SUMMARY  Nigeria's increasing militarisation is partly a consequence of the government's programme for economic recovery. This programme, influenced by the World Bank model of structural adjustment, aims at ensuring the conditions for long?run capitalist development, by actively seeking the participation of foreign capital. To earn the confidence of foreign capital and control the social consequences of an austerity package an authoritarian government is required.    SOMMAIRE   Brandt, Berg et la militarisation au Nigéria    La militarisation croissante du Nigéria est grandement due au programme gouvernemental pour le redressement économique. Ce programme, influencé par le modèle de la Banque Mondiale d'adjustement structurel, a pour but d'assurer les conditions de développement capitaliste à long terme, en recherchant activement la participation du capital étranger. Afin d'avoir la confiance du capital étranger et de contrôler les conséquences sociales d'un programme d'austérité, un gouvernement authoritaire est obligatoire.    RESUMEN   Brandt, Berg y la militarización en Nigeria    La creciente militarización de Nigeria se debe, en parte, al programa de recuperación económica del gobierno. Este programa — influenciado por el modelo de ajuste estructural del Banco Mundial — tiene como objectivo asegurar condiciones de desarrollo capitalista de largo plazo, mediante una búsqueda activa de la participación del capital extranjero. Se requiere un gobierno autoritario para obtener la confianza del capital extranjero y el control de las consecuencias sociales de un plan de austeridad

CBN (Central Bank of Nigeria)

John Ohiorhenuan

World Bank

IDS Bulletin

English

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Brandt, Berg and Militarisation in Nigeria

Ohiorhenuan, John

IDS OpenDocs

Brandt, Berg and Militarisation in Nigeria'
John Ohiorhenuan
Introduction
In 1980 the Brandt Report compared world military
expenditures of about US$450 bn per annum with
annual spending on official aid of US$20bn and
observed that if a small fraction of military spending
could be diverted to development the future prospects
of the Third World would look entirely different
[Report of the Independent Commission on Inter-
national Development Issues 1980: 117]. From the
viewpoint of the South, this is the crux of the Brandt
Commission's argument. The Brandt and Palme
Reports' other concerns with the implications of
nuclear war are not of exclusive interest to the Third
World: for in the eventuality of such a war we would
all be dead.
Nigeria's military expenditures soared during the civil
war, to 43 per cent of federal expenditures in 1969/70.
Since then, defence spending as a ratio of federal
expenditure has actually been falling, although in
absolute terms it has continued to rise. With the
reduction in armed forces personnel from 250,000 at
the end of the war to about 100,000 currently, defence
spending per member of the armed forces has risen
dramatically, from some US$2,450 in 1971 to over
US$10,200 in ¡984. But the process of militarisation in
Nigeria extends far beyond increased military
expenditures. It involves an attempt to re-order
society by decree, the imposition on the ordinary
citizen of an authoritarian ethos and the spread of a
culture of force. This article argues that serious as the
Brandt Commission's concerns might be, it is the Berg
Report on Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa [World Bank 1981] that has had the more
fundamental impact. Specifically, an authoritarian
state has been a necessary corollary of the kind of
structural adjustment policies being sponsored in
Africa by the World Bank and the ¡MF.
This article was written before the Nigerian coup in August ¡985
(cd).
11)5 Bu/le/u,. 1985. vo! IS so 4. lux/ii sie of Developrueni Siudies. Sussex
58
The Berg Solution and Recent Nigerian
Economic Policy
It is impossible in the limited space here to summarise
the Berg Report (but see IDS 1983). Simply, the
Report's central theme is the need to re-examine the
domestic economic policies of sub-Saharan African
governments which have been characterised by biases
against agriculture, exports, free trade and private
enterprise. It is these biases which have resulted in the
deteriorating economic performance of most African
countries since the 1970s. From this diagnosis,
prescription follows logically, almost naturally:
stimulate agricultural exports, restore the rule of the
market, reduce the direct economic role of the state
and relax its control of the economy, encourage
private enterprise, eliminate impediments to free trade
and adopt aggressive population control programmes.
Although the Report recommends increased aid flows,
which should where possible be coordinated by the
Bank, it suggests that these are unlikely to be effective
unless accompanied by the proposed structural
adjustment programmes.
By the time of the military coup on December 31,
1983, Nigeria seemed to be ready for such a
programme. The economy was on the verge of
collapse. External indebtedness in respect of medium
and long term loans stood at US$9.5 bn. Trade arrears
on open account constituted another US$3.6bn.
Adding undrawn loans of US$6.4 bn, total Nigerian
external commitments stood at US$19.Sbn [CBN
1984]. With debt repayment so badly in arrears, the
country's credit-worthiness was almost nil.
On the domestic front official inflation exceeded
50 per cent per annum. Unemployment was rapidly
increasing, with retrenchments and plant closures in
the industrial and commercial sectors. The Minister of
National Planning announced early in 1985 that over
one third of the workforce has been laid-off over the
past three years. In the construction sector,
employment fell sharply from an estimated 300,200 in
1980 to 112,600 in April 1984 [AED 1984]. Wage
payments in some state governments were in arrears
by as much as eight months. Real domestic output had
fallen by 16 per cent from its 1977/78 level and foreign
investment in the economy had virtually ceased.
The Nigerian situation appears to support the Berg
Report's thesis with a vengeance. The corruption and
profligacy of the overthrown civilian government was
incredible. Macroeconomic management policies
were inconsistent, if not downright incoherent.
Expanding state spending was supported by large-
scale deficit financing. The current expenditure
estimate for 1982, for instance, was double its 1981
level. Imports were liberalised even as oil receipts were
declining. Stabilisation measures introduced in April
1982 and extended in 1983 failed to relieve the
pressure on reserves. A large volume of goods were
imported under short-term credit, with the govern-
ment itself putting pressure on the Central Bank to
open letters of credit at very short notice for
government agencies [CBN 1983]. There was also
massive speculation against the naira, reflected in
heavy over-invoicing of imports and the non-delivery
of goods paid for.
The new military regime, determined to stop the rot,
imposed stringent measures. The 1984 budget speech
declared that an increase in wage levels was 'out of the
question'. The Head of State issued several warnings
against strikes and those groups which did not heed
them were quickly put to disarray. Striking employees
of the government-owned Nigeria Airways were
summarily dismissed and evicted from their homes.
When doctors declared an industrial dispute, their two
Associations were banned, the doctors themselves
were dismissed and asked to re-apply under new
conditions, and some of their leaders were gaoled.
To control imports, the government pegged the
foreign exchange budget for 1984 at N8.Obn and
introduced a foreign exchange rationing system which
emphasised machinery and raw materials. Moreover,
it reduced the basic travel allowance to N100.00,
suspended business travel allowances and reduced
home remittance allowances by 50 per cent. Tariffs
were rationalised and the range of import duties was
reduced from 0-500 per cent to 5-200 per cent with a
pledge to maintain the new rates for at least three
years. The Approved User Scheme was abolished and
all imports were placed under specific import licence.
Stressing the need for a radical restructuring of the
economy, the government embarked upon heavy
current expenditure cuts aimed at a 25 per cent overall
reduction. The most immediate results were retrench-
ment in the public sector and cuts in education
subsidies. Fees were re-introduced in educational
institutions and hospitals and various special levies
were introduced. The government also announced a
strategy of privatisation and declared that a
population policy for Nigeria had become a priority.
Agriculture was to be revitalised with new incentives
for multinational and local agribusiness. Meanwhile,
an unorthodox back to the land movement was
instituted under the War Against Indiscipline (WAI)
campaign, to clear all cities of roadside stalls.
In several respects, the Nigerian military government's
own structural adjustment programme is very similar
to those being sponsored by the World Bank and the
¡MF, even though it has so far been unable to reach an
agreement allowing it to receive balance of payments
support from the latter. The World Bank itself has
exerted considerable influence on Nigerian policy.
Following its review of Nigerian capital expenditure in
1984, the Bank recently undertook a review of current
expenditure. The thrust of its preliminary report is,
not unexpectedly, on rationalising public expenditures
and cutting recurrent costs. Bank staff are also
investigating other sources of health financing; and
the Bank-financed Sokoto Health Project is being
recommended as a model for health-care delivery. The
Bank is collaborating with the Federal Ministry of
Commerce and Industry to prepare a new package of
industrial incentives and is helping to launch a family
planning campaign. As part of its agricultural
programme, the government is proposing to extend
the Bank-financed Agricultural Development Project
to all local government areas of the country.
Nigeria-IMF talks remain stalled, especially over the
issues of devaluation, import liberalisation and the
removal of petroleum subsidies. But as General
Buhan announced in an interview with Radio Kaduna
on July 12, 1985, the talks still continue and the
problem is not devaluation per se but the politically
feasible rate of depreciation. Meanwhile, the naira is
being allowed to slide downwards. The government's
arguments are that there is no point in liberalising
imports when there is no foreign exchange to cover
them; and that the cost of living increases which would
follow sudden devaluation and removal of subsidies
would generate severe social and political unrest.
Significantly, although project loans are continuing,
the US$300 mn structural adjustment loan offered by
the World Bank in 1983 was, in 1984, made
conditional on Nigeria reaching an agreement with the
¡MF.
The Authoritarian Implications of the Berg
Solution
The declared objective of the military government is to
revive the economy and instil discipline in Nigerian
society. The government has announced that it will
59
stay in office as long as is necessary to improve the
economy and earn the confidence of Nigeria's trading
partners. The programme is mounted under the
banner of the War Against Indiscipline, with military
tribunals handling offences ranging from 'economic
sabotage' to drug peddling. A tight lid has been placed
on the press and on student and union protest.
In February, 1984 the State Security (Detention of
Persons) Decree, No. 2 was promulgated. It empowers
the government to detain indefinitely without charge
anyone suspected of 'acts prejudicial to national
security' or of having contributed to the country's
economic adversity. Several people have been held
under this decree. Recently, the government announced
that 'irresponsible views' in the newspapers would
lead to their closure. More significantly, to prevent
newspaper discussions of future political arrange-
ments, the government outlawed all political debates
in July 1985, declaring them a contravention of
Decree 2. Supplemented by Decree 4, the Public
Officers (Protection Against False Accusation)
Decree, this Decree has made it virtually impossible to
scrutinise government activities. In July 1984, for
example, two journalists were imprisoned for a year
merely for publishing a report speculating about the
appointment of new ambassadors.
These two decrees form part of a series of draconian
new laws being introduced by the military government.
Several more informal directives are also in place. All
heads of government agencies, for instance, have been
instructed to ensure that their facilities are not used as
a forum to discredit the government. Thus university
Vice-Chancellors are expected to censor the papers
delivered at any public lecture or symposium on their
campuses. The Ondo State University was closed
down when its Students' Union did not clear the
contents of some of the papers presented by 'outsiders'
at one of its symposia.
The government's reputation for tyranny, both in the
content of its policy and in its style of government, is
essentially a consequence of its Bergian economic
programme. Two dimensions are particularly
important. First, the current austerity package is
imposing serious hardships on the populace. A 'strong
government' is required to keep the tension from
erupting.
Second, and perhaps more important, it is believed
that although the government's short term economic
programme might prevent the collapse of the
economy, future economic growth will still require the
injection of substantial amounts of new capital. Hence
the government is turning to foreign private capital.
Since the early 1970s, Nigeria has ceased to be
regarded by the latter as a suitable place for long-term
60
direct investment. The ïndigenisation programme
pursued by successive Nigerian governments reduced
the ownership stake of foreign investors. The oil boom
encouraged concentration on quick-yielding invest-
ment: construction, consultaricies and commissions.
And among Nigerian capitalists, traders and agents
dominated. The peculiar feature of the oil economy
which came to provide over 80 per cent of government
revenues in foreign exchange was that it also meant
that the expatriation of surplus was easy. Profit
margins, kickbacks and commissions were taken up-
front in foreign exchange. But since it was obvious that
the oil boom conditions were not going to last
indefinitely, speculation against the naira was rife and
was reflected, for instance, in heavy over-invoicing of
imports. Moreover, the dubious ways in which some
Nigerians earned hard currency made repatriation
risky. Capital flight was thus endemic in the
conditions of Nigerian accumulation.
Against this background, the military government
must now convince capital that it will be protected,
that it can earn a high rate of return and that the
repatriation of surplus will be guaranteed. To do this,
not only must the government be seen tobe 'strong', it
has to stay around long enough to ensure stability.
Nigeria's increasing militarisation is thus a con-
sequence of the kind of programme for economic
recovery which it has adopted. The latter, to be sure,
has not been directly imposed by the World Bank and
IMF. But it has a close similarity to the structural
adjustment programmes advocated by these
institutions. Moreover it aims at developing the
conditions for self-sustaining capitalist accumulation.
This implies that less attention will be paid than
previously to equity considerations and even less to
questions of need. For such a programme to succeed
'political stability' is required to control a restive
population and earn the confidence of foreign capital.
References
AED (African Economic Digest), 1984. June
CBN (Central Bank of Nigeria), 1983. 1984, Annual Report
and Statements of Accounts, Lagos
IDS, 1983, 'Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa'.
IDS Bulletin, vol 14 no I
World Bank. 1981, Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan
Africa: an Agenda/or Action, Washington DC


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