Fair Value Manipulation to Avoid Loss and Earnings Decreases

Abstract

【中文摘要】已有文献证明了上市公司在盈余管理动机下的公允价值操纵行为,在此基础上检验操纵公允价值盈余管理的结果表现和实现路径有助于丰富现有研究。以我国 2010~2016 年年报中披露公允价值分层信息的 A 股(A-Shares,人民币普通股票)非金融类上市公司为样本,研究发现:非金融类上市公司以公允价值计量的金融资产规模的扩张显著提升了公允价值操纵对盈余管理的影响程度,既有助于管理者达成盈余管理目标,同时又增大了管理者操纵公允价值的偏好程度;第一、第二层次公允价值均被作为操纵对象,管理者通过调节与第一层次公允价值相关的已实现损益和第二层次公允价值相关的未实现损益来实现规避亏损和盈余下滑的盈余管理目的。 【Abstract】Prior research shows that managers manipulate a firm's fair value informationso as to manage the firm’s earnings.We further studythe different practices that a firm uses to manipulate its fair value information in achieving its earnings management objectives.Using fair value hierarchy information disclosed by non-financial firms listed in the Chinese A-share market,we find that the expansion of fair-value-based financial assets of non-financial listed companies has significantly increased the role of fair value manipulation in earnings management. Specifically,the expansion of fair-value-based financial assets not only helps managers achieve their earnings management objectives,but also increases managers’ preference for manipulating the fair value of financial assets. We show that managers manipulate both levels 1 and 2 fair value in that they avoid lossesand declining earnings by adjusting realized gains and losses related to the level 1 fair value and byadjusting unrealized gains and losses related to the level 2 fair value.本文为2014 年度教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目“公允价值分层披露的经济后果研究”(14YJA630042)的阶段性成果

    Similar works