Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 348 (1964)

Latella, John W.

Nerone, Frank Regan

English

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Duquesne Law Review Volume 3 Number 2 Article 12 1965 Constitutional Law - Civil Rights Frank Regan Nerone John W. Latella Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr  Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons Recommended Citation Frank R. Nerone & John W. Latella, Constitutional Law - Civil Rights, 3 Duq. L. Rev. 283 (1965). Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol3/iss2/12 This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. RECENT DECISIONSVan Dusen explains some of the problems involved in section1404 (a) but due to the infrequent litigation in the area, it may bein the far distant future before these remaining problems areanswered.JAMES KIRKCONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Civil Rights--Public Accommodations Underthe Civil Rights Act of 1964.Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 348(1964).On June 19, 1963, the late President Kennedy called for civil rightslegislation in a message to Congress to which he attached a proposedbill. Its stated purpose was:. . . to promote the general welfare, by eliminating dis-crimination based on race, color, religion, or national originin... public accommodations through the exercise by Con-gress of the powers conferred upon it ... to enforce the pro-visions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, toregulate commerce among the several states, and to makelaws necessary and proper to execute the powers conferredupon it by the Constitution.'After a year of deliberation, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Actof 1964.2TITLE H OF THE ACT - INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST DISCRIMI-NATION IN PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION 3 was attacked by theHeart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., as being unconstitutional. Plaintiff wasseeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The UnitedStates counterclaimed for the Act's enforcement. The District Court 4upheld the constitutionality of the public accommodations section andissued a permanent injunction on the counterclaim. The case came1. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 348, 351 (1964).2. P.L. 88-352; 78 Stat. 241.3. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6.4. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Ga.1964); under § 206(b) of the Act, the Attorney General made a request thata court of three judges be convened to hear and determine the case.'19651DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEWto the Supreme Court on admissions and stipulated facts. 5 Prior tothe passage of the Act, the motel had followed a practice of refusingto rent rooms to Negroes, and it alleged that it intended to continueto do so. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court 6 whichheld that Title 11 of the Act 7 was within the power of the commerceclause s and that it did not violate the fifth amendment or the thir-teenth amendment of the Constitution.The initial problem faced by the Court was to overcome the estab-lished precedent of the Civil Rights Cases9 which held the publicaccommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 187510 unconsti-tutional. The Civil Rights Cases were distinguished by the fact thatCongress, in enacting the legislation, did not rely upon the commerceclause." I Therefore, the Civil Rights Cases were not relevant in thedecision of this case.The Court did not elaborate on the question of how discriminationin public accommodations obstructs and burdens interstate commerce,but it was stated that "the voluminous testimony presents overwhelm-ing evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels impedes inter-state travel."' 1 2 However, the Government's brief expresses a moreelaborate coverage of the effect of discrimination in public accom-modations on interstate commerce.' 3 Their argument can be summedup in that discrimination in public accommodations impedes inter-state commerce by (1) depriving the market place of a consumer,and (2) causing protests and demonstrations by discontentedNegroes, the effect of which results in fewer consumers and travelersengaging in interstate commerce.5. Appellant owns and operates a motel of 216 rooms which are availableto transient guests in an area which s assessible to interstate and state high-ways. Seventy-five per cent of the motel's guests are from out of state.6. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 348 (1964).7. See statute cited note 3 supra.8. U.S. Const. Art. 1, §8, cl. 3.9. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).10. 18 Stat. 335, 336.11. See note 8 supra. The Court, in the Civil Rights Cases stated:"Of course, these remarks [as to lack of congressional power] do notapply to those cases in which Congress is clothed with direct and plenarypowers of legislation over the whole subject, accompanied with an ex-press or implied denial of such power to the States, as in the regulationof commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and withthe Indian tribes. . . . In these cases Congress has power to pass lawsfor regulating the subjects specified in every detail, and the conduct andtransactions of individuals in respect thereof." 109 U.S. 3, 18.12. See note 6 at 355 supra.13. Appellee's brief p. 23-38.[Vol. 3: p. 283RECENT DECISIONSThe Supreme Court has held in previous decisions 14 that Congresshas the power within the commerce clause to regulate the movementof people in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court in Hoke v.United State8,' 5 referring to the "intercourse" which Chief JusticeMarshall used in Gibbons v. Ogden16 to define commerce stated thatit "... includes the transportation of persons and property."' 7The Court met the contention that the Act's main purpose is toregulate moral wrongs rather than commerce by stating:That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in manyof these areas rendered its enactments no less valid. Inframing Title II of this Act Congress was also dealing withwhat is considered a moral problem. But that fact does notdetract from the overwhelming evidence of the disruptiveeffect that racial discrimination had had on commercialintercourse. It was this burden which empowered Congressto enact appropriate legislation, and, given this basis for theexercise of its power, Congress was not restricted by thefact that the particular obstruction to interstate commercewith which it was dealing was also deemed a moral andsocial wrong.18Appellant contended that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964violates the fifth' 9 and thirteenth 20 amendments of the United StatesConstitution. The Court rejected both of these contentions.14. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916); Hoke v. United States,227 U.S. 308 (1913); Passenger cases (Smith v. Turner), 7 How. 283, 12 L. Ed.702 (1849).15. 227 U.S. 308 (1913).16. 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824). The Chief Justice said:"The subject to be regulated is commerce: and . . . to ascertain theextent the power it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word. . . it is intercourse . . . between nations, and parts of nations, inall its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying onthat intercourse." [At 189-190]17. See note 15 at 320 supra.18. See note 1 at 357-358 supra; Accord, Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S.308 (1912), where the commerce clause was utilized to regulate prostitution;Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925), criminal enterprises; Boynton v.Comm. of Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960), racial discrimination in terminal restau-rants; Compare, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and N.L.R.B. v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, (1937), where the power of Congressover interstate commerce was held to extend to those intrastate activities whichso affect interstate commerce as to make regulation of them appropriate meansto the attainment of a legitimate end.19. Appellant's Brief p. 51.20. Id. at 54.19651DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEWThe Court, in rejecting the appellant's fifth amendment argument,pointed out that thirty-two states presently have public accommoda-tion statutes, 2 1 which have been held valid under the due processclause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 2 Therefore, a similar regula-tion by the federal government is not a violation of the due processclause of the fifth amendment. The Court said: "The authority ofthe Federal Government over interstate commerce does not differ inextent or character from that retained by the states over intrastatecommerce." 2 3 Nor did the Court give merit to the contention thatthe Act is a taking of property without just compensation. 24 TheCourt discarded the thirteenth amendment argument as not being"akin to African slavery." 25The majority opinion as expressed by Justice Clark, found no needto discuss the possibility that Title II of the Act may be upheld onthe fourteenth amendment. The Court stated:This is not to say that the remaining authority upon whichit acted was not adequate, the question upon which we do21. The following states have enacted public accommodation laws: AlaskaStats. §§ 11.60.230-1160.240 (1962); Calif. Civil Code §§ 51-54 (1954); Colo. Rev.Stats. §§ 25-1-1 to 25-2-5 (1953); Conn. Gen. Stats. Ann. § 53-35 (1961); Del.Code Ann. Tit. 6, c. 45 (1963); Idaho Code, §§ 18-7301 through 18-7303 (1961);Ill. Ann. Stats. (Smith-Hurd ed.) c. 38, §§ 13-1 to 13-4 (1961), c. 43, § 133 (1944);Ind. Stats. Ann. (Burns' ed.) §§ 10-901 to 10-914 (1961) ; Iowa Code Ann. §§ 735.1-735.2 (1950); Kan. Gen. Stats. Ann. § 21-2424 (Supp. 1962); Maine Rev. Stats.c. 137, § 50 (1954); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 49B § 11 (1964); Mass. Ann. Laws,c. 140, §§ 5 and 8 (1957), v. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (1963); Mich. Stats. Ann. §§ 28.343and 28.344 (1962); Minn. Stats. Ann. § 327.09 (1947); Mont. Rev. Codes Tit. 64,§ 211 (1962); Neb. Rev. Stats. c. 20, §§ 101 and 102 (1954); N.H. Rev. Stats. Ann.c. 354, §§ 1,2,4 and 5 (1963); N.J. Stats. Ann. Tit. 10, §§ 1-2 to 1-7; Tit. 18,§§ 25-1 to 25-6 (1963); N.M. Stats. Ann. §§ 49-8-1 to 49-8-6 (1963); N.Y. CivilRights Law (McKinney's ed.), Art. 4 §§ 40,41 (1946); Executive Law, Art. 15,§§ 290-301 (1964); Penal Law, Art. 46, §§ 513-515 (1944); N. Dak. Cont. Code,§ 12-22-30 (1963); Ohio Rev. Code (Pages ed.), §§ 2901.35 and 2901.36 (1954);Oreg.' Rev. Stats. §§ 30.670, 30.675, 30.680 (1963); Penn. Stats. Ann. Tit. 18,§ 4654 (1963); R.I. Gen. Laws, §§ 11-24-1 to 11-24-6 (1956); S. Dak. Sess. Laws,c. 58 (1963); Vt. Stats. Ann. Tit. 13, §§ 1451, 1452 (1958); Wash. Rev. CodeAnn. §§ 49.60.010 to 49.60.170, 9.91.010 (1962); Wis. Stats. Ann. § 942.04 (1958);Wyo Stats. Ann. §§ 6-83.1, 6-83.2 (1963).22. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948); The Court inHeart of Atlanta said: "... the constitutionality of each state statutes standsunquestioned" [at 3591.23. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 569 (1939).24. The Court states that case law is to the contrary. See Legal Tendercases, 12 Wall 457, 20 L. Ed. 287 (1871); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States,261 U.S. 502 (1923); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S.155 (1958).25. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916).[Vol. 3: p. M8.RECENT DECISIONSnot pass, but merely that since the commerce power is suffi-cient for our decision here we have considered it alone. 26Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion was "somewhat reluctant... to rest solely on the Commerce Clause."2 7 He contended that thefourteenth amendment could be upheld as appropriate to the end ofenforcing Title II of the Act. In another concurring opinion 28 Jus-tice Goldberg stated that the primary purpose of the Civil Rights Actwas to protect the personal dignity of man, which necessitates equalaccess to public accommodations. And Congress clearly had theauthority under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to enact theCivil Rights Act of 1964.This case clearly resolves any doubt as to congressional power toregulate discrimination in public accommodations as it affects inter-state commerce. In addition, it left open the question whether Con-gress could legislate against discrimination in public accommodationsper se. Although the majority of the Court did not support this deci-sion on the fourteenth amendment, their language indicates thatabsent the commerce power they may have done so. The concurringopinions of Justices Douglas and Goldberg would have supported thedecision on both the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment.In order to support the Civil Rights Act of 1964 entirely on the four-teenth amendment would have necessitated the overruling of theCivil Rights Cases. The effects of a decision supported exclusively bythe fourteenth amendment would facilitate Congress to take greaterstrides in the movement to protect civil rights in the area of publicaccommodations. Heart of Atlanta is an intermediate step for sucha decision.FRANK REGAN NERONE and JOHN W. LATELLA26. See note 1 at 354 supra.27. Id. at 369.28. Id. at 375-377.1965]

Constitutional Law - Civil Rights

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Constitutional Law - Civil Rights

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