This paper aims to expand the range of empirical work
relevant to the extended cognition debates. First, I trace the
historical development of the person-situation debate in
social and personality psychology and the extended cognition
debate in the philosophy of mind. Next, I highlight some
instructive similarities between the two and consider possible
objections to my comparison. I then argue that the resolution
of the person-situation debate in terms of interactionism
lends support for an analogously interactionist conception
of extended cognition. I argue that this interactionism might
necessitate a shift away from the dominant agent-artifact
paradigm toward an agent–agent paradigm. If this is right,
then social and personality psychology—the discipline(s) that
developed from the person-situation debate—opens a whole
new range of empirical considerations for extended cognition
theorists which align with Clark & Chalmers original vision of
agents themselves as spread into the world
