Open futurism is the indeterministic position according to which the future is \u2018open\u2019, i.e., there is now no fact of the matter as to what future contingent events will actually obtain. Many open futurists hold a branching conception of time, in which a variety of possible futures exist. This paper introduces two challenges to branching-time open futurism, which are similar in spirit to a challenge posed by Fine to (standard) tense realism. The paper argues that, to address the new challenges, (branching-time) open futurists must (1) adopt an objective, non-perspectival notion of actuality and (2) subscribe to an A-theoretic, dynamic conception of reality. Moreover, given a natural understanding of \u201cactual future\u201d, (3) it is perfectly sensible for open futurists to hold that a unique, objectively actual future exists, contrary to a common assumption in the current debate. The paper also contends that recognising the existence of a unique actual future helps open futurists to avoid potential misconceptions
