This thesis consists of three chapters, all of which make extensive use of Italian administrative data. The first chapter studies strategic delays in the timing of layoffs around an age-at-layoff threshold entitling workers to a four month increase in potential unemployment insurance (UI) benefit duration. After having documented sizeable manipulation of age at layoff near the threshold, we show that the ensuing increase in UI benefit receipt is 81% mechanically due to higher coverage and only 19% the result of moral hazard responses. The second chapter documents the effects of increased import competition from China on the Italian labour market. In the first part of the paper, we show that areas that were initially specialized in import-competing industries suffered larger losses in manufacturing employment. However, these effects are modest in size. In the second part of the paper, we show that incumbent manufacturing workers did not suffer long-term economic losses. Although they spent less time at their initial employers, they were able to carry out successful transitions towards other sectors, in areas with better job opportunities. The third chapter studies the labour market outcomes of individuals starting an apprenticeship and compares them with those of similar individuals starting temporary contracts that, at least formally, do not provide training. I show that while apprenticeships increase the probability of conversion to open-ended contracts, especially at the initial firm, they also decrease the probability of obtaining further temporary contracts. Quantitatively, this second effect prevails, generating a negative effect on the probability of obtaining any job
