Regulating CMOs by competition: an incomplete answer to the licensing problem?

Abstract

While the three functions of Collective Management Organisations – to licence use, monitor use, and to collect and distribute the revenue – have traditionally been accepted as leading to a natural (national) monopoly, digital exploitation of music may no longer support such a conclusion. The European Commission has challenged the traditional structures through reforms that increase the degree of competition. This paper asks whether the reforms have had the desired effect and shows, through qualitative research, that at least as regards the streaming of music, competition has not delivered. Part of the reason for this may be that the services required by the now competing CMOs have changed.While the three functions of Collective Management Organisations – to licence use, monitor use, and to collect and distribute the revenue – have traditionally been accepted as leading to a natural (national) monopoly, digital exploitation of music may no longer support such a conclusion. The European Commission has challenged the traditional structures through reforms that increase the degree of competition. This paper asks whether the reforms have had the desired effect and shows, through qualitative research, that at least as regards the streaming of music, competition has not delivered. Part of the reason for this may be that the services required by the now competing CMOs have changed