We live in a time when billions of IoT devices are being deployed and
increasingly relied upon. This makes ensuring their availability and
recoverability in case of a compromise a paramount goal. The large and rapidly
growing number of deployed IoT devices make manual recovery impractical,
especially if the devices are dispersed over a large area. Thus, there is a
need for a reliable and scalable remote recovery mechanism that works even
after attackers have taken full control over devices, possibly misusing them or
trying to render them useless.
To tackle this problem, we present Lazarus, a system that enables the remote
recovery of compromised IoT devices. With Lazarus, an IoT administrator can
remotely control the code running on IoT devices unconditionally and within a
guaranteed time bound. This makes recovery possible even in case of severe
corruption of the devices' software stack. We impose only minimal hardware
requirements, making Lazarus applicable even for low-end constrained
off-the-shelf IoT devices. We isolate Lazarus's minimal recovery trusted
computing base from untrusted software both in time and by using a trusted
execution environment. The temporal isolation prevents secrets from being
leaked through side-channels to untrusted software. Inside the trusted
execution environment, we place minimal functionality that constrains untrusted
software at runtime.
We implement Lazarus on an ARM Cortex-M33-based microcontroller in a full
setup with an IoT hub, device provisioning and secure update functionality. Our
prototype can recover compromised embedded OSs and bare-metal applications and
prevents attackers from bricking devices, for example, through flash wear out.
We show this at the example of FreeRTOS, which requires no modifications but
only a single additional task. Our evaluation shows negligible runtime
performance impact and moderate memory requirements.Comment: In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (ASIA CCS 20