张美霞(上海外国语大学国际金融贸易学院)；李增泉(上海财经大学会计与财务研究院) 。【中文摘要】政府常常利用税收手段影响上市公司的股利支付。本文以我国2010--2013 年沪深A股上市公司为样本，研究我国财政部、国家税务总局和中国证券监督管理委员会在 2012 年联合发布的红利差别化征税政策（财税85号文）对上市公司股利支付和投资者构成所产生的影响。研究发现：红利差别化征税政策实施后，采用现金形式支付股利的公司的数量和比例均增加了。同时，机构持股越多，每股股利越高；而那些每股支付较高的公司，也吸引了更多的机构投资者。但本文未能发现第一大股东和管理层借此增持股份或上市公司增加现金股利支付的证据。本文的研究结论表明，红利差别化征税政策具有积极效果；支持机构投资者的追随者效应，没有证实大股东的利益侵占假说。同时发现，长期持续分红的公司更倾向于稳定的每股支付政策；在公司存在再融资需求时，第一大股东和管理层持股比例越高，越可能限制股利的支付。
【Abstract】 Tax policies in China may be instituted to encourage listed firms to pay more cash to their stockholders. The Ministry of Finance enacted differential dividend tax rates on individual investors in 2012 (Rules No.85}. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies during 2010-2013 ，we study the effects of the new tax policy on the dividend payout of listed companies and the resulting dividend clienteles.The results show that after the introduction of Rules No.85 ，both the number and proportion of companies that pay cash dividends as well as the total payout ratio have greatly increased. We also find that companies with higher institutional holdings before the new tax policy increase their payouts and that companies with larger cash dividend distributions after the new tax policy attract more institutional investors.Nevertheless ，we neither found evidence that the largest shareholder and management increase their shares ，and nor evidence they promote their firm's payout in response to the new tax policy. The results lend support to the clientele effect hypothesis for institutional investors but not to the major stockholder expropriation hypothesis. Our results also show that companies with a long-term cash-paying history prefer to smooth payouts and that when companies need
external financing, shares held the largest shareholder and management are negatively related to dividend payouts when companies need external financing
