I argue that John Dewey’s analysis of imagination enables an account
of learning from imaginary cases consistent with Jonathan Dancy’s moral
particularism. Moreover, this account provides a more robust account of learning
from cases than Dancy’s own. Particularism is the position that there are no, or at
most few, true moral principles, and that competent reasoning and judgment do not
require them. On a particularist framework, one cannot infer from an imaginary
case that because a feature has a particular moral importance there, that it must
have that import in an actual case. Instead, for Dancy, cases can yield “reminders,”
and a person with a lot of experience (real or imagined) brings a “checklist” of
features that can matter to a situation. Using the Nathan-David exchange from
2 Samuel and Martha Nussbaum’s “Steerforth’s Arm” from Love’s Knowledge,
I show that this account does not explain all instances of learning from cases.
Drawing on recent work on cases, I argue that cases can be educative by serving an
exploratory function, probing what one takes to be known and provoking change
in the background one uses in evaluating a situation. I then argue that Dewey’s
work on imagination in his comments on sympathy and in A Common Faith and
Art as Experience enables such a role for cases on a particularist framework. Mark
Johnson’s recent work on metaphor further illuminates how Dewey’s account of art
can be exploratory. I contend that this account affords an exploratory role for cases
consistent with Dancy’s particularism
