest an analysis of ability, especiallywhen one’s argument crucially depends on it. As I indicated in my original challenge, onecommon response to Bill is to concede that, if we specify the case such that Bill is neitherpathological nor simply being an anti-social jerk, then perhaps we should treat him asunable to do so.6 But that’s just to express the judgment, pace Estlund, that motivationalincapacities can sometimes undermine abilities and, in turn, block requirements. Estlundhas given little reason to think that, once the details of Bill’s psychology are specified moreprecisely, we should not regard him as unable to comply. Indeed, perhaps if we specify3 As Estlund notes in his reply: “I merely pointed out that this is one familiar conception of abilityaccording to which ‘can’t will’ need not, if suitably specified, be seen as entailing ‘can’t do’ ”. Cf. Estlund(2011, p. 213).4 Recall that I’ve already shown that he can’t assume his proposed analysis on the basis that a proponentof the human nature constraint must accept it.5 In the strict sense, of course (James, 2012).6 I’ve heard this thought expressed during discussions with numerous people about the case.5David Wiensthe case such that Bill persistently makes good faith efforts to comply and yet fails to doso, it might be difficult to resist the conclusion that he is unable. At least, that is the thrustof my original challenge.REFERENCESEstlund, David. 2011. “Human Nature and the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy.”Philosophy & Public Affairs 39(3):207–237.James, Aaron. 2012. Assholes: A Theory. New York: Doubleday.Sen, Amartya. 1997. Choice, Welfare, and Measurement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-sity Press.Sen, Amartya. 2002. Rationality and Freedom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.6

Rejoinder to Estlund

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Rejoinder to Estlund

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