Carreau, Dominique

English

University of Denver

Denver Journal of International Law & Policy Volume 12 Number 2 Spring Article 9 May 2020 Le droit de l'integration economique socialiste Dominique Carreau Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp Recommended Citation Dominique Carreau, Le droit de l'integration economique socialiste, 12 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 307 (1983)(book review). This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. BOOK REVIEWLe droit de l'int6gration 6conomiquesocialisteReviewed by Dominique Carreau*R. BYSTRICKY, LE DROIT DE L'INT7tGRATION ACONOMIQUE SOCIALISTM; Sijthoff &Noordhoff, Leiden, The Netherlands (1979); available in the United Statesfrom Kluwer Boston, Inc., 190 Old Derby St., Hingham, Mass. 02043; $48.00;ISBN 90-286-0339-5; xii, 471 pp.; footnotes, appendix, bibliography, index.In Le droit de l'int~gration 6conomique socialiste Professor Bys-tricky critically analyzes the theory and practice of the socialist economicintegration. Regional economic integration is a prominent feature of con-temporary international relations. Small- or medium-sized nations formregional groups in order to create a large market for their goods. Produc-ers capable of doing so will expand their production when such a marketis available, and lower costs of production will result because of econo-mies of scale. Therefore, more goods will be available in the regional mar-ket at lower prices, and the producers will be more competitive in theworld market as well. Continental-size states such as Brazil, China, India,the United States, and the U.S.S.R., enjoy a marked advantage oversmaller nations. For small- and medium-sized nations the choice is crystalclear-either they form regional economic groups with their neighbors orthey will have no economic clout in the world. The framers of the post-World War II international trade charters fully recognized this choice andsaw the necessity of regional economic groupings. Thus, article XXIV ofthe G.A.T.T. 1 expressly legitimizes international economic integrations,provided they take the form of either free trade areas or customs unionsand that they adhere to certain principles designed to make them tradecreating and not trade diverting.2Regional economic integrations are numerous. No continent has re-mained unaffected by the move toward unification. Regardless of their* Dominique Carreau is a Professor of Law at the University of Paris I, and a memberof the Board of Advisors of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy.1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. xxiv, 61 Stat. Pts. 5 & 6,T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.2. Id. The distinction between trade creating and trade diverting was made famous byU.S. economist Jacob Viner in the 1950's. See generally J. ViNmi, THE CUSTOMS UNION IS-SUE (1950).DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Ylevel of development or their domestic economic or political organization,most nations are members of some kind of regional economic group. How-ever, not all economic groups are alike. In this respect, a basic distinctionmust be drawn between groups formed solely for economic cooperationand those which reflect true economic integration. True integration im-plies a surrender of sovereignty on the part of the group's members,whereas economic cooperation does not imply such a surrender of sover-eignty. It is not surprising that relatively few regional groups based onthe concept of strict economic integration between member states havebeen formed. Nations are usually reluctant to give up their sovereigntyeven if that surrender of power is limited to the economic sphere. More-over, regional integrations cannot be exclusively circumscribed to eco-nomic matters, and the formation of any regional group entails obviouspolitical consequences. It is no secret that the fathers of the Europeaneconomic reconstruction after World War II desired a political integrationof Europe as well as an economic one. In setting up economic integrationinstitutions' they pursued the goal, some would say the dream, of politi-cal integration. They hoped that some sort of "United States of Europe"would evolve.4 Ever since, within the European Economic Community(EEC), Member States and theoreticians have been divided over the issueof integration; some favor a "supranational" Europe, e.g., organized onthe model of a federal state, and some favor a "Europe of States," e.g., anorganization in which each member retains as many sovereign powers aspossible.5Eastern European socialist countries also formed a regional economicorganization shortly after World War IIs to help solve their economicproblems. The organization, commonly known as COMECON,' was veryinactive during the first two decades or so of its existence. The turningpoint for COMECON came with the adoption in 1971 of a voluminous"Comprehensive Program for the further deepening and perfecting of co-operation and development of the socialist economic integration betweenparticipating members." Professor Bystricky's book, and this constitutesits principal merit, forcefully demonstrates the uniqueness of the socialistintegration. COMECON is radically different from the EEC despite someoutward similarities.Professor Bystricky's main line of argument is that political consider-ations are responsible for the economic integration of socialist countries,3. Such institutions include EURATOM, the European Coal and Steel Community andthe European Economic Community.4. See W.F. FELD, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS COLLABORATION AMONG COMMON LAWCOUNTRIES: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION (1970); R. PRYCE, THE POLITICS OFTHE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1973).5. See W.F. FELD, TRANSNATIONAL BUSIrNSS COLLABORATION AMONG COMMON LAWCouNTRucs: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION (1970).6. R. BYSTmCKY, LE DROrr DE L'IN TGRATION *CONOMIQUE SOCIALiSTE 7 (1979).7. This acronym stands for the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.8. R. BySTRICKY, supra note 6, at 8.VOL. 12:2-3BOOK REVIEWwhile the Treaty of Rome9 creating the EEC primarily relies on privateeconomic forces and interests to achieve a "common market." Whetherthe factor responsible for integration is governmental fiat or private eco-nomic forces, economic and political factors cannot remain isolated. Theauthor correctly remarks that the economic achievements of COMECONcountries remain disappointing if compared to those attained in the West,while the EEC, albeit an economic success, has more or less come to ahalt for lack of political will to achieve a greater degree of integration.Professor Bystricky attributes the impressive political achievements ofthe socialist community to the leadership of the Communist Party in eachcountry. The Communist Party represents a real "supranational power"that is presently missing within the ten-nation EEC.Among the main sources of COMECON regional law are the generallaws of socialist construction which provide for the collective ownershipof all means of production, strict economic planning, democratic central-ism, state monopoly of foreign trade, and the dominant role of the Com-munist Party.10 However, it is the Soviet Union's interpretation of social-ism which is considered to be the true embodiment of these generalprinciples. Thus, Professor Bystricky maintains that the COMECONstructure is imposed on its member states by the Soviet Union in order tofoster its own political and military interests, and that COMECON's gen-eral underlying principles conveniently aid the Soviet Union in dominat-ing its smaller socialist partners. All deviations from the Soviet view ofsocialism may be crushed by relying on the omnipresent and pervadingprinciple of "socialist internationalism." According to this principle, allnational interests must be subordinated to those of the workers' interna-tional revolutionary movement." Thus, when the so-called socialist"achievements" are threatened in a given COMECON member state, thesocialist community has the right, if not the obligation, to intervene evenby military means to protect such gains.1 2 Hence, the Soviet interventionsin Berlin in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.COMECON members possess only a limited sovereignty which must bowin case of conflict to the general laws of socialist construction as theselaws are superior to the national laws within the countries of the Commu-nist bloc. 8 This position is maintained notwithstanding the recognizedprinciple of international law of the sovereign equality of states. One canagree with the author when he points out that such a position is entirelyincompatible with the present state of international law. However, it9. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for signature Nov.23, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.10. R. BYSTRICKY, supra note 6, at 44-45.11. Id. at 96-97.12. Id. at 98.13. Id. at 112. The substance of this doctrine was contained in a remark made by Leo-nid Brezhnev in 1968. Alluding to the Soviet invasion of Hungary, he stated: "The U.S.S.R.cannot be and will never be indifferent to the destiny of the socialist construction in othercountries or to the cause of world communism." Id.1983DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'owould have been interesting to raise the question of whether the limitedsovereignty concept could be viewed as a norm of jus cogens. This wouldmost likely be the socialist defense of this concept, but, in the mind ofthis reviewer, such an assertion cannot be legally argued with persuasion.Finally, it is sometimes difficult to agree with all the conclusionsreached by Professor Bystricky about the political and systemic aspectsof COMECON. For instance, he states that "the law of the mightiest isthe rule within the socialist community" '14 and implies that, in the yearsto come, COMECON's smaller members will actually have a status analo-gous to that of federated republics within the U.S.S.R. 15 These state-ments constitute unwarranted conclusions that cannot be accepted.Professor Bystricky is more perceptive when he draws attention tothe double-talk phenomenon which so puzzles Westerners and whichmars their comprehension of socialist institutions. For instance, when onereads COMECON's constitutive instruments, one has the impression thatwhat the framers had in mind was to create an institution based simplyon cooperation among members rather than an institution with suprana-tional organs whose purpose is economic and political integration. Theauthor aptly demonstrates that the way COMECON actually operates isentirely different from the way its organizational instruments indicate itshould operate, and that one should not be confused by the official termi-nology. Thus, a true integration is the purpose of COMECON, and itspolicies are founded on supranationality principles even though this con-cept was officially rejected by the Comprehensive Program of 1971.' Toillustrate his thesis, Bystricky points out the fact that COMECON-cre-ated law is supreme over national law and sometimes becomes part ofnational law with no other action on the part of the country, that someimportant economic sectors are jointly planned, and that the unanimityrequired in the COMECON decisionmaking process progressively becamefictitious and was phased out by the Comprehensive Program of 1971.17Furthermore, as noted above, the leading role of the Communist Partiesand the common ideology in the COMECON nations together with the"socialist internationalism" principle are instrumental in developing a so-cialist community which does not recognize national boundaries, which istruly supranational. Thus, the author reaches the paradoxical, albeit ac-curate, conclusion that the Treaty of Rome creating the EEC enshrines asupranationality principle, but its working has consistently been blockedfor lack of political will. On the other hand, COMECON's ComprehensiveProgram of 1971 officially rejects all supranational references, but, in real-ity, COMECON's evolution clearly shows that the socialist integration isguided by the principle of supranationality.14. Id. at 334.15. Id. at 324.16. Id. at 89.17. Id. at 41-44.VOL. 12:2-3BOOK REVIEWEqually puzzling for a Western lawyer is the legal nature of recom-mendations adopted by COMECON organs. In theory, and in conformitywith the commonly accepted rules of international law, they are not bind-ing on member states. According to Bystricky, they are similar to interna-tional treaties or EEC regulations. To this reviewer, it would seem prefer-able to equate them to the Organization for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment council decisions that bind interested members only. Thefact is that COMECON recommendations constitute obligatory legalnorms for participating Member States.18Professor Bystricky's book provides interested readers with a preciseand concise description of COMECON organs and accomplishments. Un-fortunately, Professor Bystricky's treatment of East-West joint venturesis brief and superficial, particularly in view of the fact that these jointventures represent one of the most promising modes of transideologicalcooperation. Perhaps this treatment of the subject reflects the author'sdeep-rooted feeling that economic integrations between socialist and capi-talist nations are an impossible dream.Finally, in his concluding remarks, Professor Bystricky touches upona controversial topic. He states that the COMECON nations have notachieved true socialism but have only copied the Soviet Union's versionof socialism which would be described by some as state capitalism and byothers, including this reviewer, as the kind of oriental despotism analyzedby Karl Marx. 9 Bystricky's further criticisms of the socialist system andCOMECON are equally unflattering. The tone is set, and it is notdispassionate.18. Id. at 34-40.19. Id. at 338.1983

Le droit de l\u27integration economique socialiste

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1985&amp;context=djilp

Le droit de l\u27integration economique socialiste

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

University of Denver