B Williams

DY Elstein

GEM Anscombe

J McDowell

M Smith

P Väyrynen

RM Hare

S Scheffler

T Chappell

English

This entry addresses the question of whether justice is thick, thin, or neither.  It discusses three main ways of understanding the difference between thick and thin – Williams’ 1985 distinction, the Continuum Approach, and Hare’s distinction.  The question of how to classify justice turns out to be a problem for Williams’ 1985 distinction.  If the Continuum Approach is correct, it’s far from clear why it would matter whether a given concept is classified as thick, thin, or neither.  Hare’s distinction, on the other hand, allows for a strong case to be made for the claim that “justice” is thick.  And if “justice” is thick, in Hare’s sense, then there are at least two potential implications.  The first is that justice might be a genuine value property, assuming it’s impossible for “just” to have a value-neutral counterpart.  The second is that there might be intractable intercultural disagreements about what things are just

Justice, Thick Versus Thin

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