Khalidi, Muhammad Ali

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SORITES (Σωριτης), ISSN 1135-1349http://www.sorites.orgIssue # 20 — March 2008. Pp. 37-42Temporal and Counterfactual PossibilityCopyright © by Muhammad Ali Khalidi and SORITESTEMPORAL AND COUNTERFACTUAL POSSIBILITYby Muhammad Ali KhalidiAmong philosophers working on modality, there is a common assumption that there is astrong connection between temporal possibility and counterfactual possibility. For example,Sydney Shoemaker (1998, 69-70) writes:It seems to me a general feature of our thought about possibility that how we think that something could havediffered from how it in fact is [is] closely related to how we think that the way something is at one time coulddiffer from the way that same thing is at a different time. In possible worlds jargon, the ways one and the samething of a given sort can differ across worlds correspond to the ways one and the same thing of that sort candiffer at different times in the same world. Could I have been a plumber or an accountant instead of aphilosopher? The answer seems to be yes — and this goes with the fact that we acknowledge the possibilityof a scenario in which someone who was exactly as I was at some point in my life undergoes a series ofchanges resulting in his eventually being a plumber or an accountant.In a footnote, he acknowledges that this connection between counterfactual and temporalpossibility needs to be qualified in response to an objection by Randy Clarke: «The propertyof being the child of someone who has visited Paris is not one that one can have and thenlose; but it is one that one can have in the actual world and not have in some other possibleworld.» (1998, 75n.9) Therefore, he restricts the inference from temporal to counterfactualpossibility and vice versa to «non-historical properties.»In the passage quoted above, Shoemaker stops short of endorsing strict implication relationsbetween temporal and counterfactual possibility. Still, there is a presumption in the work ofmany philosophers that ade re modal claim concerning the possession of a property by anindividual usually implies and is implied by a temporal claim concerning the possession ofthat same property by that individual. For example, it might be argued that Alfred could notpossibly have been non-human on the grounds that Alfred cannot become non-human, or thatBertha could possibly have been a plumber on the grounds that she can become a plumber.Generally, we can frame the relevant principles as follows1:(1) If x could have been F in another possible world, then x can become F in the course oftime in the actual world.(2) If x can become F in the course of time in the actual world, then x could have been F inanother possible world.These principles are rarely if ever stated in this stark fashion, but implicit appeal to them(especially the second) abounds in the work of essentialist philosophers. To cite just one1. One can also formulate contrapositive equivalents of these claims, e.g. (1’) If x cannot become F in the courseof time in the actual world, then x could not have been F in another possible world. Corresponding claims can alsobe framed in terms of necessity rather than possibility.<http://www.sorites.org> —SORITES Issue # 20 — March 2008ISSN 1135-1349 38recent example, in a book on scientific essentialism, Brian Ellis (2001, 32) characterizesaccidental properties as «properties that a thing can acquire or lose without ceasing to be athing of the kind it is.» The connection between what is accidental (i.e. non-essential, andtherefore contingent) with what can be actually acquired or lost in the course of time seemsquite widespread.However, these principles have been questioned by at least one recent writer on modality.E. J. Lowe thinks that it is neither the case that counterfactual possibility implies temporalpossibility ((1) above), nor that temporal possibility implies counterfactual possibility ((2)above). He argues against (1) as follows: «… a sculptor could perhaps have given a somewhatdifferent shape to a statue that he has just made — but it doesn’t follow that the statue can nowbe made to take on that different shape.» (2002, 80) Though Lowe does not elaborate further,it is not difficult to conjure up a case to illustrate the claim. Imagine that a sculptor has takena block of marble and fashioned it into a bust of Socrates with a small nose. Let us grant thatit may not be possible for that sculpture to be reshaped at some later time such that it has alarge nose. This would be the case, for example, if the sculpture has been fashioned from asingle piece of marble that cannot be repaired by reattaching parts that have been cut from it.However, the sculpture might originally have been capable of being fashioned into a head witha large nose (indeed, the sculptor might first have carved it in such a way as to have a largenose, then made the nose smaller). Thus, this sculpture could have had a different shape fromthe one that it actually has (counterfactual possibility), but it may not be possible for thesculpture to acquire that shape in the future (temporal possibility).As for (2), Lowe imagines a certain plant that can acquire a different shape from the shapeit now has, though it could not have had a different shape in another possible world. Hewrites: «it might be that a plant of a certain kindmustpossess a certain shape at a certainstage of its existence — for instance, when it is a seed — even though it is possible for it tochange its shape thereafter.» (2002, 80; original emphasis) He holds that it could take on adifferent shape in the future, when it is transformed from a seed into a seedling. But «it is trueto say of it, when it is a seed, that it could not have had a different shape from the shape thatit actually has at that moment.» (2002, 80) Hence, even though it is temporally possible totake on a different shape, it is not counterfactually possible for it to have had that shape.In the rest of the paper, the two principles and their respective counterexamples will beconsidered in reverse order. After describing a modified version of the second counterexample,in section 2, an attempt will be made to show that it does not, on closer inspection defeat (2).Then, in section 3, it will be argued that the first counterexample does defeat (1), but for acertain set of non-standard «irreversible properties». (The «historical properties» for whichShoemaker issues his restriction are a special case of such properties.) Section 4 will concludeby claiming that it has not been shown that temporal possibility does not imply counterfactualpossibility, and that although it has been shown that counterfactual possibility does notgenerally imply temporal possibility, the exceptions to this principle are nonstandardproperties.2. Does Temporal Possibility Imply Counterfactual?Let us begin with a modified version of the second counterexample, which purports toshow that temporal possibility does not imply counterfactual possibility. When it comes todere modality, it always helps to personalize matters. Consider a certain caterpillar Charlie inthe larval stage at timet1. At that time, it seems correct to say that Charlie must necessarily<http://www.sorites.org> — «Temporal and Counterfactual Possibility» by Muhammad A. Khalidi 39be larva-shaped (she cannot, for example, be butterfly-shaped and remain a larva). However,it is clearly possible, and in many cases it is actually the case, that Charlie can becomebutterfly-shaped at some future time. Is it really impossible for Charlie to be butterfly-shapedin some other possible world? It might be argued that she could not, on the grounds that atthat very stage in her life cycle, she must be larva-shaped. However, since we are dealing withde remodality, the question is not whether Charlie-as-larva could have been butterfly-shaped,but whetherCharlie could have been butterfly-shaped. And it is clearly possible for Charlieto have been butterfly-shaped without ceasing to be Charlie. To see this more clearly, let ussuppose that we allow some time to pass in the actual world, after which Charlie has beentransformed first into a pupa, and then into an imago (butterfly). If we assumeuncontroversially that the organism maintains its identity through these transformations, thenCharlie the larva will have become Charlie the imago.2 At that point in time, call itt2, if weask ourselves whether Charlie could have been a butterfly, the answer is clearly that she couldhave been, since she is actually a butterfly, and actuality implies (counterfactual) possibility.Therefore, since it is true of Charlie att2 that she could have been a butterfly, it is also trueof Charlie att1, that she could have been a butterfly.But what should we make of the claim that Charlie is necessarily larva-shaped at the larvalstage of her existence, or that she cannot possibly have been butterfly-shaped while at thelarval stage? It is true that it is impossible for a larva to be butterfly-shaped (according tobiological laws as we know them). But that does not show that it is impossiblefor Charlieto be butterfly-shaped. The claim that it is impossible for a larva (while remaining a larva) tobe butterfly-shaped is quite different from the claim that it is impossible for Charlie (whileremaining Charlie) to have been butterfly-shaped. The first is an essentialist claim aboutproperties, while the second is an essentialist claim about an individual’s possession of aproperty. Accordingly, insofar as we are concerned withde re modalities pertaining to thepossession of certain properties by individuals, the first claim does not lead us to theconclusion that an individual’s possession of a property may be temporally possible butcounterfactually impossible.We could try to relativize the counterfactual claim to a time, but that would not help. Itmight be said that Charlie at timet1 (while in the larval stage) could not have been butterfly-shaped. But if we assume necessity of origin for organisms, so that Charlie necessarilyoriginates from some particular fertilized egg, then there is a possible world in which Charliewas born at some time prior to the time at which she was actually born. In particular, thereis another possible world in which Charlie hatched earlier than1 d was already transformedinto a butterfly byt1. Therefore, it is not even true to say of Charlie at timet1 that she couldnot have been butterfly-shaped att1.3Is this case like Lowe’s? It would appear so. In his example, a particular plant, which isa seed at a particular time, could not have had some other (non-seed) shape at that time. Butif we frame this in terms of ade remodal claim about that particular plant, call it Danny, thenit is clearly the case that Danny could have had some other shape, just as Charlie could have2. If the organism does not survive these transformations then the counterexample cannot get off the ground, sinceit rests on the idea that it is a temporal possibility for the organism to change in this way.3. Some (e.g. Peter King (1999)) have argued that it is incoherent to effect temporal comparisons across possibleworlds. If so, then the onus is on the opponent of principle (2) to show how else to interpret the counterexampleso as to defeat (2).<http://www.sorites.org> —SORITES Issue # 20 — March 2008ISSN 1135-1349 40been butterfly-shaped. While it may be true that a seed that necessarily has a particular shapecould not have had a plant-like shape at that stage of its existence, that is (again) not ade remodal claim about a particular individual.3. Does Counterfactual Possibility Imply Temporal?In the above elaboration of Lowe’s first counterexample, a bust of Socrates with a smallnose, call it ‘Soc’, cannot at timet1 (given its dimensions at that time) be carved so that it hasa large nose. So it is not temporally possible for Soc to acquire a certain shape fromt1onwards, but it would have been possible for Soc to have had that shape in some otherpossible world. Imagine that Soc is first carved into a bust with a large nose at some timet0prior to t1. Now let us suppose that the sculptor has learned that Socrates had a small snubnose and has further chiseled Soc’s nose at time1, making it smaller. It is not possible att1for the bust to be transformed in such a way that it becomes large-nosed, but it could havebeen large-nosed in another possible world (indeed, it had a large nose in the actual world att0). This is supposed to refute the claim that counterfactual possibility implies temporalpossibility.4The general form of such cases is as follows. They ask us to consider an individuali thatlacks some contingent propertyP at time t0, whereP is such that once it has been acquiredit cannot be lost. Then they suppose thati acquiresP at some later timet1. SinceP is acontingent property ofi, i might not have possessedP in the first place, but once it hasacquiredP at t1 it cannot be withoutP any time aftert1. Thus, when we consideri any timeafter t1, it is clear that it might not have hadP but that it cannot come not to haveP. Thisshows that something can be a counterfactual possibility but not a temporal possibility. Butare there any such contingent propertiesP, which are such that once acquired, they cannot belost? Here are a few examples:adult, immune to chicken pox, war veteran, andafflicted withan incurable disease. Moreover, it is quite simple to construct such an «irreversible property»from certain ordinary «reversible» properties. Take some contingent propertyQ, such asridinga bicycle, and then construct a tensed version ofQ, call it P, has ridden a bicycle. Clearly,anything that has hadQ at some time always hasP at every subsequent time, soP is not aproperty thati can lose fromt1 onwards (even thoughi might lose Q itself). Thus, anindividual can possessQ at one time and not another, but having hadQ, that individualcontinues to haveP no matter what. LosingP is therefore not a temporal possibility for thatindividual from t1 onwards, even though it is clearly a counterfactual possibility not to possessP, simply becauseQ is contingent in the first place.How does this apply to Lowe’s counterexample? The bust of Socrates could have beensmall-nosed in another possible world, but it cannot be made to become small-nosed aftert1in this world. However, in this case the propertysmall-nosedis not obviously an irreversibleproperty, as defined above. What makes it irreversible is the assumption, to which I alludedin section 1, concerning the medium in which the sculpture has been fashioned (though Lowehimself does not make this assumption explicit). In this case, having acquired a small nose,we are assuming that Soc cannot regain the matter in the right location, in order to acquirea large nose (thereby losing the propertysmall-nosed). If the sculptor were working in themedium of clay, he could simply replace the bits of matter that had been discarded, and Soc4. I take it that it is uncontroversial that the sculpture endures through such relatively minor changes to its nose,remaining the same sculpture throughout. If not, the changes can be made as small as one likes so as not to affectthe identity of the artifact.<http://www.sorites.org> — «Temporal and Counterfactual Possibility» by Muhammad A. Khalidi 41could become large-nosed again. Hence, the irreversible property in this case is somethinglike, small-nosed bust carved in marble.The above scheme also accounts for Shoemaker’s counterexample (which was suggestedby Clarke) concerning the «historical property» of being the child of someone who has visitedParis. First, consider a simpler case, the propertyhas visited Paris. This is indeed anirreversible property, as defined above: it is contingent but cannot be lost once it has beenacquired. Moreover, it is a tensed property that can be formed from a reversible property inthe manner suggested above. IfQ is is visiting Paris, thenP is has visited Paris, and it isclear that ifQi is actual at some timet1 for an individuali, thenPi is actual for all times aftert1. In other words, one cannot lose the propertyP in the actual world5, even though there isa possible world in which~Pi. In Shoemaker’s case, the matter is complicated somewhat bythe fact that the property is possessed not by the individual under consideration, but by thatindividual’s parents. Presumably, this works because many essentialist writers presupposesome form of origin essentialism for human beings, so having the parents that one actuallyhas is also an essential property of an individual. Thus, one can displace the propertyP ontothe individual’s parents rather than the individual him or herself, but the conclusion remainsthe same.Therefore, principle (1) fails for what I have called «irreversible properties» (includingsome tensed properties that can be constructed in such a way that they are irreversible). Suchpeculiar properties might be banished by «sparse» theorists of properties, who argue that notall predicates correspond to properties and that only real properties should be admitted intoour ontology. But there is no need to resort to such desperate measures, provided we bear inmind that principle (1) does not apply to the class of irreversible properties.4. ConclusionThis paper has tried to show, by elaborating on Lowe’s counterexamples, that they do notblock the inference from temporal to counterfactual possibility, and that although they doblock it from counterfactual to temporal possibility, they do so only for a class of non-standard irreversible properties (including some tensed properties). The inference fromtemporal to counterfactual possibility would seem to be more crucial for modal theorizing thanthe converse, since one plausible guide to what could happen in other possible worlds is whatcould happen in the course of time in this world. It is still permissible to reason from whatproperties an individual might come to possess in the future to what properties that individualmight have possessed in some other possible world, at least insofar as it makes sense to speakof de re modal properties of individuals in the first place. Whether this would enable us toreplace our possible-worlds talk with talk about possible futures is a subject for another paper.ReferencesEllis, Brian (2001),Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.King, Peter J. (1999), «Hereafter, in a Later World Than This?»Sorites10, 74-79.Lowe, E. J. (2002),A Survey of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.5. Hence the phrase, «We’ll always have Paris.»<http://www.sorites.org> —SORITES Issue # 20 — March 2008ISSN 1135-1349 42Shoemaker, Sydney (1998), «Causal and Metaphysical Necessity,»Pacific PhilosophicalQuarterly 79, 59-77.AcknowledgmentI would like to thank Nelly Dib for discussions relating to the topic of this paper andfor reading it and providing helpful feedback.Muhammad Ali KhalidiDepartment of PhilosophyYork University4700 Keele StreetToronto, ON M3J 1P3. Canadakhalidi@yorku.ca

Temporal and Counterfactual Possibility

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Temporal and Counterfactual Possibility

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