Winslow, Veloyce G.

English

UND Scholarly Commons (University of North Dakota)

North Dakota Law Review Volume 27 Number 4 Article 4 1951 Automobiles - Bankruptcy - Validity of Provisions in Motor Vehicles Financial Responsibility Act Denying Effect to Discharges in Bankruptcy Veloyce G. Winslow Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr  Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Winslow, Veloyce G. (1951) "Automobiles - Bankruptcy - Validity of Provisions in Motor Vehicles Financial Responsibility Act Denying Effect to Discharges in Bankruptcy," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 27 : No. 4 , Article 4. Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol27/iss4/4 This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. RECENT CASESRECENT CASESAUTOMOBILES--BANKRUPTCY-VALIDITY OF PROVISIONS INMOTOR VEHICLES FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACTS DENY-ING EFFECT TO DISCHARGES IN BANKRUPTCY.-A judgmenthad been obtained against plaintiff for negligently operating an auto-mobile. After obtaining a discharge in bankruptcy, he applied for adriver's license. The Michigan Secretary of State refused the applica-tion, relying on a Michigan statute which provides, "A discharge inbankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment shall notrelieve the judgment debtor from any of the requirements" of theMotor Vehicles Financial Responsibility Act.' Plaintiff, applying fora writ of mandamus, contended the act was unconstitutional as anattempt to alter the Federal Bankruptcy Act.' It was held that thewrit would not be granted. The discharge in bankruptcy did not endplaintiff's moral obligation to pay, and the state could require fulfill-ment of the moral obligation as a condition precedent to granting thelicense by virtue of its inherent power to regulate the use of thepublic highways.! De Vries v. Alger, 329 Mich. 68, 44 N.W.2d 872(1950).Earlier cases reached a contrary result,' holding that a state hasno power to make exceptions to the operation of a discharge in bank-ruptcy. However, in 1941 the Supreme Court of the United States,four justices dissenting, held that such a provision was a valid meansof enforcing a public policy aimed at eliminating financially irrespon-sible drivers from the highways, and thus not in derogation of theBankruptcy Act.' This appears to be the sole exception which thecourts have been willing to make to the operation of a discharge inbankruptcy. The usual result in such situations is illustrated byan early case' holding that a municipality which had enacted anordinance allowing discharge of employees for failure to pay debtscould not discharge a fireman who had obtained a discharge in1 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 300, § 513 (1949).11 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.Accord, Munz v. Harnett, 6 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (discharge inbankruptcy is not satisfaction of a judgment, but only bars the creditor'sremedies for collection) (statute specifically provided that discharge inbankruptcy should not satisfy judgment).4 In re Perkins, 3 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. N.Y. 1933) (denying plaintiff fulleffect of discharge in bankruptcy was in conflict with Bankruptcy Act,thus invalid) (discussed in 43 Yale LJ. 344); Ellis v. Rudy, 171 Md. 280,289 Ad. 281 (1937) (not legislative intent to apply the law to judgmentdebtors who had been discharged in bankruptcy).Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941) (due process not violated if stategives a plaintiff an additional means of enforcing payment of a judgmentby dealing with the license and registration of the driver).6 In re Hicks, 133 Fed. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1905).NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEWbankruptcy. Statutes of the type found in the instant case' aresubject to the criticism that, standing alone, they fail to give protec-tion to the judgment creditor who has already been injured. NorthDakota meets this situation by allowing recourse to an unsatisfiedjudgment fund when the judgment debtor has no resources withwhich to pay, and the judgment is more than $300.00 and less than$10,000.00.' Massachusetts has met the situation by requiring com-pulsory liability insurance of all drivers.9 This method, however, isopen to the objection that it amounts to a subsidization of insurancecompanies or represents an instance of the state itself going into theinsurance business. Nevertheless, it would appear that the require-ment of compulsory liability insurance offers greater protection, atleast in the case of residents of the state, than an unsatisfied judg-ment fund, since there is no minimum amount which is not covered.Veloyce G. Winslow.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER OF MUNICIPALITY-VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE DECLARING DOOR-TO-DOOR SOLI-CITING A NUISANCE-Appellant, representing a national magazinesubscription company in charge of a crew of solicitors, was sentencedand fined by appellee city for violation of a city ordinance declaringthat the going in and upon private residences within the city bysolicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendorsof merchandise without request or invitation, for the soliciting oforders or sale or disposal of their merchandise to be a misdemeanorand punishable as such. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld theconviction and fine, whereupon appellant attacked the constitution-ality of the ordinance in the United States Supreme Court. In findingthe ordinance constitutional, over two dissents, the court held that itwas not violative of due process, commerce clause or freedom ofspeech and press. While admitting that the knocker on the door isan invitation or license to attempt an entry, the court decided thatfrequent visits become a nuisance. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 71S.Ct. 920 (1951).Here involved is the ordinance commonly known in both lay andlegal circles as the Green River ordinance because of its origin inGreen River, Wyoming, in 1931. Its widespread adoption has produceda sharp conflict between the local police power and persons engagedin businesses which go directly to the prospective customer in hishome. It represents a phase of the municipal police power whichconcededly is justified insofar as it relates to public health, morals,N.D. Rev. Code c. 39-16 (Supp. 1949).S N.D. Rev. Code c. 39-17 (Supp. 1949).Mass. Gen. Laws c. 90 (Tercent. ed. 1932).

Automobiles - Bankruptcy - Validity of Provisions in Motor Vehicles Financial Responsibility Act Denying Effect to Discharges in Bankruptcy

https://commons.und.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3519&context=ndlr

Automobiles - Bankruptcy - Validity of Provisions in Motor Vehicles Financial Responsibility Act Denying Effect to Discharges in Bankruptcy

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

UND Scholarly Commons (University of North Dakota)