Spagat, M

Royal Holloway Research Online

Briefing on the Colombian Conflict

Royal Holloway - Pure

1Briefing on the Colombian Conflict  By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERACGENERAL FRAMEWORK • The Colombian conflict can be roughly characterized as a three-sided one involvingleft-wing guerrillas, government forces and illegal right-wing paramilitaries.• There has been a rough equilibrium over the years; paramilitary activity has been highduring periods when the government has done a poor job of containing the guerrillasand vice versa.• Existence of the paramilitaries reflects a failure of the state to contain the guerrillas,although the paramilitaries now have a life of there own and will continue to exist withor without the guerrillas.MAIN ILLEGAL GROUPSGUERRILLAS – FARC AND ELN • Check point/road block actions (without robbery), infrastructure attacks and attackson means of transport account for roughly half of all guerrilla events in our dataset.• Then come bombings, incursions, ambushes, mine explosions and massacres(kidnappings are not included in our data at present but are a big activity)BRIEFING ON THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICTBy Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC2Briefing on the Colombian Conflict   By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERACPortfolio of attacks by guerrilla groupsMassacre2% Incursion8%Check point20%Mass kidnapping1%Infrastructure15%Means of transport12%Bombing9%Ambush8%Mine explosion3%Other22%• The ELN stresses infrastructure attacks more and bombings less than the FARC.• Are the Guerrillas narco-terrorists? Yes, but the term is too narrow.  The guerrillas dolots of things (e.g., infrastructure attacks) not normally associated with terrorism andlots of things inconsistent with a desire for a quiet life dealing drugs.Guerrillas – FARC and ELNSource:  CERAC3Briefing on the Colombian Conflict  By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC• The ultimate goal of the guerrillas is to take power, not to get rich off drug-dealing.    Amore medium-term and realistic goal is to maintain and extend local power.• Guerrilla revenue comes not just from drugs but also from kidnapping, extortion andtheft, notably of land and cattle.• The guerrillas cause most injuries to civilians, these coming mostly in bombings.Distribution of injured civilians in attacks by identified group attacking78%11%11%Injured civilians by guerrilla groups Injured civilians by paramilitary groups Injured civilians by governmentGuerrillas – FARC and ELNSource:  CERAC4Briefing on the Colombian Conflict   By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERACMass kidnapping5% Check point and/or road blockage9%Incursion16%Massacre70%PARAMILITARIES• Basic strategy has been to massacre civilians they suspect of helping the guerrillas.Portfolio of attacks by paramilitariesParamilitariesSource:  CERAC5Briefing on the Colombian Conflict  By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC02004006008001.0001.2001988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Civilians killed in paramilitary massacres Paramilitary massacres• Cause most killings of civilians, mostly through massacres.Civilians killed in paramilitary massacres 1988-2004ParamilitariesSource:  CERAC6Briefing on the Colombian Conflict   By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC• The paramilitary Killing/Injury ratio is on the order of 10, compared to roughly 2 for theguerrillas and 1 for the government.  This is because they mostly kill people by shootingthem at short range in massacres.Ratio of killings to injuries in attacks by group attacking 1988-2004051015202530351988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004K/I by guerrillas K/I by paramilitaries K/I by government forcesParamilitariesSource:  CERAC7Briefing on the Colombian Conflict  By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC• Generally perform very badly in clashes with other armed groups, getting killed muchmore than the opposing guerrillas and government forces.Killings by group in (clashes with paramilitary participation)paramilitary clashes 1988-200401002003004005006001989 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Guerrillas killed Paramilitaries killed Government forces killedParamilitariesSource:  CERAC8Briefing on the Colombian Conflict   By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC• Very high levels of Government-Guerrilla clashesGovernment guerrilla clashes 1988-2004MAIN TRENDS UNDER URIBE01002003004005006007008009001988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Uribe's governmentMain Trends under UribeSource:  CERAC9Briefing on the Colombian Conflict  By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC02004006008001.0001.2001.4001.6001.8002.0001988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 20040,00,51,01,52,02,53,03,54,04,5Guerrillas killed Government forces killed Ratio Gue/GovUribe's government• Higher ratios of guerrillas killed to members of government forces killedNumber of government forces and guerrilla s killed 1988-2004Main Trends under UribeSource:  CERAC10Briefing on the Colombian Conflict   By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC• Government forces have increased both their initiative and responsiveness againstthe guerrillas.• Heavy activity in the so called ¨Operación JM¨zone in the deep south of the country;but not just there, activity remains all over the place.05001.0001.5002.0002.5003.0003.5001988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Combatants killed Civilians killedUribe's government• Many combatants killed, fewer civilians killed.Combatants and civilians killed 1988-2004Main Trends under UribeSource:  CERAC11Briefing on the Colombian Conflict  By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERACMap 1: Clashes between government forces andguerrillas in 2004• Notable problem areas are SoutheasternAntioquia and near the Venezuelan borderwith the Ecuadorian border emerging asan issue.Main Trends under Uribe12Briefing on the Colombian Conflict   By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERACMap 2: AttacksMain Trends under Uribe13Briefing on the Colombian Conflict  By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC• Government-Paramilitary clashes rose from almost nothing to something, but thendisappeared.• Fewer guerrilla attacks (one-sided events) although these have started to come back.Number of guerrilla attacks02004006008001.0001.2001988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Uribe's governmentMain Trends under UribeSource:  CERAC14Briefing on the Colombian Conflict   By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC0501001502002503003504004505001988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004ELN clashes ELN attacksUribe's government• ELN is disappearing as an attacking force.Number of ELN clashes and attacksMain Trends under UribeSource:  CERAC15Briefing on the Colombian Conflict  By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC• Fewer paramilitary attacks (one-sided events)Number of paramilitary attacks0501001502002501988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Uribe's government• Since 2002 the paramilitaries have been on an official ceasefire.  They have violated itfrequently but have, nevertheless reduced their activity, focusing less on the guerrillasand more on land-grabbing, drug dealing and political infiltrationMain Trends under UribeSource:  CERAC16Briefing on the Colombian Conflict   By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC• The paramilitaries are killing fewer civilians than before but the numbers are growing.• Civilian killings are overwhelmingly in isolated rural areas, mainly from paramilitarymassacres.Population density and civilians killed in paramilitary massacres0,00,10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,91,00-50100-150200-250300-350400-450500-550650-700800-850900-9501050-11001650-17002350-24002750-28004100-41504500-45505650-570016100-16150People per square kilometreCummulative participationPopulation2005 KCivMasParMain Trends under UribeSource:  CERAC17Briefing on the Colombian Conflict  By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC0,00,10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,91,00-5050-100100-150150-200200-250250-300300-350350-400400-450450-500500-550550-600650-700750-800800-850850-900900-9501000-10501050-11001100-11501650-17001700-17502350-24002650-27002750-28003650-37004100-41504350-44004500-45505600-56505650-57009350-940016100-16150People per square kilometreCummulative participationPopulation2005 KCivMasGuePopulation density and civilians killed in guerrilla massacresMain Trends under Uribe• Civilian injury rates remain very high due to a sustained guerrilla bombing campaign.• Civilian injuries tend to concentrate in biggest cities and the most isolated rural areasbut these effects are not as pronounced as for massacres.Source:  CERAC18Briefing on the Colombian Conflict   By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERACPopulation density and civilians injured in guerrilla bombings0,00,10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,91,00-50100-150200-250300-350400-450500-550650-700800-850900-9501050-11001650-17002350-24002750-28004100-41504500-45505650-570016100-16150People per square kilometreCummulative participationPopulation2005 ICivBomGue• 2004 was not as good as 2003 and indications are that 2005 will show furtherbacksliding.Main Trends under UribeSource:  CERAC19Briefing on the Colombian Conflict  By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC• The government has made serious mistakes in the political side of counterinsurgency.• It has not made a good case internationally, e.g., its bewildering campaign to deny thatColombia has a conflict.• There is weak international support for paramilitary demobilization, in part due to failureof the government to build a wide coalition for its Peace and Justice Bill.• Resources, including time but also money, are lacking for investigation of paramilitarycrimes.  The government is doing a poor job of doing forensic tests on guns andpairing them with demobilizing combatants.• More importantly, resources are scarce for reparations.  Building a good victims registryis the key to this process but it will be expensive to get this right.  The internationalcommunity should focus more on reparations for victims and less on punishments forperpetrators.• The UN needs to be brought into the demobilization process.  Right now the OAS iscarrying this load almost by itself with little support and lots of criticism just formonitoring the process.• Potential security vacuum as paramilitaries demobilize.  The government is addressingthis problem with a new division and 5,000 additional police but this is unlikely to beenough.BIGGER PICTUREBigger Picture20Briefing on the Colombian Conflict   By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC• No sign that the guerrillas are really on a trajectory of defeat at this stage.• Uribe remains remarkably popular but this has translated into only modest additionalfinancing for the conflict.• Neighboring states, primarily Venezuela and Equator, must be pressured to cooperate.These countries clearly have understandings, implicit or explicit, that illegal groupscan go there as long as they threaten only Colombian interests.  Venezuela is justnow setting up a production line that will be able to produce ammunition usable by theFARC for weapons they have been struggling to feed.• There needs to be a broader, more integrated program of taking away territory, hol-ding it and building institutions, including police, judges and prosecutors.  There doesseem to be some desire to do this but the resources are lacking.• In this context training for special forces, military, police, judges, prosecutors andemergency medicine is very valuable.• Controlling land is the most promising approach to cutting the supply of drugs inthe long run.  It is vital for Colombia to do a comprehensive land survey.  There istoo much ungoverned space for spraying to really work as the primary tactic in thedrug war.Bigger Picture21Briefing on the Colombian Conflict  By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC1988-2004 1998-2004Ratio of killings in events with paramilitary participation to total number of killings 0,26 0,36Ratio of injuries in events with guerrilla participation to total number of injuries 0,82 0,79Ratio of killings to injuries in paramilitary attacks 11,23 11,21Ratio of killings to injuries in guerrilla attacks 0,96 0,92Ratio of killings to injuries in government attacks 2,64 2,43Civilian killngs 12771 7766• Continued US funding seems assured but with an unfortunate single-minded focus onspraying.Some Ratios for the Colombian Conflict 1988-2004Professor Michael Spagat is the Chairman of the Advisory Board of CERAC and Research Associate.He is a professor of Economics at Royal Holloway-University of London and has an extensiverecord of research in political economy of conflicts, dictatorships and repressive regimes.  He hasalso done research in comparative and monetary economics.Professor Spagat holds a PhD in economics from Harvard University and is a member of the CEPRand the William Davidson Institute.e-mail:  M.Spagat@rhul.ac.uk   website:  www.cerac.org.coBigger PictureSource:  CERAC

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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict

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