In this paper social dilemmas are modelled as two-player games. In particular we model
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken and Stag Hunt. When modelling these games we
assume that players adapt their behaviour according to their experience and look for
outcomes that have proved to be satisfactory in the past. These ideas are investigated by
conducting several experiments with an agent-based simulation model in which agents
use a simple form of case-based reasoning. It is shown that cooperation can emerge from
the interaction of selfish case-based reasoners. In determining how often cooperation
occurs, not only what Agents end up doing in any given situation is important, but also
the process of learning what to do can crucially influence the final outcome. Agents’
aspiration thresholds play an important role in that learning process. It is also found that
case-based reasoners find it easier to cooperate in Chicken than in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and Stag Hunt
