Davis, Jake H.

Mindfulness

English

Jake H. Davis

Crossref

Facing Up to the Question of Ethics in Mindfulness-Based Interventions

PhilPapers

COMMENTARYFacing Up to the Question of Ethicsin Mindfulness-Based InterventionsJake H. DavisPublished online: 18 December 2014# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014IntroductionMonteiro, Musten and Compson (2015) have highlightedthree important areas for assessing contemporarymindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) in light of traditionalBuddhist conceptions. First is the adherence of contemporarypresentations to fundamental elements of “right mindfulness”.The second question is whether the practices taught in MBIslead to insight into the roots of suffering or instead offer onlymore symptomatic relief. A third area of critique regardswhether the presentation of MBIs should explicitly includethe ethical context in whichmindfulness is traditionally taught.Each of these areas is crucial for understanding both thepotential and also the pitfalls for the modern development ofMBIs. I suggest that questions about whether MBIs ought toadhere to Buddhist visions of right mindfulness and of ethicalaction can only be answered, if at all, as part of a continuingdialogue on the very general ethical question of how it is bestfor a human being to be. However, questions about the causesof suffering and how to most effectively address them mayserve as an area of common concern across human culturesthat can be appealed to as a basis for such dialogues on ethics.A number of the articles in the recent issue of Contempo-rary Buddhism (January, 2011) have contrasted various Bud-dhist textual characterizations of right mindfulness with con-temporary presentations of mindfulness as non-judgmentalpresent-centered attention. In these debates, it can often soundas if the definition of right mindfulness (Pāli sammā-sati) isfixed by the tradition(s) and the question is whether contem-porary presentations in various MBIs adhere to this authorita-tive definition. However, it is important to recognize that inthe context of mindfulness teachings, both ancient and con-temporary, the notion of right mindfulness functions first andforemost as an ethical term. This is true quite aside from pointsabout whether sammā is best translated as “right”. Instead, thepoint is that both religious and secular teachers of mindfulnessuse the term “mindfulness” to present aspects of the vision ofhuman flourishing that they and their own cultural traditionendorse. If one thinks that the development of a non-judgmental present-centered attention is one of the most valu-able ways for human beings to develop themselves, then thatwill play a central role in one’s presentation of mindfulnesspractice. On the other hand, some individuals and practicetraditions might hold instead that such a non-judgmentalpresent-centered attention is not sufficient, or perhaps noteven necessary, for a human being to cultivate what is mostvaluable. If so, their textual and oral presentations of mindful-ness practice are likely to stress other aspects, such as analyt-ical and evaluative contemplative practices.The controversy over the possibility of a mindful sniper,noted by Monteiro et al., exemplifies the breadth of ethicalvision that is at stake in defining right mindfulness. To say thatthe mindfulness of a sniper does not amount to right mindful-ness is to say that human beings ought to cultivate otherqualities instead of or (more likely) in addition to the kindsof focused attention that are important for being an effectivesniper. For instance, it might be that cultivating a more open-monitoring style of attention training would result in feelingmore fully the pain involved in the embodied motivation tocause harm, and thus would be incompatible with being asoldier. Indeed, the comprehensiveness of what is at stake indefiningmindfulness is explicit in Kabat-Zinn’s (2011, p. 290)recent remark that in certain contexts, he has used the termmindfulness as a placeholder for a “universal dharma that isco-extensive, if not identical, with the teachings of the Bud-dha, the Buddhadharma.” Of course, it should not be naivelyassumed that different practice traditions all lead to the sameJ. H. Davis (*)Department of Psychiatry and Human Behavior, Brown University,Providence, RI, USAe-mail: jhdavis@vijja.netMindfulness (2015) 6:46–48DOI 10.1007/s12671-014-0374-3universal goal, path, or truth. Different individuals, differentpractice traditions, and different cultures hold different visionsof how it is best for a human being to be. And if so, it shouldnot be surprising that presentations of mindfulness will varywithin traditional contexts, as well as between traditional andmodern contexts. Even if we did have access to the Buddha’sown words on what is to count as right mindfulness, there ishardly a cross-cultural consensus that we ought to accept theBuddha as the authority on how a human being ought to be.No appeal to authority will settle the question of whetherMBIs adhere to right mindfulness, precisely because what isat issue is which qualities and understandings are the ones thata human being ought to cultivate. To settle that questionwould require nothing short of an answer to the ethical ques-tion of how it is best for a human being to be.The Pāli Nikāyas do present a relatively consistent visionof how a human being ought to be. For one, as a whole, thesediscourses are very clear that we ought to purify ourselves ofgreed, hatred, and delusion. Such Buddhist textual claimsabout which motivational states are to be cultivated, andwhich are not, do seem to be intended as universal ethicalclaims, or at least as applicable to all human beings. Monteiroet al. noted this point, citing scholars such as Gombrich andKeown, and went on to draw out an implication for theinclusion of ethics in MBI pedagogy.…because intentions are either virtuous or not, theycannot differ from one social group to another. Applyingthis idea to an MBI program, it suggests that the inclu-sion of an ethical framework in the form of ethicalintentions likely would pose no threat to the social orreligious identification that participants may hold.However, from the fact that Buddhist texts claim that theirown ethical judgments of various motivational states are uni-versally correct, it hardly follows that Buddhist ethical judg-ments are indeed universally correct! Many other culturaltraditions would also claim universality for their own (verydifferent) visions of how human beings out to be. Monteiroet al. conceded that different behavioral manifestations of theuniversal value of respect, say, might result in conflicts over“religious and cultural differences in attire”. However, theproblem is much larger than this. Two cultures might bothvalue compassion, and yet in one of these cultures, maintain-ing a family’s honor takes precedence, resulting in practicessuch as “honor killings”. Likewise, some modern liberalsmight value righteous anger towards injustice, whereas manytraditional Buddhists will see this as misguided.To impose a pedagogy based implicitly on a Buddhistvision of how human beings should be onto those who donot already accept such a vision may itself be ethically prob-lematic. So there is a strong argument to be made againstMBIs simply laying out Buddhist precepts as the correctcontext within which to train in mindfulness, without somedialogue on the question of whether these are the best ethicalguidelines to adopt, and, if so, why. At a minimum, this mightinvolve dialogical practices of clarifying the values that indi-vidual students bring to an MBI course. In practice, suchexplicit clarification in conjunction with explicit strategiesfor strengthening individuals’ resolve to embody the valuesthey already hold may be sufficient to allay many of theconcerns noted by Monteiro et al. Nonetheless, from sometraditional Buddhist perspectives, such an approach will ap-pear insufficient. In part, this is because contemporary indi-viduals’ values, even once they have been clarified, will likelydiffer in some respects from various traditional Buddhistperspectives. However, as noted above in the context ofdiscussions of right mindfulness, traditional Buddhist ethicalvisions differ in ways large and small from one another, aswell. Moreover, as guides for us today, even the most textuallyand historically rigorous presentations of traditional conceptsof right mindfulness and of right action can at best be taken assuggestions for further inquiry. We can decide to defer toothers (our own cultural lineage, a teacher from an exotictradition) for answers to question about how best to live, butthat decision to defer is itself a decision, and as such subject toreflective scrutiny.The problem of differing visions of human flourishing israised also by the further critique that secular applications ofmindfulness may provide only symptomatic relief of suffer-ing. From many traditional perspectives, the ultimate goal ofmindfulness practice is to achieve liberation from the cycle ofrebirth. MBIs are not presented in a context in which thatspecifically Buddhist metaphysical vision can be assumed,and so they cannot realistically hope to motivate (many of)their students by appealing to the prospect of liberation fromrebirth. However, the Buddhist ideal of realizing the cessationof anguish and unease—dukkha—may in fact provide a noteof consilience between traditional and secular presentations.To the degree that some specific traditional conception doesnot involve eliminating all kinds of dukkha in this very life,then to that degree, neither can MBIs be expected to achievethat. Conversely, to the degree that the cession of anguish andunease is something that can in principle be achieved in ahuman life, through traditional practices of training universal-ly human cognitive faculties, then it is not clear why MBIinterventions involving training attention in the right wayscould not, in principle, achieve the same goal. Of course,many of us in a secular Western context may be sufficientlycontent with a reduction of some symptoms of dukkha that wedo not persevere on to address its deepest roots in the mind.On the other hand, that seems to be the case for many tradi-tional Buddhists as well, the metaphysical visions of rebirthand liberation they may hold notwithstanding.The most important and most challenging critique of mind-fulness teachings in our contemporary context, to my mind, isMindfulness (2015) 6:46–48 47one that applies equally to traditional Buddhist presentations aswell as to modern MBIs. The challenge in both arenas is forteachers to justify their (different) ends as well as their (different)means, in the context of a cross-cultural dialogue about how it isbest for human beings to be, by appealing to considerations thathave force for all human beings. Arguably, the aim to mosteffectively reduce anguish and unease can provide just such auniversal starting point for conversations focused on how hu-man beings ought to be motivated. One way to formulate such aproposal is to evaluate actions on the basis of whether theyreduce aggregate suffering in the world. However, a differentapproachmore in line with the Pāli Nikāyas is to focus onwhichsorts of motivational states are characterized by ease, and whichby unease, for the agents themselves (Davis, forthcoming).Nonetheless, the point should not be to establish as truesome one traditional Buddhist vision of ethics. Rather, questionsabout the transmission of mindfulness across cultural contextsmake clear the need to engage in a dialogue that can challengeall of us, from every cultural tradition, to carefully examine ourdeepest convictions about how it is best for human beings to be,and thus how it is best for each of us to train our minds.ReferencesKabat-Zinn, J. (2011). Some reflections on the origins of MBSR, skillfulmeans, and the trouble with maps. Contemporary Buddhism, 12(1),281–306. doi:10.1080/14639947.2011.564844.Monteiro, L. M., Musten, R. F., & Compson, J. (2015). Traditional andcontemporary mindfulness: finding the middle path in the tangle ofconcerns. Mindfulness, 6, 1–13.48 Mindfulness (2015) 6:46–48

https://philpapers.org/archive/DAVFUT.pdf

Facing Up to the Question of Ethics in Mindfulness-Based Interventions

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Crossref

PhilPapers