CEO Compensation Incentive and Income Growth Persistence

Abstract

【中文摘要】西方经济学界的主流观点认为,现金激励是短效激励机制,它有损于企业的长期业绩增长。建立长效激励机制,应该以股权基础的薪酬代替现金薪酬。西方的理论是建立在经理人市场有效的基础之上的。在经理人市场流通性不足的中国,本文的研究发现,现金激励也能发挥长效作用。以中国 2009~2014年 A 股非金融上市公司为样本的实证研究表明,现金激励与股权激励一样对提升企业利润增长的持续性具有实质性的正向影响。本文研究的意义在于修正了西方学术界的主流观点,有助于正确认识中国的薪酬激励实践。本文的研究结果对中国非上市公司薪酬激励实践具有较好的借鉴意义:非上市公司虽然难以实施股权激励制度,但是高强度的现金激励同样可以起到股权激励那样的长期性激励效果。 【Abstract】The mainstream view of Western economics is that cash incentive is a short-term incentive mechanism,which impairs the long-term performance growth of enterprises,and long-term incentive mechanism should be equity-based compensation instead of cash compensation. However,this paper finds that cash incentive can play a long-term incentive role:both cash incentives and equity incentives have substantially positive impact on the persistence of earnings. The significance of this study is to correct the mainstream views of Western scholars ,and make people understand China's compensation practices more accurately. The finding of this study is a good reference for the compensation practice of Chinese non-listed company:although it is difficult to implement equity incentive system,but strong cash incentive can also have the incentive effects of equity incentive.本文受国家自然科学基金项目“宏观经济政策、公司治理对企业创新的影响研究”(项目号:71372029)资助

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