This paper aims at bringing a new philosophical perspective to the current
debate on the death penalty through a discussion of peculiar kinds of uncertainties
that surround the death penalty. I focus on laying out the philosophical argument,
with the aim of stimulating and restructuring the death penalty debate.
I will begin by describing views about punishment that argue in favour of either
retaining the death penalty (‘retentionism’) or abolishing it (‘abolitionism’). I will
then argue that we should not ignore the so-called “whom-question”, i.e. “To whom
should we justify the system of punishment?” I identify three distinct chronological
stages to address this problem, namely, “the Harm Stage”, “the Blame Stage”, and “the
Danger Stage”.
I will also identify four problems arising from specific kinds of uncertainties
present in current death penalty debates: (1) uncertainty in harm, (2) uncertainty in
blame, (3) uncertainty in rights, and (4) uncertainty in causal consequences. In the
course of examining these four problems, I will propose an ‘impossibilist’ position
towards the death penalty, according to which the notion of the death penalty is inherently
contradictory.
Finally, I will suggest that it may be possible to apply this philosophical perspective
to the justice system more broadly, in particular to the maximalist approach to
restorative justice
