Singh's cultural evolutionary theory posits that methods of inducing shamanic altered states of consciousness differ, resulting in profoundly different cognitive states. We argue that, despite different methods of induction, altered states of consciousness share neurophysiological features and cause shared cognitive and behavioral effects. This common foundation enables further cross-cultural comparison of shamanic activities that is currently left out of Singh's theory

Jennings, Carolyn

Tabatabaeian, Shadab

English

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care, and doctors (especially when self-employed) have to con-vince people of their competence and care (Steinkopf 2012;2017). Further, the rituals and structure of contemporary medi-cine still play an important role in highlighting and legitimizingpatients’ need for care. Although health belief systems havelargely changed from spiritual to biological, parallels between con-temporary medicine and shamanism are evident. Althoughmedical training no longer requires celibacy, the arduous and pro-longed training can be considered a similarly transformative event.Interestingly, the duration of medical training in Western medi-cine has remained at six or seven years since medieval times atleast, despite great differences in availability of useful biomedicalknowledge (French 2003). Further, patients usually go to doctorswith the expectation of receiving acknowledgment of their sickstates by being prescribed treatments, often leading to the pre-scription of pure or impure placebos or even overtreatment(e.g., Faessler et al. 2010; Howick et al. 2013; Meissner et al.2012). Although the prescribed treatment is ineffective or evenharmful, it contributes to the legitimization of the patient’s suffer-ing as well as to the doctor’s reputation. On the one hand, thedoctor’s acknowledgement of the patient’s sick state manifestedin diagnosis and prescription is a signal to the community for alegitimate need for relief and care. On the other hand, a doctorgenerously prescribing treatment and thus acknowledging thepatient’s needs may develop a better reputation (and more eco-nomic success) than a medical miser who treats only when treat-ment is indicated (Fabrega 1997; Steinkopf 2017).In sum, the shaman has to persuade patients and onlookersthrough a healing spectacle, and the sick individual has to con-vince others of a sick state, incapacity, and a need for care. Bothmay have a shared interest in making the healing encounterappear effective, because it supports the shaman’s claim of exper-tise and the patient’s adoption of the sick role. Modern doctorsalso act and compete in terms of satisfying expectations and build-ing community consensus around the sick person’s need for care.Toward a neurophysiological foundation foraltered states of consciousnessdoi:10.1017/S0140525X17002187, e87Shadab Tabatabaeian and Carolyn Dicey JenningsUniversity of California, Merced, CA 95343stabatabaeian@ucmerced.edu cjennings3@ucmerced.eduhttp://faculty.ucmerced.edu/cjennings3/Abstract: Singh’s cultural evolutionary theory posits that methods ofinducing shamanic altered states of consciousness differ, resulting inprofoundly different cognitive states. We argue that, despite differentmethods of induction, altered states of consciousness shareneurophysiological features and cause shared cognitive and behavioraleffects. This common foundation enables further cross-culturalcomparison of shamanic activities that is currently left out of Singh’stheory.Singh’s cultural evolutionary theory successfully accounts for mul-tiple aspects of shamanism as a recurrent phenomenon. Whenaddressing the evolution of shamanism, however, Singh rejectsaltered states of consciousness (ASC) as a crucial element, consid-ering these less important than other elements, such as behavioraladaptations. He further claims that different methods of inducingASC have “profoundly different physiological and psychologicaleffects” (sect. 4.2, para. 1). One of Singh’s reasons for settingaside ASC as explanatory is that he thinks the ASC used byshamans do not have a common neurophysiological basis. Yet,this claim is unsubstantiated. Here, we suggest that ASC bothshare certain neurophysiological features and give rise to sharedcognitive and behavioral effects.Altered states of consciousness induced by methods as varied assensory deprivation, shamanic drumming, trance, meditation,endurance running, hallucinogen consumption, and even epilep-tic seizures produce shared cognitive and behavioral effects,including hallucinations, out-of-body experiences, ego dissolution,enhanced imagery, and a distorted sense of time (see Castillo1990; Danielson et al. 2011; Dietrich 2003; Forgays & Forgays1992; Hayashi et al. 1992; Kjellgren et al. 2003; 2008; Mason &Brady 2009; Speth et al. 2016; Suedfeld 1980; Suedfeld & Eich1995; Vaitl et al. 2005; Zuckerman & Cohen 1964). Theseshared effects are not likely to be coincidental; rather, it is likelythat ASC share certain neurophysiological features that corre-spond to these cognitive and behavioral effects. Although thereis as of yet no consensus as to what these shared neurophysiolog-ical features are, it is worth reviewing some evidence supportingthe view.One line of evidence comes from using electroencephalography(EEG) to compare ASC with non-altered states. EEG results indi-cate that ASC, regardless of induction method, correspond togreater activity in the low-frequency bands – delta, theta, andslow alpha (see Takahashi et al. [2005], Batty et al. [2006], Cahn& Polich [2006], and Fox et al. [2013] for meditation and relaxa-tion states; Neher [1962], Oohashi et al. [2002], and Gingras et al.[2014] for trance and shamanic drumming; Hayashi et al. [1992]and Iwata et al. [2001] for sensory deprivation; Muthukumaraswa-my et al. [2013], Tagliazucchi et al. [2016], and Carhart-Harriset al. [2016] for hallucinogens; and Danielson et al. [2011] for epi-leptic seizures). These frequency bands, in turn, are associatedwith internally directed attention and attenuated interactionwith the external environment (e.g., Benedek et al. 2014).These results suggest that internally directed attention might bea common element of ASC. Supporting this view, practices suchas drumming, trance, endurance running, and focused meditationsimulate sensory deprivation to varying degrees and cause highlyfocused internal attention, such that engagement with externalstimuli is highly attenuated (Castillo 1990; Dahl et al. 2015; Die-trich 2003; Gingras et al. 2014; Hove et al. 2016; Lutz et al. 2008).This disengagement of attention from external stimuli, known asperceptual decoupling, helps to sustain internally directed tasks(Hove et al. 2016; Smallwood et al. 2007; Smallwood et al.2011; Spreng et al. 2010). Similarly, hallucinogens that induceASC impair reactions to external stimuli, but this occursbecause of the failure of sensory gating in ﬁltering out extraneousstimuli, causing a failure to process incoming information ade-quately (Carter et al. 2005; Geyer & Vollenweider 2008).The second line of evidence comes from studies using neuroim-aging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging(fMRI). Such studies suggest that one of the most commoneffects of ASC, known as ego dissolution (the loss of a sense ofself), corresponds to disruptions to the default mode network(DMN). The DMN is activated during self-referential processes,such as autobiographical memory retrieval (Boly et al. 2008;Buckner et al. 2008; Raichle et al. 2001). Studies using fMRIhave indicated that, during ASC induced by various methods –including focused meditation (Brewer et al. 2011), hallucinogenconsumption (Carhart-Harris et al. 2012; 2016; Palhano-Fonteset al. 2015; Tagliazucchi et al. 2016; Speth et al. 2016), and epilep-tic seizures (Danielson et al. 2011) – the activation of the DMNdecreases, giving rise to ego dissolution. These studies alsoreveal that, during ASC, regardless of induction method, highfunctional connectivity is exhibited between three interactingbrain networks: default mode, frontoparietal control, and salience(see Brewer et al. 2011; Carhart-Harris et al. 2016; Hasenkampet al. 2012; Hove et al. 2016; Tagliazucchi et al. 2016). The fron-toparietal control network is responsible for cognitive control andattention (Cole & Schneider 2007; Cole et al. 2014; Vincent et al.2008). The salience network is responsible for detecting salientevents (internal or external) and for directing resources to the rel-evant neural areas (Christoff et al. 2009; Menon & Uddin 2010;Seeley et al. 2007). Enhanced connectivity among these threeCommentary/Singh: The cultural evolution of shamanism36 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 41 (2018)https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001893Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Access paid by the UC Merced Library, on 07 Jun 2018 at 23:30:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available atlarge-scale brain networks could explain some of the effects expe-rienced by individuals during ASC, including the perceptualdecoupling discussed above.This evidence supports the idea of a common neurophysio-logical foundation to ASC. We further claim that a commonneurophysiological foundation to ASC can be of signiﬁcant explan-atory value for a cultural evolutionary theory of shamanism. Forexample, Singh’s theory notes but does not currently explain theshaman’s insensitivity to pain, which, in our view, would beexplained by perceptual decoupling in ASC. Similarly, Singh’stheory does not account for the shaman’s ritualistic practice ofusing dark times of the day or dark spaces, such as caves; in ourview, this is explained by the relationship between sensory depri-vation and ASC. Finally, Singh’s theory notes but does not cur-rently explain why shamans believe they are not in control oftheir experience, which, in our view, is explained by the experi-ence of ego dissolution common to ASC. Although ASC andtheir underlying mechanisms require further investigation, weargue that it is too soon to reject the idea of a common neurophys-iological foundation to ASC. Our argument is consistent with theprimary objectives of Singh’s cultural evolutionary theory and canbe considered an extension to that theory, because it can helpexplain the universality, ubiquity, and endurance of shamanicactivities around the world.The social functions of shamanismdoi:10.1017/S0140525X17002199, e88Rachel E. Watson-Jones and Cristine H. LegareDepartment of Psychology, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX78712.dr.rachel.watsonjones@gmail.com legare@austin.utexas.eduwww.rachelwatsonjones.com www.cristinelegare.comAbstract: Cultural evolutionary accounts of shamanism must explain thecross-cultural recurrence and variation in associated practices. Wesuggest that Singh’s account of shamanism would be strengthened byconsidering the social functions of shamanism in groups. Shamanismincreases social group cohesion, making it distinct from other magico-religious practices.The term shamanism can be applied broadly to a wide set ofmagico-religious practices that occur across cultures. Historical,social, economic, and ecological factors contribute to how sha-manistic practices are organized within cultural groups. Singh’saccount of the cultural evolution of shamanism provides a frame-work for explaining cross-cultural variation and recurrence ofrelated practices. As the author notes, however, the current“theory is agnostic as to whether shamans provide beneﬁts toclients or groups” (sect. 3.4, para. 3). We argue that understandingsocial functions is central to a cultural evolutionary account of sha-manism. We discuss how the social nature of shamanism differen-tiates it from practices related to other magico-religious practicessuch as witchcraft. We also explain that the rituals associated withshamanism provide a means of social cohesion that does notalways necessarily involve signaling cooperative intent (Watson-Jones & Legare 2016).Shamanism and traditional healing are distinct from practicesrelated to witchcraft. Winkelman’s (1986b) analysis of StandardCross-Cultural Sample (Murdock & White 1969) data providedevidence that magico-religious practices are related to politicaland economic complexity. This analysis revealed that there arefour major practitioner types related to socioeconomic conditions:1. The Healer Complex that includes shamans, shaman/healers, and healers – the major distinction among these beingthat the shamans and shaman/healers engage in trance states,whereas the healers do not. Shamans were most associated withhunter/gatherer societies, shaman/healers with all societies thathad agriculture, and healers with almost all societies that werepolitically integrated.2. Mediums who were characterized as engaging in possession-like trance states and were found in agricultural and pastoralistsocieties3. Priests who were often leaders in societies with political inte-gration and a hierarchical social structure that relied heavily onagriculture4. Malevolent practitioners who engaged in harmful activitiesagainst others in societies with political integration. Across manycultures, witchcraft practitioners are considered malevolentactors. For example, in South Africa, witchcraft is a common attri-bution for the ultimate cause of AIDS transmission (Legare &Gelman 2008). Witchcraft practitioners are accused of usingtheir supernatural knowledge for individual gain and are notregarded as working in the interests of all members of the commu-nity. In many cases, once communities with shamans are inte-grated into more complex socioeconomic systems, practitionersassociated with the predominant religion call out or labelshamans as witches to delegitimize their role within the commu-nity (Winkelman 1986b).Shamanism is communal. Many anthropologists have arguedthat shamanism has social functions; it increases social cohesionand cooperation. Shamans act as a conduit to the supernaturalrealm, where they act on group members’ behalf and enablerituals (often dramatic) that bind group members together for acommon goal. This is not to say that shamans act selﬂessly. Asthe author notes, shamans often are prestigious members oftheir communities. An account of the cross-cultural recurrenceand variation of magico-religious practices must take intoaccount the perceived, or actual, motivations of the practitioners.The shaman reduces uncertainty surrounding important ﬁtness-related events, such as illness, childbirth, hunting, and protectionfrom enemies. Healers are almost exclusively responsible fordealing with illness-related issues, and witches are perceived asfocused on causing harm to others, most often surreptitiously. Itwould be interesting to consider whether shamanism is ever prac-ticed in secret – if shamanistic practices are done in isolation fromother community members, are they ever done without request orknowledge of the community?The importance of shamanism and similar practices for groupfunctioning is not necessarily related to signaling cooperativeintent, and the author provides a cogent argument against costlysignaling accounts of shamanism. Cooperative intent doesn’t getoff the ground without a preexisting, regularly maintained coreof social cohesion. The rituals associated with shamanismprovide a means of reafﬁrming social solidarity through sharedexperience and providing an indication of commitment to groupnorms.Does shamanism professionalize because of its contribution togroup functioning? Singh argues that shamanism professionalizes“because individuals typically must invest in transformativepractices to be considered capable of inﬂuencing uncertain out-comes” (sect. 5.1, para. 4). In this way, the professionalizationdiffers from that of practices related to technical knowledge.Both expertise and group consensus increase perceptions ofritual efﬁcacy (Souza & Legare 2011). We argue that theprofessionalization of shamanism also is related to the functionit serves for groups. As the earliest ritual practitioners, shamansprovided a means of group cohesion that was, and is, essentialfor small-scale societies.The deﬁning characteristics of shamanism come partly from itsrelationship to social group dynamics and the beneﬁts its practicesprovide for social cohesion. Singh’s framework of the cultural evo-lution of shamanism neglects an essential explanatory feature ofshamanism: the social beneﬁts it provides to human groups.Commentary/Singh: The cultural evolution of shamanismBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 41 (2018) 37https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001893Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Access paid by the UC Merced Library, on 07 Jun 2018 at 23:30:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at

Toward a neurophysiological foundation for altered states of consciousness

AbstractSingh's cultural evolutionary theory posits that methods of inducing shamanic altered states of consciousness differ, resulting in profoundly different cognitive states. We argue that, despite different methods of induction, altered states of consciousness share neurophysiological features and cause shared cognitive and behavioral effects. This common foundation enables further cross-cultural comparison of shamanic activities that is currently left out of Singh's theory.</jats:p

Toward a neurophysiological foundation for altered states of consciousness

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