U tekstu se govori o mjestu, ulozi i odnosu predstavničkog sustava i neposredne demokracije unutar trijade političkog, legalnog i popularnog konstitucionalizma. Upućuje se i na ustavnoteorijsku i političku apologiju ustava i ustavnosti, posebno na ulogu ustavnog sudstva u kontekstu razloga i granica korištenja institucija neposredne demokracije unutar ustavnodemokratske organizacije vlasti suvremene države. Posebno se izlažu razlozi o tome zašto – prema autoru – ustavnodemokratsko shvaćanje teksta Ustava Republike Hrvatske ne registrira niske frekvencije sirenskog zova recentnih referendumskih inicijativa, (konkretno onih koje ciljaju na promjenu čl. 72. Ustava, a tiče se broja zastupnika u Hrvatskom saboru, i dopunu Ustava čl. 72.a o uskrati prava glasovanja zastupnicima iz redova nacionalnih manjina o povjerenju vladi i proračunu). Zaključak je autora da je riječ o pokušajima konstitucionalizacije redukcionističkih antiegalitarnih ideja aktualnog populističkog Sturm und Dranga. U tom i sličnom kontekstu Ustavni sud dobiva imperativnu zadaću obrane ustavnih vrednota od ekscesivnog aktivizma kako različitih demagoško- konzervativnih grupa tako i birokratiziranih a indiferentnih stranačkih formacija hrvatske predstavničke demokracije.This text is about the place, role and relation of the representative system and direct democracy within the triad of political, legal and populistic constitutionalism. Also, it is directed at constitutional-theoretical and political apology of constitution and constitutionalism. This is in particular at the role of constitutional judiciary within the context of the reasons and limits of using institutions of direct democracy within the constitutional democratic organisation of contemporary government powers. It, in particular, sets out the reasons for which, according to the author, constitutional democratic understanding of the text of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia does not register low frequencies of warning calls of recent referendum initiatives. Concretely, they are those which aim at change to art. 72 of the Constitution – number of representatives in Croatian parliament and amendments to Constitution art. 72a - on taking away the voting rights for national minority representatives to vote on confidence to the government and budget. It is the author’s conclusion that it is about attempts to constitutionalise reductionistic anti-egalitarian ideas of actual populistic Sturm und Drang. In this and similar contexts, the Constitutional Court acquires the imperative task of defending constitutional values from excessive activism and from both various demagogically-conservative groups and bureaucratic and indifferent party formations of Croatian representative democracy
