Jeffries, Richard N.

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UND Scholarly Commons (University of North Dakota)

North Dakota Law Review Volume 45 Number 1 Article 4 1968 Automobiles - Liability of Manufacturers or Sellers - Automobile Manufacturer's Liability for Negligent Design Richard N. Jeffries Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr  Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Jeffries, Richard N. (1968) "Automobiles - Liability of Manufacturers or Sellers - Automobile Manufacturer's Liability for Negligent Design," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 45 : No. 1 , Article 4. Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol45/iss1/4 This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. RECENT CASESAUTOMOBILES-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS OR SELLERS-AUTO-MOBILE MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT DESIGN-The plain-tiff instituted this action to recover damages for personal injuriesreceived by him when the automobile in which he was riding wasstruck in the rear by an automobile manufactured by the defend-ant and being driven at a speed exceeding one hundred miles perhour. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in itsdesign and manufacture of an automobile which was capable ofbeing driven at such a dangerous speed. The plaintiff appealedfrom dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim upon whichrelief might be granted. The Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit,with one dissenting opinion, held that the automobile manufacturerwas not liable on the theory that the manufacturer had a duty todesign an automobile incapable of causing injury through foresee-able misuse for a purpose for which the automobile was neversupplied. Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968).Beginning with the landmark case, MctcPherson v. Buick MotorCo.,1 courts have held that a manufacturer is liable for loss causedby the negligent construction of an automobile.2 But in a numberof situations the automobile which is involved in the accident ismade as intended and no defect in construction exists. The auto-mobile may be functioning perfectly after the accident. In thistype of case the plaintiff has attempted to show that loss wascaused by a negligent design.8 Here, too, in Schemel the plaintiffwas not alleging that some defect existed in the construction ofthe automobile which prevented the driver from operating it ata lesser speed. For example, there was no allegation that the ac-celerator stuck or that a defect in the brakes caused the accident.Obviously, if the plaintiff can show negligence in design he notonly has established the requisite fault but also that the defectexisted when the automobile left the manufacturer's hands. Whereasif it is alleged that a particular item was defective in its construc-tion, the plaintiff may be defeated for lack of proof that the alleged1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).2. Necaise v. Chrysler Corp., 335 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1964): Ford Motor Co. v.Mathis, 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963); Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 820 F.2d 130, 132(3rd Cir. 1963) ; Northern v. General Motors Corp., 2 Utah 2d 9, 268 P.2d 981 (1954).3. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); General MotorsCorp. v. Muncy, 367 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1037 (1967) ; Evansv. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966) cert. denied, 885 U.S. 836 (1966).RECENT CASESdefect did not arise after some use (or misuse) while in the handsof the ultimate consumer.4The court in Schemel relies primarily on its previous decisionin Evans v. General Motors Corp.5 in which recovery was deniedbecause the use of the automobile was improper. The plaintiff'sdecedent was killed when the left side of the automobile collapsedon him after a collision with another automobile. The plaintiffalleged that their automobile was designed with an "X" framewhich did not have side frame rails to protect a driver involved ina side impact collision. The court in Evans made the followingobservation:The intended purpose of an automobile does not includeits participation in collisions with other objects despite themanufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that suchcollisions may occur.8Clearly, a collision is not an intended purpose of an automobile.The underlying policy which the court in Evans seems to be pro-moting is that an automobile manufacturer discharges his duty ifhe produces a product designed to meet normal uses and he isnot required to anticipate abnormal uses. Evans refuses to extendthe responsibility of the manufacturer. The court states that themanufacturer need not make its automobile "accident proof."'7Following Evans, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Larsenv. General Motors Corp.8 reversed and remanded a decision ofa Minnesota United States District Court which had given judgmentfor General Motors Corporation. In Larsen the plaintiff receivedpersonal injuries while driving a Chevrolet Corvair. A head-on col-lision caused a severe rearward thrust of the steering mechanisminto the plaintiff's head. Liability was asserted against GeneralMotors Corporation on an alleged design defect in the steeringassembly.0 General Motors, relying on Evans, contended that ithad no duty to produce a vehicle in which it would be safe tocollide. The court, however, expanded the duty of the automobilemanufacturer. The court delcared the duty to be one of reasonablecare in the design of its vehicle and to avoid subjecting the userto an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision. 10 The4. See generally Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design,Instructions, or Warnings, 19 Sw. L. J. 48 (1965).5. Supra note 3.6. Evans v. General Motors Corp., aupra note 8, at 826.7. Evans v. General Motors Corp., supra note 3, at 824.8. Supra note 3.9. The plaintiff alleged that the design and placement of the steering shaft exposedthe driver to an unreasonable risk of injury. In effect, the shaft acted as a spear aimedat a vital -Dart of the driver's anatomy. The plaintiff contended that because of the designdefect he received injuries that he would not have otherwise received. Or In the alter-native, he alleged that his injuries would not have been as severe.10. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., supra note 3, at 502.NORTH DAKOTA LAW REViEWcourt in Larsen circumvented Evans by stating that while auto-mobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with one another,this is a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobileuse."It is interesting to note that in Evans and Larsen the facts arequite similar; yet, two different results are reached. The factsare similar since in both cases it was not contended by the plaintiffthat the alleged design defect caused the accident. In both, thecause of the accident was a collision and the alleged design defectonly increased the severity of the injuries.Commencing with the year 1957 many automobiles were pro-duced with extreme and exaggerated tail fins on which certainunfortunate pedestrians became impaled. No duty was found owingto the pedestrians by the automobile manufacturers for this allegednegligent design.12 In the area of non-automobile design litigation,however, the manufacturers have been held liable for harm causedby the product when it is used not for its intended purpose but forsome other purpose which the manufacturer might have reasonablyforeseen."sCertainly, it is also foreseeable that the automobile manufac-turer's product may be driven into bodies of water. Then underthe plaintiff's reasoning in Schemel the manufacturer would havea duty to equip its automobiles with pontoons. 14 In the instant caseit is also foreseeable that irresponsible motorists will operate theirvehicles at unlawful and excessive speeds, but the court refusesto confer a duty upon the defendant manufacturer to design itsautomobiles with governors.While the courts have been willing to protect users of auto-mobiles from negligent construction, " this willingness to protecthas not extended into the area of negligent design. 6 Cases in which11. rd. at 502.12. Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F.Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963); Hatch v. Ford MotorCo., 163 Cal. App.2d 393, 329 P.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1958). Both cases involved minorscolliding with a parked automobile. In Hatch the minor collided with the radiator or-nament; in Kahn, the minor collided with the rear tail fin. Both courts denied liabilityas a matter of law for the alleged negligent design.13. Blohm v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 880 F.2d 841 (10th Cir. 1967) (collapsible mobilederrick rig) ; Spruill v. Boyle-Midway Inc., 808 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962) (furniture polish) ;Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. ADp.2d 650, 235 P.2d 857 (Ct. App.1951) (Chair); cf. Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966). aert.dentied, 386 U.S. 1036 (1966) (bulldozer).14. This was one of General Motors' arguments in the Evans case. While this par-ticular breach .of duty has not yet been alleged, interestingly enough, a year after Etanwas decided, an unsuccessful plaintiff in a lower court brought an action against GeneralMotors on the theory that it had a duty to design an automobile that would be fireproofafter a collision. Shumard v. General Motors Corp.. 270 F.Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967).15. Supra note 2.16. Evans v. General Motors Corp., eupra note 8; General Motors Corp. v. Munoy,supra note 3. Contra Larsen v. General Motors Corp., supra note S.RECENT CASES 103plaintiffs have had more success in negligent design litigation haveinvolved not automobiles but other various "motor vehicles.' 11The courts perhaps feel a reluctance to let a jury comprisedof laymen evaluate and judge the product design conceived andproduced by experts in the field. If this is so, the argument is notparticularly cogent as juries have decided other cases involvingexpert testimony and presumably have reached a just result. Ifthe courts are reluctant to find the manufacturer liable for fearof the burden of increased cost to the manufacturer, that costwould no doubt be passed on to the ultimate consumer anywaythrough the increased prices of automobiles.5The feeling on the part of some courts is that if liability fornegligence in design is to be extended this is a responsibility forthe legislature to assume. 19 Indeed the legislature has assumedsome of this responsibility. In 1966 the President signed into lawthe National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 20 The statedpurpose of the Act is to reduce traffic accidents and deathsand injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents.2 1 The Actempowers the Secretary of Commerce 22 to prescribe appropriateand objective motor vehicle standards. 2 Compliance with the stand-ards by the manufacturer, however, will not settle the questionof common law liability24 but the violation of these minimumstandards might be evidence of failure to use due care. That Con-gress contemplated the problem of automobile design is clearlyreflected in Section 1391 of the Act. 25 The judiciary will be facedwith the question of negligent design in any case in which theprescribed standards are not met; also, in any case in which thestandards are perhaps inadequate.North Dakota, in a case decided in 1965, recognized a plaintiff'sclaim for negligence in construction against a truck-tractor manu-facturer.2 In another case involving a suit against the manufacturer17. Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3rd Cir. 1954) (bus) ;Clark v. Zurich Truck Lines, 844 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (truck); but seeGossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966) (truck).18. See generally 52 IA. L. REV. 956 (1966-1967).19. Evans v. General Motors Corp., suvrG note 3, at 824; Shummard v. General MotorsCorp., supra note 14, at 313.20. 80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. § 1381-1425 (Supp. II. 1967).21. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (Supp. 11, 1967).22. 15 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. II, 1967), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1652 (f) (1) (Supp.II, 1967). The Secretary of Transportation now carries out the provisions of the Actthrough the National Traffic Safety Bureau.23. 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (a) (Supp. JI, 1967).24. 15 U.S.C. § 1397 (c) (Supp. 1I, 1967).25. 15 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. II, 1967). "Motor Vehicle Safety means the performanceof motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment in such a manner that the public is pro-tected against unreasonable risk of accidents occuring as a result of the devign, con-struction or performance of motor vehicles .... "26. Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965). Plaintiff purchaseda new 1960 Chevrolet 2% ton truck tractor from one of the defendant manufacturer'esdealers. Plaintiff alleged negligence in the manufacture and construction of the vehicleand also breach of warranty. The North Dakota Supreme Court said that plaintiffsNORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEWof a potato harvesting machine, the court does indicate in itsopinion that the duty of a manufacturer extends to product design.27Automobile design reflects a basic public policy question. Thedesign of a complex product such as an automobile takes intoaccount safety of operation. However, this safety objective competeswith other public demands of the manufacturer's product. Thesedemands are economy, style, and speed and performance. It seemsthat if Schemel's case had gone to the jury that causation wouldhave been extremely difficult to prove. Arguably, the driver ofthe automobile manufactured by General Motors Corporation couldbe considered an intervening force cutting off the chain of causation.Perhaps it would be desirable to restrict the speed and perform-ance capabilities of an automobile as suggested by the plaintiffin Schemel. However, it is doubtful that the judiciary will everimpose the duty. Clearly, the legislature has not chosen to do so. 28RICHARD N. JEFFRIESLIMITATION OF ACTIONS-PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-MAL-PRACTIcE-Two doctors performed a Caesarean section operationon the plaintiff, and left a surgical sponge inside her body. Believingshe had a tumor, the plaintiff underwent surgery more than fouryears later, and the sponge was then discovered. The plaintifffiled suit for malpractice against the doctors, but the DistrictCourt, Lubbock County, granted defendant's motion for a summaryjudgment based on the two-year Statute of Limitations. This judg-ment was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court of Texas, twojudges dissenting,1 reversed the judgments of the trial and ap-pellate courts, and remanded the cause for trial. The court heldthat the Statute of Limitations does not commence to run untilthe cause of action is discovered, rather than when the negligenceoccurred. Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967).The primary question raised in this case is whether the Statuteof Limitations regarding a malpractice action begins to run at thetime of the operation, or at the time the negligent act is dis-complaint did state a cause of action on either a theory of negligence or implied war-ranty. The main issue In the case, however, concerned the manufacturer's defense ofprivity of contract which the court did not allow.27. Lindenberg v. Folson, 138 N.W.2d 573 (N.D. 1965).28. 33 Fed. Reg. 6465-6470 (1968). Some of the recent safety standards have to dowith the following: door latches, hinges, and locks; windshield wiping and washingsystems; windshield defrosting and defogging systems; headlamp concealment devices;and hood latch systems.1. Griffin and Walker, J. Griffin stated that to adopt the discovery doctrine wouldlead to hopeless confusion and destroy the "cut-off" point which the legislature hadalready established. He felt that the court had no right to pass leglslatlon to Changethe Statute of Limitations.104

Automobiles - Liability of Manufacturers or Sellers - Automobile Manufacturer\u27s Liability for Negligent Design

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Automobiles - Liability of Manufacturers or Sellers - Automobile Manufacturer\u27s Liability for Negligent Design

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