The claim to be defended may be called phenomenological neutral monism: phenomenological neutral monism about perception (or selfless perception): ordinary perception does not intrinsically present us with the distinction between itself and its objects, that is, with the fact that its objects exist (or seem to exist) independently of the perceptual act

Massin, Olivier

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Swiss Philosophical Preprint Series# 16Olivier MassinThe Self­World Dualismand Neutral Monismadded 10/11/2008ISSN 1662­937X© Olivier MassinSelf-World Dualism and Neutral MonismOlivier Massin, Pro*Doc Seminar, FribourgNovember 3, 20081 Varieties of Self-World DualismSelf-World dualism (SWD): most subjects know (or seem to know) that there is a difference betweenthemselves and the external world (i.e., the world that exists independently of their atti-tudes towards it).1Self-World dualism’s question: how do we get the knowledge (or apparent knowledge) that there is adistinction between us and the external world ?Many different ways in which that question can be understood:1.1 Realist, anti-realist and idealist readings of the SWD questionrealist : the SWD question is not a question about the existence of the self and the external world.Taking both of them for granted, the question adresses the epistemological issue of howthis distinction comes to be known by the subject.anti-realist : the SWD is not a question about the existence of the self and of the external world.Neither of them exist. The SWD question is a question about the origin of a wrong beliefor impression.idealist : the SWD question is (also) a question about the very existence of the self, the world, orboth. By distinguishing between self and world, we truly create a distinction that wasn’tthere before.=⇒ the realist reading shall be assumed here: there is a distinction between the subject and theexternal. The SWD question is only epistemological: how does the subject comes know that distinction.1.2 Intuitionist vs. inferentialist reading of the SWD questioninferentialist : Our knowledge of the distinction between ourselves and the external world is reachedby inference, e. g. inference to the best explanation, or inference to unsensed causes.intuitionist : Our knowledge of the distinction between ourselves and the external world is reached byexperience: we immediately experience or intuit such a distinction.=⇒ the intuitionist reading shall be assumed here.1The locution comes from Russell (1995).11.3 Internalist vs. externalist reading of the SWD questioninternalist : how is that that, from the point of view of the subject, there is a difference between himselfand the external world? How is that difference subjectively accessed?externalist : how does the cognitive system of the subject represent and tracks the difference betweenhimself and the external world? Is there a specific sub-system that reliabily represents thatdifference? (even if it is not consciously accessed).=⇒ the internalist reading shall be assumed here. This doesn’t preclude the truth of the externalistreading, internalism and externalism beeing here compatible and complementary (Baldwin 1991; 1995).Condillac (1997) proposes the thought experiment of a statue to which we add new senses progressively.He addresses the SWD question: he wants to determine when the statue will have an idea of the externalworld. He writes:J’avertis donc qu’il est très important de se mettre exactement à la place de la statueque nous allons observer. Il faut commencer d’exister avec elle, n’avoir qu’un seul sens,quand elle n’en a qu’un ; n’acquérir que les idées qu’elle acquiert, ne contracter que leshabitudes qu’elle contracte : en un mot, il faut n’être que ce qu’elle est (1997, p. 9)1.4 Genetic vs. epistemic reading of the SWD questiongenetic: the subject start without any conception of self-world dualism. The question is then tounderstand how he comes to access that distinction during his developpment.epistemic: whether or not the knowledge of the distinction between self and world is inate, one canask what justifies, presently, our belief in the external world.=⇒ the epistemic reading shall be assumed here. Two remarks though:1. The piagetian program of the genetic reading has been subject to criticisms by recent develop-mental psychologists. They have empircally argue that the self-world distinction was innate (e.g.the feeling of the permanence of object). Russell(1995) gives the following answer: coding thedistinction between self and world is not sufficient for having a reflective, conscious knowledgeof that distinction. → one can be nativist in reponse to the externalist version of the SWDquestion, but constructionnist in response to the internalist version.2. The two readings are compatible: it may be that the justifier of our belief in a distinction betweenourselves and the world, is of the same kind than its origin. J.M. Baldwin (1906) introduced theexpression “genetic epistemology”.SummaryThe SWD question we shall address is the following: assuming there is a distinction between the selfand the world, how do we experience that distinction, from a first person perspective? This experienceis not necessarily the one that gave birth to our belief in SWD, but it is in any event the experiencewe appeal to when asked to justify our belief in SWD.2 From Self-World Dualism to phenomenological Neutral Monism2.1 Two opposite answers to the SWD questionsTwo main types of answers have been proposed to the SWD question, as here understood.2primitive SWD: the distinction between self and world is presented to the subject in the most basictype of intentional experiences (the ones that are necessary for other type of intentionalexperiences). It is not possible to have an intentional experience and to lack knowledge (orapparent knowledge) of SWD.derivative SWD: the distinction between self and world is not presentend to the subject in the mostbasic types of intentional experiences. It is possible to have intentional experiences and tolack knowledge (or apparent knowledge) of SWD.Upholders of the primitive SWD view typically insist that the self-world distinction is presented tous in ordinary perception. They endorse the perceptual view below. The most common version ofthe derivative SWD view on the other hand, has it that the self-world distinction is only presented inexperiences which involved agency of the subject to some extent, such as the experience of resistanceto our will. Call that the agentive view.perceptual view: the distinction between self and world is present in every perception (or apparentperception)agentive view: the distinction between self and world is presented only in experiences which involveagency of the subject, typically experiences of resistance to our will.There is certainly some intuitive appeal to the agentive view (we empathize with Dr Johnston reactionto Berkeley), but it faces one main difficulty: it has to deny that ordinary perception present us withthe reality of its objects, with the distinction between subjet and object. In what follows, I try toargue that there are good reasons to bite the bullet.2.2 Two versions of the agentive viewUpholder of the agentive view disagree on the subjective nature of the basic intentional experiences,that we enjoy before getting knowledge of the SWD.egotist the subject starts from self-knowledge (he knows himself) and then discovers there is some-thing else than himself. The point of departure is solipsism.– Following the Cartesian tradition, Condillac subscribes to the egotist version. Inabsence of any SWD knowledge, all the things perceived are identitied by the subjectto modification of himself. Seeing red is being red2. Phagocytic self.– The egotist version is suggested when one speaks of the problem of objectivity : howcan a subject which already knows himself gain the conception of an external world.neutralist the subject starts from neutral knowledge, knowledge which is neutral relative to the self-world distinction. He has just neutral appearances.– The idea that the first mode of knowledge (or apparent knowledge) is neutral is tobe found among neutral monists (Mach, James, B. Russell, Carnap, although neutralmonism is an ontological thesis rather than a phenomenological one), Scheler (1973,p. 294) speaks of “exatic knowledge”, and Cook Wilson describe it at follows:2This remainstrue, according to Condillac, even when some qualities are presented continuously while other vary:Si, supposant qu’elle [la statue] est continûment la même couleur, nous faisons succéder en elle les odeurs,les saveurs et les sons, elle se regarderait comme une couleur qui est successivement odoriférante, savoureuseet sonore. Elle se regarderait comme une odeur savoureuse, sonore et colorée, si elle était constamment lamême odeur ; et il faut faire la même observation sur toutes les suppositions de cette espèce. Car c’est dansla manière d’être où elle se retrouve toujours, qu’elle doit sentir ce moi qui lui paraît le sujet de toutes lesmodifications dont elle est susceptible. (Condillac, 1997, p. 87)3« In our ordinary experiences and in the sciences, the thinker or observerloses himself in a manner in the particular object he is perceiving or the truthhe is proving. That is what he is thinking about, and not about himself ; and,though knowledge and perception imply both the distinction of the thinkerfrom the object and the active working of that distinction, we must notconfuse this with the statement that the thinking subject in actualizing thisdistinction, thinks explicitly about himself, and his own activity, as distinctfrom the object. » (Cook Wilson, 1926, p. 79)– we have to give up the Cartesian and Brentanian idea that mental acts are essentiallyconscious.– the self is subjectively a contrastive idea. Knowledge of the self and knowledge of theworld are mutually dependent. They arise together.– One rationale for prefering the neutralist approach is that the self is elusive : “whyshould this kind of being, which is the most difficult of all to elucidate, serve as thestarting point for ontology?” (Scheler against Heidegger). What is to be said aboutthe self independently of its relation to the external world?=⇒ I shall assume the neutralist approach: basic intentional experiences are not phenomenologicallyintentional: the distinction between the act or self and the object is not presented in those experiences.But is that plausible at all ?2.3 In defense of selfless perceptionThe claim to be defended may be called phenomenological neutral monism:phenomenological neutral monism about perception (or selfless perception): ordinary perception doesnot intrinsically present us with the distinction between itself and its objects, that is,with the fact that its objects exist (or seem to exist) independently of the perceptual act.This is not to say;– that perception presents us with the fact that its object depends on us (such as in pain experi-ence).– that perception does not extrinsically present us with the fact that its objects exist indepently ofour perception of them. Perceptual experience is usually an abstraction from a more general andsomehow unitary experience which involves also memories, beliefs, desires, expectations, actionstendencies... (one may usefully distinguish thin from thick experience: the claim is only thatphenomenological neutral monism is true of the thin experience).– that perception does not present us with the fact that (in some cases at least) its object areexternal to us in a spatial sense. The only felt externality that is denied is externality in thesense of independance. Feeling O as distant from a point of view, does not imply feeling it asexisting independently from that point, nor feeling that point as a constituent or place of me.Even with those qualifications in mind, the idea of selfless perception may still sound odd to manyphilosophers. One furher rationale in its favour is that it almost naturally follows from a far lesscontroversial claim about perception, often called (strong) intentionalism or transparency: perceptionis phenomenologically transparent. The phenomenology of perception amounts to the phenomenologyof its object or content. The argument for phenomenological neutral monism about perception goesthen as follows:1. In order to experience a relation as such, it is necessary to experience its relata.42. Independence from perception is a relation between the perceptual act and its object.∴ In order to experience the fact the perceptual object exists independently of the perceptualact, it is necessary to experience both the perceptual act and its object.3. In ordinary perceptual experience, perceptual acts are phenomenally transparent.∴ In ordinary perception, one does not experience the independence of the perceptual objectfrom one’s perception; i.e., the object is not presented as distinct from the act.ConclusionTo recap, there are three rationale in favour of phenomenological neutral monism about perception (i)properly understood, that thesis is not so radical (ii) it is a natural consequence of strong intentionalismabout perception (iii) it nicely fits with the intuition that agency plays an essential role in our knowledgeof the SWD. On interesting upshot is that if this is true, the phenomenal self is essentially contrastiveand agentive.ReferencesJ. Baldwin, “Thoughts and things or genetic logic (vol. 1-3),” London: Swann Sonnenschein and Co,1906.T. Baldwin, “Two types of naturalism,” Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 80, pp. 171–199, 1991.——, “Objectivity, causality and agency,” The Body and the Self, pp. 107–125, 1995.Condillac, Traité des sensations, traité sur les animaux, 1754. Fayard, 1997.J. Cook Wilson, “Statement and inference, vols. i-II,” 1926.J. Russell, “At two with nature: agency and the development of self-world dualism,” The body and theself, pp. 127–152, 1995.M. Scheler, Selected Philosophical Essays. Northwestern University Press, 1973.5

The Self-­World Dualism and Neutral Monism

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