In his article, the author considers possible forms of relationship between
Kant’s ethics and consequentialism. In this context, he analyses David
Cummiskey’s views which are expressed in his book, Kantian Consequentialism
(1996). He demonstrates the possibility of justifying the consequentialism on
the basis of Kant’s ethics and its values. Likewise, several other authors (such
as Scott Forschler, Philipp Stratton-Lake, Michael Ridge) are of the opinion of
the possible compatibility of Kant’s ethics and consequentialism. On the other
hand, however, Christine M. Korsgaard is an example of a strict rejection of the
similarity between Kant and the consequentialist ethics. The author based on
the ethics of social consequences as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism
claims (like Cummiskey), that there are similarities between Kant’s ethics
and consequentialism. Unlike Cummiskey, however, he sees similarity in the
Kant’s formula of humanity and the understanding of humanity in ethics of social
consequences, especially in the form of additional moral value
