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农地征用、财政分权与制造业发展
Authors
宋小宁
杨治国
Publication date
10 November 2008
Publisher
Abstract
中国式财政分权使预算内财政资源集中于中央政府,进而导致承担诸多经济、社会、政治任务的地方政府设法筹集预算外财政收入,这主要通过农地征用实现。一方面,可以利用城市政府的强势地位用较低的征地补偿成本获得农村土地,再以出让的方式获得高额出让金;另一方面,利用征得的土地发展能对任期内经济增长和地方增值税、营业税收入有积极作用的制造业来取得较好的政绩。我们从地方政府官员追求政治租金最大化的角度刻画了这个政治经济学逻辑。国家自然科学基金项目“农村地区非对称型财政的机理分析和乡村财政制度设计”(项目编号:70573086)的阶段性成
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Last time updated on 10/06/2020