Models are the ultimate results of all (scientific, non-scientific, and anti-scientific) kinds of cognition. Therefore, philosophy of cognition should start with the following fundamental distinction: there are models, and there are means of model-building. Laws of nature and theories are useful only as a means of model-building. If it's true that models are the ultimate results of cognition, then shouldn't we try reordering the field, starting with the notion of model? In this way, couldn't we obtain a unified and more productive picture - a model-based model of cognition

Podnieks, Karlis

English

If it's true that models are the ultimate results of cognition, then shouldn't we try reordering the field of the philosophy of cognition, starting with the notion of model? In this way, couldn't we obtain a unified and more productive picture - a model-based model of cognition

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Towards Model-Based Model of CognitionIn data mining, people are working (sometimes - with almost no theory behind) with a variety of computer models that are extremely useful in practice,  but  hardly  resemble  their  target objects.  "All models are wrong, but some are useful." - as put by the statistician George E. P. Box (1979:  Robustness  in  the  strategy  of scientific  model  building.  Robustness  in  statistics, 201-236).This wide experience with "theory-less, wrong and useful" models is  provoking three radical ideas.  None  of  them  is  completely  new,  the novelty  might  be  the  composition  proposed below: let's consider philosophy of all kinds of cognition,  and  try  a  completely  model-based rewriting of it.The first idea: internally, there is no difference between  "true"  models  and  "wrong"  models. Mainly, we do not know in advance (sometimes - for centuries), which parts of our models or theories are true, and which are not. Sometimes we know that our model is  "wrong" in  many respects,  but  it  remains  useful,  nevertheless. Many  people  may  continue  believing  in  an overthrown model or theory for a long time - and  continue  acting  accordingly.  Hence,  the somewhat  paradoxical  term  -  "wrong" knowledge.  This  corresponds  well  to  "The Dappled  World"  picture  (Nancy  Cartwright), see  Paul  Teller (2004:  How  We  Dapple  the World, Philosophy of Science, 71(4): 425-447). Thus, for the philosophy of cognition, "wrong" knowledge should be as prominent a subject as  the "true" knowledge.And, if we wish to answer non-trivial questions like as "Is it true that quarks really exist?", then our philosophy of cognition shouldn't introduce  the  notion  of  "truth"  too  early,  as  something primary,  and  therefore  -  mystical.  Truth  is emerging later - on top of cognition, it doesn't reside  at  the  bottom  of  it.  We  can  derive ontologies  and  truths  only  by  analyzing invariants of a successful model evolution - as I tried to propose in "Is Scientific Modeling an Indirect Methodology?" (The Reasoner 3(1): 4-5).In  terms  of  theories,  a  similar  idea  was proposed as  the “Deepening Maxim” by  Paul Thagard (2007:  Coherence,  truth,  and  the development  of  scientific  knowledge. Philosophy of Science,74, 28-47): "If a theory not only maximizes explanatory coherence, but also broadens its evidence base over time and is deepened by explanations of why the theory’s proposed  mechanism  works,  then  we  can reasonably conclude that the theory is at least approximately true." (41). And by Jeffrey Alan Barrett (2008:  Approximate  Truth  and Descriptive  Nesting.  Erkenntnis 68(2):  213-224)  -  as  "a  notion  of  local  probable approximate  truth  in  terms  of  descriptive nesting  relations  between  current  and subsequent theories" (213).The  second  idea:  models  are  the  ultimate results of all (scientific, non-scientific, and anti-scientific)  kinds  of  cognition.  Therefore, philosophy of  cognition  should  start  with  the following  fundamental  distinction:  there  are models, and there are means of model-building.  Laws of nature and theories are useful only as a means  of  model-building  -  "The  Toolbox  of Science" -  as put  by  Mauricio Suarez,  Nancy Cartwright  (2008:  Theories:  Tools  versus Models.  Studies in History and Philosophy of  Modern Physics, 39: 62-81).The third idea: to cover all kinds of cognition, the  notion  of  model  should  be  defined  as broadly as possible: a model is anything that is  (or could be) used, for some purpose, in place of  something  else. To  put  it  somewhat paradoxically: models are tiny fragments of the Universe possibly usable (for some purpose) in place of other fragments (or, even in place of the  entire  Universe).  Mathematical  models, fictional  worlds,  mental  structures  and processes are included here, of course. Among  philosophers,  this  broadest  possible notion  of  model  was  stated  by  Paul  Teller (2001:  Twilight  of  the  Perfect  Model  Model. Erkenntnis,  55:  393–415).  But,  among computer  scientists,  it  can  be  traced  back  to Marvin  Minsky (1965:  Matter,  Mind  and Models.  Proceedings of  IFIP Congress 65,  1: 45-49).Minsky applies the notion of model in a way, that  is  very  natural  from computer  scientist's point  of  view,  but  seems  not  very  popular among philosophers. I would put this  "robotic ontology" as follows:In my head,  I have a model of the world (an incomplete one, incoherent, inconsistent, in part -  fictional,  containing  all  my  knowledge, beliefs, dreams etc.). And I'm acting according to this model. In this model, other persons are believed to have their own models of the world (in some respects - different from my model). And they are acting according to their models. I may know these models  more or less,  and in this  way  I  can  predict  -  to  some  extent  - people's behavior. Thus, my model of the world may contain "models of models" - for example, a simplified model of your model of the world.And, to complete the picture: how about model-building  in  philosophy?  Perhaps,  many  will agree  with  Peter  Godfrey  Smith (2006: Theories  and  Models  in  Metaphysics.  The Harvard Review of Philosophy, XIV: 4-19): "... much  metaphysical  work,  especially  of  the contemporary  systematic  kind,  might  best  be understood  as  model-building,  ..."  (4). However, "It would be foolish to suppose that such  a  hypothesis  could  be  applied  to  all metaphysical discussion, but it might be true of an  important  part  of  the  field."  (5).  But  how about trying this "foolish" step?If none of the above theses is completely new, then - what is missing? My general impression: despite  many  brilliant  insights,  generated  by philosophers  for  many  years,  the  field (philosophy  of  cognition)  remains  unordered for too long a time. For example, according to the  account  given  by  Roman  Frigg,  Stephan Hartmann (2006:  Models in Science.  Stanford Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy),  there  is  still  no generally  acknowledged  unified  notion  of model.  Or, according to the account given by Eric  Schwitzgebel (2006:  Belief.  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), there are several competing approaches to explaining "what is it to  believe".  Couldn't  these  complications  be caused by the idea of "propositional attitude" - the idea that separate propositions are believed in, and not entire models, theories, or fragments of them?If it's true that models are the ultimate results of cognition, then shouldn't we try reordering the field, starting with the notion of model? In this way,  couldn't  we  obtain  a  unified  and  more productive  picture  -  a  model-based  model  of cognition?Karlis PodnieksComputer Science, University of Latvia

Towards Model-Based Model of Cognition

PhilPapers

The Reasoner, Vol. 3, N 6, June 2009, pp. 5-6. Towards Model-Based Model of CognitionIn data mining, people are working (sometimes - with  almost  no  theory  behind  them)  with  a variety of  computer  models  that  are  extremely useful  in  practice,  but  hardly  resemble  their target objects. "All models are wrong, but some are useful." - as put by the statistician George E. P.  Box (1979:  Robustness  in  the  strategy  of scientific  model  building.  Robustness  in  statistics, 201-236).This  wide experience  with  "theory-less,  wrong and  useful"  models  is  provoking  three  radical ideas.  None  of  them  is  completely  new,  the novelty  might  be  the  composition  proposed below: let's consider philosophy of all kinds of cognition,  and  try  a  completely  model-based rewriting of it.The first idea:  internally, there is no difference between  "true"  models  and  "wrong"  models. Mainly, we do not know in advance (sometimes -  for  centuries),  which  parts  of  our  models  or theories are true, and which are not. Sometimes we  know  that  our  model  is  "wrong"  in  many respects,  but  it  remains  useful,  nevertheless. Many  people  may  continue  believing  in  an overthrown model or theory for a long time - and continue  acting  accordingly.  Hence,  the somewhat  paradoxical  term  -  "wrong" knowledge.  This  corresponds  well  to  "The Dappled World" picture (Nancy Cartwright), see Paul Teller (2004:  How We Dapple the World, Philosophy  of  Science,  71(4):  425-447).  Thus, for  the  philosophy  of  cognition,  "wrong" knowledge should be as prominent a subject as the "true" knowledge.And, if we wish to answer non-trivial questions like as "Is it true that quarks really exist?", then our philosophy of cognition shouldn't introduce  the  notion  of  "truth"  too  early,  as  something primary,  and  therefore  -  mystical.  Truth  is emerging later - on top of cognition, it  doesn't reside  at  the  bottom  of  it.  We  can  derive ontologies  and  truths  only  by  analyzing invariants of a successful model evolution - as I tried  to  propose  in  "Is  Scientific  Modeling  an Indirect Methodology?" (The Reasoner 3(1)).In terms of theories, a similar idea was proposed as  the  “Deepening  Maxim”  by  Paul  Thagard (2007: Coherence, truth, and the development of scientific knowledge.  Philosophy of Science,74, 28-47):"If  a  theory  not  only  maximizes  explanatory coherence,  but also broadens its  evidence base over  time  and  is  deepened  by explanations  of why  the  theory’s  proposed  mechanism  works, then we can reasonably conclude that the theory is at least approximately true." (41).And by Jeffrey Alan Barrett (2008: Approximate Truth and Descriptive Nesting. Erkenntnis 68(2): 213-224)  -  as  "a  notion  of  local  probable approximate truth in terms of descriptive nesting relations  between  current  and  subsequent theories" (213).The second idea: models are the ultimate results of  all  (scientific,  non-scientific,  and  anti-scientific)  kinds  of  cognition.  Therefore, philosophy  of  cognition  should  start  with  the following  fundamental  distinction:  there  are models, and there are means of model-building.  Laws of nature and theories are useful only as a means  of  model-building  -  "The  Toolbox  of Science"  -  as  put  by  Mauricio  Suarez,  Nancy Cartwright  (2008:  Theories:  Tools  versus Models.  Studies  in  History  and  Philosophy  of  Modern Physics, 39: 62-81).The third idea: to cover all kinds of cognition, the notion of model should be defined as broadly as possible: a model is anything that is (or could  be)  used,  for  some  purpose,  in  place  of  something  else. To  put  it  somewhat paradoxically: models are tiny fragments of the Universe possibly usable (for some purpose) in place of other fragments (or, even in place of the entire Universe). Mathematical models, fictional worlds,  mental  structures  and  processes  are included here, of course. Among  philosophers,  this  broadest  possible notion of model was stated by Paul Teller (2001: Twilight  of  the  Perfect  Model  Model. Erkenntnis, 55: 393–415). But, among computer scientists,  it  can  be  traced  back  to  Marvin Minsky (1965:  Matter,  Mind  and  Models. Proceedings of IFIP Congress 65, 1: 45-49).Minsky applies  the notion  of  model  in  a  way, that  is  very  natural  from  computer  scientist's point of view, but seems not very popular among philosophers. I would put this "robotic ontology" as follows:In  my head,  I  have  a  model  of  the  world (an incomplete one, incoherent, inconsistent, in part - fictional, containing all my knowledge, beliefs, dreams  etc.).  And I'm acting  according  to  this model. In this model, other persons are believed to have their own models of the world (in some respects -  different  from my model).  And they are acting according to their models. I may know these models more or less, and in this way I can predict  -  to  some  extent  -  people's  behavior. Thus,  my  model  of  the  world  may  contain "models of models" - for example, a simplified model of your model of the world.And, to complete the picture: how about model-building  in  philosophy?  Perhaps,  many  will agree with Peter Godfrey Smith (2006: Theories and  Models  in  Metaphysics.  The  Harvard Review of Philosophy, XIV: 4-19): "...  much metaphysical  work,  especially of  the contemporary  systematic  kind,  might  best  be understood as model-building, ..." (4).However,"It  would  be  foolish  to  suppose  that  such  a hypothesis could be applied to all metaphysical discussion, but it might be true of an important part of the field." (5). But how about trying this "foolish" step?If none of the above theses is completely new, then - what is missing? My general impression: despite  many  brilliant  insights,  generated  by philosophers  for  many  years,  the  field (philosophy of cognition) remains unordered for too long a time. For example, according to the account  given  by  Roman  Frigg,  Stephan Hartmann (2006:  Models  in  Science.  Stanford Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy),  there  is  still  no generally acknowledged unified notion of model. Or,  according  to  the  account  given  by  Eric Schwitzgebel (2006:  Belief.  Stanford Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy),  there  are  several competing approaches to explaining "what is it to  believe".  Couldn't  these  complications  be caused by the idea of "propositional attitude" - the idea that separate propositions are believed in, and not entire models, theories, or fragments of them?If it's true that models are the ultimate results of cognition,  then shouldn't  we try reordering the field, starting with the notion of model? In this way,  couldn't  we  obtain  a  unified  and  more productive  picture  -  a  model-based  model  of cognition?Karlis PodnieksComputer Science, University of Latvia

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Towards Model-Based Model of Cognition

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