The aim of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of the emergence, nature, and significance of non-state transnational governance. This research objective is pursued by examining an aspect of transnational non-state governance often neglected, the role of the state in the emergence and operation of non-state governance schemes. The role of the state in this context is illuminated by identifying and explaining the emergence of a particular type of authority, called transnational regulatory authority. Transnational regulatory authority emerges when the authority of creating regulation bearing a degree of legal obligation about an issue-area or industry at a global level, is delegated to non-state actors. This delegation of regulatory authority is puzzling, as it implies a loss of regulators' control over the regulatory governance of their jurisdictions, but also raises significant normative concerns, since authority has been entrusted to the state under specific procedures which form the very foundation of a democratic political association. An explanation to this puzzle is proposed by a theoretical framework created through the synthesis of insights provided by the economic theory of international regulation and the political theory of authority. The propositions that emerge from this synthesis are tested through the examination of two case-studies, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for the Registration of Pharmaceutical Products (ICH). The principal finding of the thesis is that the delegation of rule-making authority to transnational organizations is the result of explicit redistributive regulatory strategies, domestic or international, designed to satisfy specific domestic constituencies. However, regulators need to allay the normative concerns raised by this delegation of authority. To do this, they have to justify their decision by persuading the political establishment and the public that this delegation is necessary for the provision of adequate regulatory governance
