Abu Ghazalah, Sarah

Markantonakis, Konstantinos

Mayes, Keith

In this paper, we propose a lightweight mutualauthentication protocol for low-cost RadioFrequency IDentification (RFID) tags. AlthoughRFID systems promise a fruitful future, security andprivacy concerns have affected the proliferation ofthe RFID technology. The proposed protocol aims toprotect RFID tags against a wide variety of attacksand especially Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Wefound that the majority of the proposed protocolsfailed to resist this kind of attack. To analyse ourproposed protocol, we provide an informal analysis.In addition, we formally analyse the security of theproposed protocol via using automated formalverification tools such as CasperFDR and AVISPA.We also employed an up-to-date privacy model toevaluate the privacy of the RFID protocol. Theresults show that the proposed protocol achievestag’s data secrecy, privacy and authentication underthe presence of a passive adversary

A Formally Verified Mutual Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost RFID Tags

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Royal Holloway - Pure