Earley, Joseph

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Earley, Joseph E.

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BOOK REVIEWShould the Historical Star-System in Chemical EducationBe Replaced?Eric Scerri (2016) ATale of Seven Scientists and a New Philosophyof Science. Oxford University Press, New York, NY. ISBN:9780190232993, 228 + xxxiv Pages, Price: $29.95 (Hardback).Joseph E. Earley1# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017In this short work, Eric Scerri seems to recommend that anyone seeking to understand theperiodic properties of the elements should concentrate on the work of obscure scientists ratherthan on the famous investigators now featured in introductory chemistry courses. He tellsabout seven individuals, currently nearly unknown, who provided results later incorporatedinto developments generally considered to have been major breakthroughs but which advancesare usually attributed to scientists other than those discussed here.These anti-heroic stories suggest what the author calls Ba new philosophy of science^ whichhe has found useful Bto unify the various intellectual strands^ (p. xxiv) in his own life. Thebasis of this approach is: Bscience proceeds by almost imperceptible small steps in anevolutionary fashion, not so much through the genius and brilliance of individual scientistsbut more by a process of trial and error, chance and sheer stumbling around. Above all, scienceis a collective enterprise, but not consciously so^ (pp. 4–5). Scerri concedes that, in the past,others have also advocated evolutionary and communitarian understandings of scientificprogress but asserts and that he arrived at his system independently, without studying earlierauthors.The first two of the seven scientists covered here dealt with large questions. Britishphysicist John Nicholson (1881–1955) was interested in the spectra of astronomical nebulaeand also in the weights of chemical elements and the internal structure of atoms. He postulatedthat the elements with which we are familiar were produced from several Bproto-elements^which no longer exist on Earth but which persist in distant nebulae. Using theories based onsuch ideas (most of which were quite contrary to then-established and also laterunderstandings—that is, those notions were wrong) he was able to compute quite accurateatomic weights for most of the then-known elements and to rationalize complex line-spectra ofSci & Educhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-017-9933-z* Joseph E. EarleyJoseph.Earley@georgetown.edu1 Department of Chemistry, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057, USAthe Orion Nebula and of the solar corona. Nicholson also correctly predicted frequencies of anumber of spectral lines that had not been observed before his publications but were foundshortly thereafter. He also came to the conclusion that the angular momentum of electronswithin atoms must be quantized. Although earlier versions of Niels Bohr’s theory of theelectronic structure of atoms did not include this feature, quantization of electronic angularmomentum became quite prominent in Bohr’s later revisions—and Bohr fully creditedNicholson with having discovered that quantization.Dutch lawyer Anton Van den Broek (1870–1925) developed a serious spectator’s interest inatomic physics. He followed up an incidental suggestion of Mendeleev and designed a three-dimensional periodic table. He also closely studied Geiger and Marsden’s reports of howalpha-particles were scattered by various elements. Shortly after Rutherford published hisconclusion that atoms had positively-charged nuclei (without specifying the magnitude ofnuclear charge), Van den Broek, based on numerical analysis of experimental results of others,suggested (in Nature, no less) that the charge of each atomic nucleus was equal to the index-number of that element in the periodic table. Henry Moseley later stated that his justly-famousexperiments (which established the correctness of this suggestion) were carried out Bwith theexpress purpose of testing Van den Broek’s hypothesis.^Introductory chemistry courses frequently consider how electrons distribute themselvesamong energy levels and energy sublevels in the lowest-energy states of individual atoms ofeach of the elements1—as if such information was important in determining periodic proper-ties. The remaining five of the scientists covered in this book made important contributions inthis context. German electrochemist Richard Abegg (1869–1910) was important in thedevelopment of the electronic understanding of the combining capacities of atoms. Englishchemist Charles Bury (1890–1968) clarified the relationship between the electronic structureof atoms of the elements and their placement in the periodic table. British chemist, John D.Main Smith2 showed how atomic electron-shells are structured, with two electrons moretightly held than the rest.3 English physicist Edmund Clifton Stoner (1899–1968) developedmore-adequate models of sublevel structure and of collective-electron ferromagnetism. Frenchengineer, Charles Janet (1849–1932)4—among other contributions—developed the left-stepperiodic table.In the past, chemists have often made important contributions to philosophy. CharlesSanders Peirce (1839–1914), generally recognized as one of the most significant of North-American philosophers, identified himself as a chemist throughout his career. Hilary Putnamdocumented that Peirce’s important contributions to the logic of relations were widely knownamong European logicians in the late nineteenth century, at a time when Gottlob Frege’srelated work (published 4 years earlier than Peirce’s) remained largely unknown.5 Frege’slogical work became widely known only after Bertrand Russell revived it in connection withhis advocacy of logic-centered philosophies such as those now called Bpositivism^ andBanalytical philosophy.^ Michael Polanyi (1891–1976), Hungarian-born British physicalchemist and philosopher, argued that positivism supplies a false account of knowing, which1 Such as might conceivably be found in highly dilute vapors of monatomic gases, if such did exist.2 Dates for John Main Smith do not seem to be available.3 Main Smith Bdiscovered the s-electrons^.4 Janet worked sequentially in geology, entomology, biology, and chemistry, each for about 10 years, andachieved notable—but not outstanding—success in each of those areas.5 Peirce’s linear notation was used in the important logical works of that era, whereas no one else ever usedFrege’s three-dimensional notational system.J. E. Earleyif taken seriously undermines our highest achievements as human beings. Polanyi vigorouslyadvocated the view that science was a community enterprise, dependent on sharedBinterpretive frameworks.^German-born British philosopher, Heinz Post, Eric Scerri’s Ph.D. mentor, was muchimpressed by how, in 1962 and later, the work of Thomas Kuhn (1922–1976) on scientificrevolutions brought about shifts in general philosophical understanding of scientific develop-ment.6 Kuhn was certainly aware of Polanyi’s work and on some occasions indicated that hewas influenced by it. Many authors have pointed out strong similarities between Kuhn’sBparadigms^ and the awkwardly-named Binterpretive frameworks^ described by Polanyi.Though both Polanyi and Kuhn recognized similarities in their approaches, each pointed outtheir fundamental difference in general outlook from the other. Kuhn was generally understoodas denying that science leads to truth, thereby generating accusations of relativism. Kuhndenied those accusations, but formally rather than persuasively. Post distanced himself fromKuhn, stating: BContrary to Kuhn, I believe that scientific theory converges towards a uniquetruth.^ Throughout this book, Eric Scerri downplays the scientific importance of truth andfalsity, while also inserting what amount to formal denials of relativism.Scerri does recognize that the general philosophical approach that dominated North-American academic philosophy for decades has now run into problems. Toward the end ofthe present work (p. 212) he asks: BWhy, one might ask, has analytical philosophy of sciencenot withered away yet?^ Perhaps, an anti-analytical objection Marjorie Grene raised againstphilosopher Arthur Fine might be applicable both to Kuhn’s work and also to Scerri’s more-recent effort. Grene claimed that Fine held that realism must be justified by an argument morerigorous and exact than the methods by which scientific conclusions are reached. That is, thenotion of truth which some (perhaps many) analytically-trained philosophers have internalizedis Ba God’s-eye view^—an account of reality which would be adequate for any and everyconceivable purpose. This hypothetical notion of truth might well be coherent with logic-focused philosophy but it is not consistent with contemporary (post-Peirce) scientific realisms,such as Rom Harré’s Bpolicy realism.^A striking characteristic of contemporary philosophy of science7 seems to be that those whovigorously defend certain explanatory levels as fundamental then tend to display little or nointerest regarding what can validly be inferred concerning those levels. Jaegwon Kim, forinstance, vigorously argues that physical processes can all be understood in term of functioningof submicroscopic entities, but makes no explicit use of submicroscopic reasoning in his ownwork. Similarly, in this book, Eric Scerri argues that scientific research is much like biologicalevolution, but refers to the obsolete8 quasi-biological concept Bmissing link^ as if it were incurrent use in discussions in evolutionary science, and gives short shrift to conclusions ofrecent biological researchers, barely mentioning the powerful notion of punctuated equilibri-um. (It is widely agreed that pattern is important, even though how it should be explained isdebated.) Current studies of the evolution of microorganisms (where rapid generation-turnoverfacilitates study of evolution, see van Boxtel, C. et al. BTaking chances and making mistakes^)demonstrate that the course of evolution is partially determined by regularities of several sorts,but is additionally determined by contingent circumstances of many types. Factors involved in6 Post was especially interested in how major scientific changes often preserve significant pieces of earlierapproaches (Bthe correspondence principle^).7 Remarkably, neither philosophers nor scientists show much interest in Bphilosophy of science.^8 Prominent in the 1908 controversy regarding the Piltdown man.Should the Historical Star-System in Chemical Education Be Replaced?the origin of novelties are important—but characteristics which influence the Bspread ofnovelties through populations^ are often of even more significance. Such considerations seemto be pertinent to why, although Michael Polanyi’s approach still has strong supporters,Thomas Kuhn’s work achieved (and retains) much wider acceptance.The result typified by the Polanyi/Kuhn contrast can also be seen in non-philosophicalchemistry. In 1954, John O. Edwards correlated rates of nucleophilic chemical reactions interms of two parameters (basicity to protons and polarizability), characteristic of each reactantnucleophile. In 1961 and 1962, Edwards published results of collaborative research with RalphPearson. Starting in 1963, Pearson published many papers, reviews, and chapters all vigor-ously promoting his theory of hard and soft acids and bases (HSAB). This generalized theapproach Edwards had used on nucleophiles to wider subject-areas and re-packaged it usingconcise and easily-remembered terms. BThe Edwards equation^ is still used by some feworganic chemists, but HSAB theory generated much more widespread and lasting interest thanEdwards’ work had ever received. Analogous to the cases of microorganism evolution andphilosophical theory-acceptance, contingent details of how scientific innovations are presentedand promoted have profound influence on how or whether those innovations spread andpersist. Pearson’s developments of Edwards’ approach—relatively superficial though theymay have been—were in fact highly important.It is surely the case that scientific progress occurs by an evolutionary process and thatscience is mainly communitarian rather than principally individualistic. As mentioned above,chemist-philosophers Charles Peirce in the nineteenth century and Michael Polanyi in the mid-twentieth century made closely similar points. Those conclusions are new only in as much asthey differ from the customary presuppositions of many analytical philosophers.Postmodern literary critic, John Barth recommended that, to appreciate any historicalperiod, students of literature should read mediocre writers rather than great ones. This seemsto be similar to Scerri’s counsel to pay more attention to now-obscure scientists. Barth wroteThe Sot Weed Factor (in part, at least) to illustrate his advice. That 1960 novel runs tediouslyon for more than 740 often rather-turgid pages. Chemical educators surely will want to includeaspects of the interesting stories that are told in this book in their courses, but they should thinklong and hard before they abandon linking major conceptual shifts to specific historicalfigures. At least since ~ 700 B.C. when Hesiod composed his Theogany, tales about outstand-ing individuals and their (however mythical) achievements have been both memorable andinspiring in ways that more historically-accurate accounts usually are not.This book contains a selection of interesting background-stories for one of the main themesof introductory chemistry courses, and also provides some first-hand testimony about howanalytically-trained philosophers can belatedly discover aspects of reality inconsistent withtheir own earlier presuppositions without taking notice of the earlier work of others on thoseaspects.Compliance with Ethical StandardsConflict of Interest The author of this review asserts that no conflicts of interest exist regarding this review orits contents.J. E. Earley

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