Several philosophers have tried to develop a framework for decision-making in the face of fundamental moral uncertainty. Critics argue that the project is misguided, as it assumes that there’s a kind of “subjective” rightness that depends on which moral views might be true (rather than which ones are true). This chapter replies to some such criticisms presented by Elizabeth Harman. Harman argues that “moral uncertaintists” seem committed to counterintuitive views about what’s right and what we’re culpable for, and that the only way of modifying the uncertaintist position to escape these commitments renders it uninteresting. However, uncertaintism can avoid these counterintuitive implications by focusing on epistemic probabilities of moral claims rather than subjective ones, and by positing different “orders” of subjective rightness. Further, the version of uncertaintism Harman calls “uninteresting” is not; it specifies what would count as one’s best try at doing what she has objective reason to do.</p
