An approach to the semantics of fiction that uses the tools of truth relativism provides an alternative to Meinongian and pretence-based approaches. The approach is consistent with the deep motivations of John Wood's Truth in Fiction

Lopes, Dominic McIver

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Sherlock is Law AbidingDominic McIver LopesPhilosophy, University of British Columbia, Canada.dom.lopes@icloud.comA deliciously implicit conceit of Truth in Fiction is that Sherlock Holmes is notlaw abiding [1]. In recent years, the pleadings for the defense have had it that Holmesdoes not fall entirely within the jurisdiction of the laws. John Woods mounts a farmore radical defense. He urges his readers to refuse to convict, thereby nullifyingthe laws. To make the case, he deploys a theoretical concept, the concept of truthin situ. The concept suggests another, cake-and-eat-it, defense of Holmes. On thisdefense, the laws retain their authority and their full jurisdiction over Holmes, butthe chap is innocent. Sherlock is law abiding.The laws upon which Holmes stands indicted are three:I. the something law: everything whatever is something or otherII. the existence law: reference and quantification are existentially loadedIII. the truth law: no truth-evaluable sentence that discomplies with the somethinglaw or the existence law can be true.We read that Holmes mustered the Baker Street irregulars. Since Holmes does notexist, the existence law pronounces that the sentence cannot refer to him. Since thesentence cannot refer to him, the truth law pronounces that the sentence cannot betrue. Generalizing from Holmes and The Sign of the Four to all fictions and theircreatures, the corollary is a fourth law:IV. the fiction law: there is nothing to which the sentences of fiction refer andnothing of which they are true.If the fact of the case is that there is no Holmes, the laws dictate our reasoning fromthat fact.Those whom Woods calls “pretendists” stipulate to the fact of the case andaccept the authority of the laws. The sentence about Holmes and the Baker Streetirregulars cannot be true. Yet the sentence is not in the same boat as any run ofthe mill sentence that is false by reference failure. Sentences known to be false byVol. 7 No. 2 2020Journal of Applied Logics — IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their ApplicationsLopesreference failure leave us emotionally untouched and cognitively disengaged. Weaward them a big shrug. By contrast, knowing that there is no Holmes, and thatthe bit about the irregulars cannot be true, we nevertheless find ourselves very muchturned on emotionally and cognitively. We care. We want to know more. We turnthe pages. Attuned to these data, pretendists propose that the jurisdiction of thefour laws is only partial and that fictions and their creatures also answer to anotherauthority. In Kendall Walton’s version of the proposal, fictions function as props inregulated games of make-believe [2]. In these games, we are prescribed to imaginethat there is a Holmes and that he called in the Baker Street irregulars. Our soimagining is thought to explain our emotional and cognitive engagement.Woods shares the pretendists’ deep respect for reader responses, but he doubtsthat regulated acts of imagining or make-believe adequately explain the contours ofreaderly life. He also shares the pretendists’ aversion to joining the Meinongians incontesting the fact of the case, that there is no Sherlock Holmes. So, he defies thelaws. The fiction law must go. With it goes the truth law and the existence law.The something law is harmless and may tarry.Philosophers have been wary of this kind of move for several reasons. Some havenothing to do with fiction in particular: they concern the laws’ general plausibility ormethodological power across the board. For the record, Woods is not sympathetic,but set that aside. Holmes’s defiance of the laws raises a more acute problem. Thefact of the case is that there is no Holmes, but the truth is that Holmes summonedthe irregulars. Indeed, “Holmes” refers to Holmes. Inconsistencies loom. Andinconsistencies trouble us. Woods therefore endeavors to remove our troubles. Oneremedy, a strong dose of paraconsistent logic, is not the preferred cure. The bettercure is to embrace an idea that Woods finds in Aristotle, the idea of truth in arespect, or truth in situ [3].Truth is one thing and “true” is not ambiguous; but, all the same, truth-makersvary. Take these inconsistent sentences:W. Holmes is a fictional character.S. Holmes mustered the Baker Street irregulars.(W) is made true by the extra-story world, while (S) is made true by Doyle’s act oftelling the story. We may say that (S) is true in situ the story, meaning by that justthat Doyle’s story telling makes it true. The payoff is, first, that readers implicitlygrasp the relation between the truth of (S) and its truth in situ the story. The idea isempirically plausible: readers are aware of — constantly reminded of — the sourceof sentences like (S). Second, our sensitivity to the relation between the truth of (S)and its truth in situ the story inoculates thinkers against making inferences wherethe inconsistency between (S) and (W) threatens to wreak havoc.172Sherlock is Law AbidingSo concludes the case for nullifying the laws. Turn now to cake-and-eat-it. Theclaim will not be that cake-and-eat-it dominates nullification. As noted, Woods isunsympathetic to the laws, quite apart from Holmes’s predicament. The claim isonly that Woods should welcome cake-and-eat-it as a contender, especially in so faras it leverages and clarifies the theoretical concept of truth in situ.The concept is just the same as one that comes to life in other philosophicalcontexts, notably the debate about predicates of personal taste [4]. When it comesto matters of taste, faultless disagreements abound. For example:Dom: Durian tastes heavenly.John: By Jove, it does not!Neither party to the exchange is at fault. Each has ample and vivid evidence fortheir take on durian. Moreover, the exchange is not pointless, for they know thatthey share useful information [5]. So the exchange is faultless, but it is also adisagreement. Dom’s view on the topic is at odds with John’s. The question ishow to understand such cases of faultless disagreement. “Contextualists” maintainthat what Dom asserts is the proposition that durian tastes heavenly-to-Dom andJohn asserts the proposition is that durian does not taste heavenly-to-John. On thisview, John does not deny the very proposition that Dom asserts. The propositionsare consistent. The task is then to recover a sense in which the exchange is agenuine disagreement. By contrast, “truth relativists” contend that Dom asserts theproposition that durian tastes heavenly and John denies the very same proposition.Yet their disagreement is faultless because Dom speaks truly and so does John.Needless to say, truth is one thing; “true” is not ambiguous.Why not think that Dom’s assertion is true in situ Dom and John’s is true insitu John? The thought is perfectly natural. A fact about Dom — his having histaste — makes what he says true, and a fact about John — his having a differenttaste — makes true what he says. Relativists about predicates of personal taste donot use the “in situ” phrase. They say that in exchanges like these, a sentence istrue in a context of assessment set by a personal taste parameter. What Dom saysis true in the context of assessment set by Dom’s personal taste and what John saysis true in the context of assessment set by John’s personal taste, but one asserts andthe other denies the very same content.Truth relativists have worked out the details, but their semantic tools have notbeen applied to fiction [6]. Why not try out a truth relativist approach to fiction,seeing if it puts meat on the bones of the concept of truth in situ? After all, truthrelativism seems to deliver just what Woods wants. Return to (W) and (S). (W)is true if and only if (W) is true in a context of assessment where the extra-storyworld sets a truth-maker parameter. By the same token, (S) is true if and only if173Lopes(S) is true in a context if assessment where a story sets a truth-maker parameter. Inaddition, (S) is true in the same sense of “true” as is (W). Watch out, though! Themeaning of (S) is not given either by the proposition pin the story, Holmes summonsthe irregularsq or by the proposition pit is true in the story that Holmes summonsthe irregularsq. The meaning of (S) is given quite simply by the proposition pHolmessummons the irregularsq.Truth is one thing, but every truth has a truth-maker, and there are differenttruth-makers. “Holmes summoned the irregulars” is true in situ something (TheSign of the Four) and “Doyle made Holmes up” is also true in situ something (theextra-story world). In other words, Woods should green light a new law:the location, location, location law: no sentence is true unless it is truein situ some context of assessment.Again, the LLL law does not identify truth with truth in situ. It merely acknowledgesthat every truth is made true by something. There is the cake; now we can eat ittoo. The fact of the case is that there is no Sherlock Holmes. The proposition thatthere is no Sherlock Holmes is plainly true in situ the extra-story world. Woodsconcedes the something law. The existence and truth laws are consistent with theLLL law. One may hold both that no truth-evaluable sentence that discomplies withthe something law or the existence law can be true, and that no sentence can betrue unless it is true in situ some context of assessment. The truth law and LLL lawtogether imply that “Holmes” refers in (S). Presumably, “Holmes” refers to Holmesin situ The Sign of the Four.More importantly, the conjunction of the three cardinal laws with the LLL lawno longer implies the fiction law, namely that,there is nothing to which the sentences of fiction refer and nothing ofwhich they are true.What would imply the fiction law, given the conjunction? The answer is, instruc-tively, throwing inthe one site hypothesis: there is exactly one context of assessment, theextra-story world.The problem is not with any of the three cardinal laws; the problem is with thehypothesis. Woods denies the one site hypothesis anyway, in company with anyonedriven by cake-and-eat-it proclivities. Even better, denying the hypothesis is rea-sonable as long as we have the LLL law. The appeal of the hypothesis was that wewant to understand the “world” and we must guard against a bunch of made up174Sherlock is Law Abidingstuff interfering with that empirical project as we run our inferences. A recognitionof how darn good we are at keeping our locations straight means we need not fearmuch interference from fiction as we run our inferences. It also explains why we arenot foolish to be so interested in truths in fiction. The impulse to explore is notspent at the boundaries of the extra-story world.Reading Woods, I found myself appreciating how apt it is, when thinking aboutthe problems of fiction, to craft viable new positions. The remarks above are offeredin the same spirit as animates Truth in Fiction. Eventually we must narrow downthe options. Part of me hopes that is no time soon.References[1] John Woods. Truth in Fiction: Rethinking Its Logic. Cham: Springer, 2018.[2] Kendall Walton.Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the RepresentationalArts. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.[3] Aristotle. Metaphysics, 1005b: 19–20.[4] Dominic McIver Lopes. Being for Beauty: Aesthetic Agency and Value. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2018, pp. 166–75.[5] E.g. Andy Egan. Disputing about Taste. Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and TedA. Warfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 247–92.[6] Esp. John MacFarlane. Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.Received October 2019175

Sherlock Is Law Abiding

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Sherlock Is Law Abiding

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