Anzaldo, Armando Aranda

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NATURALISTIC ETHICS. IS THERE SUCH A THING?ARMANDO ARANDA-ANZALDO Not so long ago, a rather naive idea, namely that there is a lineal relation-ship between a given organism set of genes (the genotype) and the set ofobservable characters from such an organism (the phenotype), in such away that the first set crucially determines the second set, was among thefew dominant paradigms that guided and conditioned (in the Kuhniansense) the progress in my field of research: cell and molecular biology.Indeed, such a notion was rooted in the fact that in rather simple biologicalsystems such as viruses and bacteria there is an almost direct correlationbetween the coding (informational) content of the genome and the result-ing phenotype. This lead to a widespread suggestion that organismiccomplexity was directly related to genomic complexity, therefore know-ing the genome was equal to knowing the organism. Thus, in the lasttwenty years a lot of effort and money was devoted to the sequencing ofwhole genomes from several micro and macro-organisms, including hu-mans. It cannot be ignored that many of the supporters of the HumanGenome Project had the reductionist hope that such a sequencing effortwould reveal the key to our human condition: The genes we have that arelacking in other species, and so directly responsible for our human oddproperties such as abstract thought or ethical concern 1.I presume that the search for a naturalistic ethics was also justified onthe basis of the aforementioned paradigm suggesting that some specifi-cally human genetic features, that evolved according to Darwinian naturalselection, are behind our capacity for establishing sets of standards bywhich to regulate our behavior, so as to distinguish what is acceptable inpursuit of our aims from what is not. In other words, this is tantamountto the following line of reasoning: Given the evidence indicating that bothflies and humans have genetic systems and that fly behavior is geneticallydetermined to a high degree, would not be the case that human behavioris also genetically determined? And if so, then ethics is just a by-productfrom the workings of natural selection acting upon the genome throughthe ages of evolution as evidenced by the game of survival of the fittest.Furthermore, the more recent Chimpanzee Genome Project was justifiedLaboratorio de Biologia Molecular, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad Autonoma del Estadode Mexico, Mexico. / aaa@uaemex.mxLast contribution in Ludus Vitalis: “It is worth to fit the social sciences in the same track as thestudy of biological evolution?” vol. VIII, num. 14, 2000, pp. 213-218.Ludus Vitalis, vol. XIV, num. 25, 2006, pp. 217-220.on the basis that comparison with the already sequenced human genomewould pinpoint human genes absent in the chimp’s genome or at leastspecific mutations in some crucial genes that may explain our humanness 1,2,including issues such as why do chimps may kill other members of theirspecies without showing any short or long-term remorse 3,4, while wehumans may also do the killing but risk in the process to become tormentedlike Raskolnikov. However, now we know that the fly has 13 600 genes whilea tiny, microscopic worm by the name of Caenorhabditis elegans has 19 000genes and a very simple climbing weed known as Arabidopsis thaliana hassome 25 000 genes. Mammals such as humans, chimps, rats and mice, arestuck at some 33 000 genes each 5,6. So there is no obvious correlationbetween actual gene number and organismic complexity, and certainly nocorrelation between gene number and organism behavior (just comparethe fly active behavior with the typical passivity of the vegetal condition).In September 2005, the full draft of the chimp’s genome was released 6 andso it became clear, after comparing that information with the humangenome, that there are no human-specific genes responsible for the obvi-ous intellectual differences between humans and chimps. Indeed, it seemsto be the case that humans have fewer genes than the chimps, and suchhuman genetic losses are behind some typically human features such aslack of body hair or delayed sexual maturation 7. Moreover, the currentevidence indicates there will be no human-specific gene for greed or anyother popular sin, nor genes for altruism or other unselfish behavior, andso our human capacities for sinning or self-immolation remain culturalfeatures not based on genetics, thus the search for a naturalistic ethicswould remain as a most unnatural project. As a rather skeptical observerof such efforts for linking gene evolution by natural selection with complexhuman cultural features, I must say that it has been a long time since Ilearned to ask the right level of questions to my experimental models:viruses, cells or rodents. So I feel quite comfortable asking to my biologicalmodels questions about the biochemical regulation of energy transfer, themolecular control of cell proliferation or the structural features of cellularageing. However, I never thought reasonable to search for the roots ofpoetry by doing experiments with rats.Thus I have always been baffled by scientists who claim to be studyingthe behavior of rats in a maze or termites in a mound so as to find the keyto understand the complexity of human societies. Nor I give much creditto scientific papers claiming to describe animal models of Alzheimerdisease, considering that as a physician I’m fully aware that the diagnosisof Alzheimer disease is not based on any specific biochemical or molecularcriteria but is a diagnosis established on the basis of cognitive impairmentmanifested in various ways such as trouble in remembering recent eventsand conversations, or the progressive loss of reading, writing and arith-218 / LUDUS VITALIS / vol. XIV / num. 25 / 2006metical abilities, things which cannot be evaluated neither in flies or mice.It is a fact, not worth of a specific research program to prove it, that thegenius of Shakespeare is better understood in literary terms than in termsof the quantum mechanics of the ink used by the bard to pen his works.Thus, for the sake of intellectual economy I suggest that as scientists weshould better stick to the principle of asking the right level of questions tothe right kind of model. This may help us to stop wasting our time withbogus science and bogus problems. Otherwise we may spend ages work-ing out the biochemistry of poetry or the moral dilemmas of ants.Thus coming back to the issue of a possible naturalistic ethics it seemsto me like pursuing a mirage. This do not means that I believe that ethicalbehavior is supernatural, transcendental or God-given. Nevertheless, asthe evidence goes, humans are the only beings aware of being in the worldas entities different from the world itself. This is the basic condition forhaving a personal history that goes from the very first moment of self-con-sciousness (which is by no means equal to the time of our animal birth) tothe last at the time of our death. Such is the substrate of ethics: mortalbeings with a personal history, that may give or take throughout theirindividual lives, that may destroy or respect nature, that may wage a waror let themselves to be killed in name of some abstract ideal. It is a fact thatchimps can learn to recognize themselves when reflected by a mirror 8, yetthere is a long way to go from there to true self-awareness. Our cerebralcortex is orders of magnitude more complex than the cerebral cortex of thechimpanzee. Yet a careful reading of the relevant scientific papers shows(hype in the opposite sense notwithstanding), that human brain complex-ity is not the result of novel human genes absent in the chimp’s genome,and the comparative survey of both human and chimp genomes indicatesthat no particular mutations in genes linked to neural development canexplain the huge anatomical differences between the human and thechimp brains 9. Leaving aside the genetic evidence, I concur with bothLudwig Wittgenstein and Kurt Gödel who suggested that there are notenough brain cells so as to explain the capabilities of the human mind, ableto solve problems and puzzles not solvable by even the most powerfulcomputers; just consider the proof of the first incompleteness theorem byGödel or the proof of the non-solvability of the halting problem by Turing.Hence human minds are neither computers nor physically determined bythe cellular components of the brain 10. This do not means that the humanmind is unnatural or divine, yet it points out that there is more in naturethan genes or cells in order to explain our complex human features. Thisfact enlarges the scientific landscape and encourages a fresher outlookregarding the study of the human mind, instead of walking in circlesaround simpler models that are rather useless for that purpose.ARANDA-ANZALDO / NATURALISTIC ETHICS? / 219Thus it happens that the human mind is quite a unique phenomenonupon this earth and so we have no parallel models available for its study,chimps notwithstanding. I think that the study of animal behavior is veryinteresting and rewarding in its own terms, yet is a kind of superstition toclaim that from such a study we may conclude anything really meaningfulabout complex human behavior. Obviously when certain peptides andhormones discharge in the brain and the gut of all mammals, includinghumans, they cause a feeling of hunger, and in the same way somehormones are behind the basic sexual desire in all mammals, while drugsthat mimic the action of endogenous molecular signals may modify hu-man mood and behavior. Yet, it is foolish to think that from such well-known biochemical facts we may eventually reach the actual explanationfor sexual fetishism or human gastronomy. So it would be rather absurdto analyze the chimpanzee’s diet in order to find the roots of the Frenchnouvelle cuisine!Ethical concern is a phenomenon related to human minds, thus it seemsto me that the investigation into the content of moral principles and virtuesand their justification must remain within the realm of humanity andhuman minds. Such is classical normative ethics that has always ap-proached the question in terms of the human condition.Corollary. Given that the available scientific evidence indicates the futil-ity of the search for a naturalistic ethics somehow sprouting from Darwin-ian evolution by natural selection, then we may conclude that moral actionis a human feature that has no foundation in genetics and is only deter-mined and conditioned by human will and ethical thinking rooted inhuman history and culture. Thus, sociobiology and Darwinian fundamen-talism notwithstanding, we are free and fully responsible for our deeds.REFERENCES1 Baltimore, D. 2001. “Our genome unveiled.” Nature, 409:814-816.2 Gunter, C. and Dhand, R. 2005. “The Chimpanzee genome.” Nature, 437:47.3 de Waal, F.B.M. 2005. “A century of getting to know the chimpanzee.” Nature,437:56-59.4 Hauser, M. 2005. “Our chimpanzee mind.” Nature, 437:60-61.5 Bork, P. and Copley, R. 2001. “The draft sequences: filling in the gaps.” Nature,409:818-820.6 The Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium. 2005. “Initial sequenceof the chimpanzee genome and comparison with the human genome.”Nature, 437:69-87.7 Li, W-H. and Saunders, M..L. 2005. “The chimpanzee and us.” Nature, 437:50-51.8 Anon. “Timeline: a brief history of chimps.” 2005. Nature, 437: 48-49.9 Hill, R.S. and Walsh, C.A. 2005. “Molecular insights into human brain evolu-tion.” Nature, 437:64-67.10 Wang, H. “Can minds do more than brains?” In: Nature’s Imagination (ed: JohnCornwell), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995.220 / LUDUS VITALIS / vol. XIV / num. 25 / 2006

Naturalistic ethics. Is there such a thing?

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Naturalistic ethics. Is there such a thing?

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