Drawing an analogy between modal structuralism about mathematics
and theism, I oer a structuralist account that implicitly denes theism in
terms of three basic relations: logical and metaphysical priority, and epis-
temic superiority. On this view, statements like `God is omniscient' have
a hypothetical and a categorical component. The hypothetical component
provides a translation pattern according to which statements in theistic
language are converted into statements of second-order modal logic. The
categorical component asserts the logical possibility of the theism struc-
ture on the basis of uncontroversial facts about the physical world. This
structuralist reading of theism preserves objective truth-values for theistic
statements while remaining neutral on the question of ontology. Thus, it
oers a way of understanding theism to which a naturalist cannot object,
and it accommodates the fact that religious belief, for many theists, is an
essentially relational matter
