This thesis aims to explain why and how the Netherlands came to form part of the post-war Western security system and to support he rearmament of West Germany. It looks critically at how major post-war developments in Europe affected Dutch foreign policy, traditionally one of abstentionism, and considers the extent of Dutch influence in post-war Western cooperation. The Dutch attitude towards the process of German rearmament and to the Netherlands' own security needs is described and analysed. The considerable problems the Dutch had with Britain and the Unites States over Indonesia and the German question, and with Britain and the "European question", are set out and analysed, as are important aspects of Dutch-German relations, particularly the "annexation question" and trade. Important landmarks, and how the Dutch approached them, are dealt with. These are the Marshall Plan, the Brussels Treaty Organisation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Council of Europe, the Schuman Plan and the Plieven Plan. The different attitudes of two Foreign Ministers, Dirk Stikker and Willem Beyen, towards the question of European integration, are analysed. The thesis concludes that Beyen laid less stress on the Atlantic partnership than did Stikker, and considerably more on European integration. Its final conclusion is that the Netherlands, although it decided to be a part of an alliance, still retained sufficient independence to influence events
