Eyes on the Prize: An (Interactive) Eye-Tracking Study of Motives in Economic Interactions

Abstract

We investigate how untrained observers use decision makers’ gaze patterns to uncover motives behind their decisions. Gaze patterns can reveal motives, as decision makers dedicate more attention to items particularly relevant for these motives. We display either non-strategic or strategic gaze patterns of decision makers to observers and let the latter infer the former’s motives and actions. While the non-strategic gaze patterns provide strategically undisturbed information, the strategic gaze patterns require taking the future consequences of the interaction into account. When the gaze is non-strategic, observers can recognize the more prosocial and generous decision makers. In contrast, when the gaze is strategic, the eye-tracked decision makers successfully alter their gaze to appear more prosocial. Consequently, less prosocial decision makers are chosen for future interaction more often, leading to increased payoffs for them and decreased payoffs for the observers